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AFRICA SOUTH

IN EXILE

ol. 5 No. 1 Oct.—Dec. 1960

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by Dennis Kiley

THE CONGO CRISIS
Articles by Colin Legum and Frank Barber

NIGERIA AND TOMORROW'S AFRICA
by Akin Mabogunje

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VOL. 5 No. 1 EDITOR : RONALD M. SEGAL OCT.—DEC. 1960

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AFRICA SOUTH is published quarterly by Africa South Publications (England) Ltd. Editorial and Advertising Offices are at Abford House, Wilton Rd, London, S.W.1, England. Price per issue 4s.; 16s. per year, post free in Africa, Europe, Australia and the United Kingdom. In the United States, promotion offices are located at 336 Summit Ave., Mount Vernon, New York, N.Y., and subscriptions should be sent to Mrs. M. Singer at that address. Price per issue 75c; $3 per year, post free. Entered as second-class matter at the Post Office at New York, N.Y. Price per issue in West Africa 4s.; 16s. per year, post free. Representative, Mr. E. Mphahlele, University College, Ibadan, Nigeria. Price per issue in East Africa 4s. Representative, Miss Frene Ginwala, Box 807, Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika. Price per issue in South Asia Rs. 2.50; Rs. 10 per year, post free. Representatives, Messrs. K. V. G. de Silva & Sons, 415 Galle Road, Colombo 4, Ceylon.

THE HEART OF DARKNESS

FROM the moment that the Congo Republic gained statutory independence from Belgium, the territory would seem to have exploded into violence and disorder. With few exceptions, newspapers throughout the West and settler Africa reported widespread raping and assaults, with photographs of white refugees in contortions of fury and distress. One may discount, of course, many of the press dispatches; there was a circumstantial hysteria about them which suggested that the evidence had been hurled into some vast echoing chamber to be caught by the correspondents round the rim, while the more lurid had a rather too well-thumbed look, as though they had been taken from a file on revolutionary atrocities to be dusted off and speedily retouched. It is unlikely that the number of white women raped, if it can ever be adequately established, will turn out to be large; the white dead do not yet touch a dozen. Indeed, one may wonder whether, of all the Congo atrocities, the press reports did not constitute the worst.

Violence there has clearly been, however, and denouncing those exaggerations which appear to have been deliberately scattered in order to excuse Belgian re-occupation of the Congo cannot deny it. It is significant that most of the anti-white assaults were against Flemish-speaking settlers, whose reputation for racial tyranny was loud throughout the Congo, and against the families of Belgian army officers, who had clearly earned more rancour than regard from the African troops they had commanded. Yet this, of course, is only a small part of the explanation. Anti-white violence was a reprisal not just for individual acts of racial arrogance, but for history.

The white liberal in the Union of South Africa is distrusted by many Africans precisely because his humanism is so often patronage, because he thinks in terms of principles and not of people. He expects those Africans whose struggles he supports to show their deserts by conducting themselves with a dignity and self-discipline that the whites only too obviously fail to exhibit. But Africans are, after all, just as capable of dignity and discipline, of despair and the fury of despair, as their circumstances permit or encourage them to be. When police respond to their protests and petitions with shots, they respond to the shots with stones and a wild, helpless burning of all that

is linked in their minds with white dominion. Oppression deforms, no less the oppressed than the oppressors, in a terror of survival. And when Sir Edgar Whitehead, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, arrests the leaders of peaceful African resistance to his rule, because they have the dignity to resist it at all and the discipline to resist it in words, Africans in Salisbury and Bulawayo riot, stoning cars, burning buildings, and besieging shops. What else would Sir Edgar have them do? Were they to stare in apathy while all political organization and leadership were plundered from them, they would not be more than other men, they would be less.

The moral of the Congo is that the prints of just such oppression as now deforms life in the Rhodesias, unless carefully smoothed over, remain embedded in the memory of a people long after the feet themselves have gone. Reading many of the newspaper reports and editorials on anti-white violence in the newly independent Congo, one might reasonably have supposed that Belgian rule had lasted a genial matter of months and been quite gratuitously expelled by an explosion of blind black racialism. When it is remembered rather that Belgian rule lasted a ruthless 80 years, is the violence that followed it so very difficult to understand? During the first thirty years, when the territory was under King Leopold's personal control, the native population was reduced by over a third, while royal agents drove Africans in search of ivory and rubber, with limbs and lives heaped high as the measure of any failure to fulfil the quota demanded. Whoever reads Casement and Conrad nowadays, it is clearly not the leader-writers on many of our newspapers. And when in 1908, international agitation forced Leopold to surrender his dominion to the Belgian government, the curtains were drawn around the colony so close that only an occasional whisper escaped when a traveller or missionary moved them for a moment aside. Throughout the 50 odd years of Belgian government rule, forced labour was silently practised, and political protest stilled by imprisonment or death. Hardly a handful of years ago, there were over 4,000 political prisoners in Congo gaols. And though the Belgian policy of paternalism protested economic rather than political advances, its withdrawal revealed not one African doctor or lawyer or architect and only one African engineer, who had qualified at the end of 1959, in its wake. Had rancour taken even greater reprisals than it did, one should not in all reason have been surprised.

Reprisals, however, were not inevitable. Belgium could have healed much of the hatred it had burned so deep into the Congolese mind if only it had exhibited a concerted generosity in its departure. Had it trained with sympathy and speed African officers to command the Force Publique, there might not have been that major break-down in the machinery of order which made anti-white violence at all considerable. Had it given the nationalist leadership effective reason to believe that its intention to depart was genuine and that, while it stayed by request of the Congolese themselves, it would place its experience and resources at their service, a short interim period of co-operative government might have been evolved, during which essential training in the senior civil service would have been given to Congolese, and skills, which had so long been denied, zealously and decisively spread amongst them. All this might still have failed to overbear the past, but it should have been tried. Instead, a policy was evolved that seems to have been at its best a state of casual confusion and, at the worst, deliberate sabotage. Alarms were sedulously sounded for the safety of the white population, numbers of technicians withdrew or made obvious preparations to do so, billions of francs were sent scuttling to safety in Brussels, and—months before actual independence and the antics of M. Tshombe—rumours were rife, to be obliquely confirmed by Rhodesian politicians, of a settler and big business movement for Katanga secession. As a result, the Congolese government inherited a wrecked civil service, a Force Publique straining towards mutiny, a dried-out exchequer, and—within a few days of independence—a breakaway Katanga, with diaphanously disguised Belgian backing, which not only dangled all tax income from the provincial mines beyond the government's reach, but stimulated and fortified tribal separatism throughout the territory. And when Belgian paratroops were flown in—ostensibly to protect the white population from violence—they treated the Congolese with a trigger-happy arrogance that could hardly fail to agitate further disorders.

One need only consider how the situation might have been resolved five years ago to measure the part that the free and independent African States must have played in the present resolution. None of Belgium's allies in the West, despite domestic pressure from those with investments in the province, recognised the independence of Katanga, and even Belgium felt it imprudent to risk the consequences of coming out into the

open. For the London '*Daily Telegraph*', hardly a newspaper of the Left, Eric Downton wrote from Elisabethville in the issue of July 27th: "The masquerade of Katanga 'independence' is becoming daily more pathetic. M. Tshombe, the self-styled President, is today far more under the domination of Belgian officials than he was as an obscure politician before Congo independence. His regime depends entirely on Belgian arms, men and money. Without this, his government would in all probability be quickly pulled down from within and without. The outline of Belgium's emergency policy for Katanga is now discernible. It is to protect the great Belgian financial stake here and hold a political bridgehead in the hope of a Congolese union amenable to Belgium and the West". The African States, with support from Asian countries, have already influenced the Security Council into demanding the speedy withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo and supplying food and technical assistance to the country. Pan-Africanism is no longer fantasy, it is hardening fast into fact, and the world will increasingly have to come to terms with it. Once Belgian forces withdraw from the Katanga, M. Tshombe's popular support can be properly measured and an internal dispute left to be internally resolved. That anti-secession demonstrations should have broken out in the province during the Secretary-General's visit to Elisabethville—and demonstrations during which five lives are reported to have been lost—suggests that M. Tshombe's position is far from unassailable within Katanga itself. Events may yet precipitate a provincial referendum under United Nations supervision, but any such referendum would only have meaning if representatives of the central government were permitted freely to campaign throughout the region. M. Tshombe's picture of a free vote in a sealed room, with all his significant political opponents locked outside, is as ludicrous as any of his previous posturings. The storm that swept the Congo in the wake of independence may yet have flashes in it, but it is dying; and while the African States continue to act in concert, there seems very little chance that it will revive.

The heart of darkness that once was Belgium's empire in Africa no longer beats. Yet, only a border away, race rule persists, repression mounting southwards in savagery to the Union of South Africa. There, in the south, pulses today's heart of darkness, in the secret trials and tortures of Portuguese Africa, the arrests and riots and now at last the shootings o

Southern Rhodesia, the Sharpevilles of the Union. May one easily believe that power can be transferred—as one day it must—in these territories without a hurricane of repression and reprisal? Yet, across the eastern frontier of the Congo, Tanganyika moves with speed and deliberation towards independence and popular rule, amidst the back-slappings of nationalists and white settlers alike. There the British government, spurred no doubt by the trust status of the territory, discouraged tribalism and not only suffered, but occasionally even nurtured, the nationalist movement from the moment that withdrawal appeared more profitable than repression. If its administration has not been exemplary, its retreat has at least revealed excellent sense, and the reward is the legacy of good-will and order it is leaving behind it. Would a similar reward not follow a sensible and speedy retreat from those fastnesses of race rule that the white communities in the south now hold so intransigently? If recent events in the Congo have any lesson to teach, it is the retribution of repression. For its own sake, as much as for the sake of all the many millions whose lives it despoils, the white south would do well to awake at last to the shutters being flung open all around it.

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'At least WE know where we're going, don't we, Sir Edgar ?'

THE PONDOLAND MASSACRE

DENNIS KILEY

Former Cape Editor of 'Golden City Post', now South African Correspondent of the 'News Chronicle.'

In January 1958, four people were sten-gunned to death at Gopane village in the Bafurutse reserve, near Zeerust. A month later all pressmen were barred from the area.

In May 1958, an unknown number of people were killed in Sekhukhuneland. A week later the press was barred from the area.

In June 1960, about thirty people were shot to death at Nqusa's Hill in Pondoland. The press had been barred from the area already.

Clearly, the Nationalists have become more efficient, but the basic pattern remains much the same. The pattern is dictated by Dr. Verwoerd's racial theories, which are in turn partly the result of divine inspiration (as he himself has revealed to us) and partly a survival of those race theories which so calamitously set Hitler's armies and concentration camps in motion. For their successful application they need above all a comfortable darkness, undisturbed by flash-bulbs or the movements of prying reporters.

Thus, when I arrived in fear-ridden Gopane (nearly 200 refugees from the area are living in Lobatsi, British Bechuanaland Protectorate, to this day) in January 1958, I had to work fast to piece together the grisly story of what had been done before the police discovered I was there. Together with the Rev. Charles Hooper, Anglican priest for the whole territory, and his wife (subsequently banned from the area), I questioned men, women and children. They described how the four people, including a ten-year-old boy, had been shot after a police search.

Two boys showed me where their father, Tiro Montsho, had been shot dead, and I had the chilling experience of picking up from the middle of the blood-splash on the grass a piece of human intestine, from which it was a reasonable guess that he had been shot at fairly close range.

Minutes later, two riot-vehicles of police arrived on the scene and, unlimbering their sten-guns, the police barked at us all to leave the area at once. What would have happened to myself and my non-white photographer if the Rev. Hooper had not been there, it is not pleasant to imagine.

The reason for the Zeerust killings was basically that the Bantu Affairs Department had ordered the Bafurutse women to carry "passes" like their men. They were to carry them at all costs, and the Government-nominated chiefs were instructed to see that they did. When the inevitable tribal disturbances followed, a 270-lb. police sergeant, Jan van Rooyen, was put in charge of operations, with a squad of mobile sten-gun police under his command. The horrors that followed have been sufficiently chronicled by the Rev. Hooper in his book 'Brief Authority'.

In Sekhukhuneland, mass opposition gathered to a head during May 1958, after Chiefs Arthur and Godfrey Sekhukhune had been banned from the area (they are still exiles) for refusing to enforce Nationalist policy upon their people. Pro-Government chiefs were appointed, villages were broken up for purposes of "ethnic grouping" and better control by the chiefs, and presently the riots began.

It was a time of agony for the people of Sekhukhuneland, hounded as they were by mobs seeking Government supporters on one hand and police squads seeking the mob leaders on the other. Chief Kholane of Malibong and an ex-policeman called Bob Nkadimeng had their throats cut by tribesmen, and at least seven other people were killed. Sergeant Jan van Rooyen was transferred from Zeerust to Sekhukhuneland, and the press was barred from the area while the police hunted for the "instigators".

In Pondoland and the neighbouring Transkei, fear and violence have spread steadily ever since the Nationalists decided to turn the area into the first great Bantustan and set about appointing chiefs who would carry out their policies and sacking those who would not.

Some of their policies—notably soil reclamation—were perfectly ordinary administrative measures. Others—like the move to make the Dutch Reformed Church the "official" church for the whole territory—were not so ordinary. All measures, however, were enforced as rapidly as possible and with a minimum of consultation, while the Government repeatedly maintained—as it still does—that it is prepared to discuss objections only with the chiefs, who are of course its own paid and manageable servants.

The inspiration for this policy is summed up in an answer given by the dedicated young information officer for the Transkeian territories when I asked him: "Have you ever considered, even for a moment, that some solution other than apartheid may be

necessary in South Africa?'' With pity and with contempt he told me: ''I can see you have never studied the laws of genetics. . . .''

It is these ''laws of genetics'', then, which are being put into effect in the ''Bantu Homelands'' of Pondoland and the Transkei.

The tribesmen themselves have recently formed an ''Anti Bantu Authorities Act Committee'' in the Lusikisiki district of Eastern Pondoland, and have submitted a memorandum to the Department of Bantu Administration. They make these points:

- Their Paramount Chief, Botha Sigcau, is pro-Nationalist and unpopular. They claim he should never have succeeded to the title, and that his brother, Nelson, is the rightful chief.
- Taxes under Bantu Authorities are higher, and tribesmen feel that the taxes are only used to pay the salaries of the unwanted Government-appointed chiefs.
- They object to the new Bantu Education Levy, which taxes them to pay for the indoctrination of their children and their training for more efficient servitude.
- They resent being grouped into villages under the new land scheme; traditionally their huts have always been scattered.
- They detest the land rehabilitation schemes, particularly cattle culling and dipping.
- They claim that bribery and corruption are commonplace, and that only those who can afford bribes get fair treatment at the new ''tribal courts''.
- They complain that consultation is the basic rule of Xhosa society, but that the newly-appointed chiefs do not consult the people and the Government officials consult only the chiefs. They were not consulted over the whole scheme for ''Bantustan'', they have never accepted it and they will not have it forced upon them.
- Tribesmen are not allowed to hold meetings of more than ten people to discuss grievances, unless the local Native Commissioner gives permission.

To all this the Pondo tribesmen—and their cousins the other Xhosa—have reacted by holding illegal meetings to thrash out their problems, and by murdering the pro-Government chiefs and burning their huts.

As word of the Nqusa's Hill massacre spread through the forests and rolling hills of Pondoland, flames could be seen rising up almost every night at different points. Police, military

vehicles and aircraft searched the wild countryside for "instigators", and hundreds took refuge in the forests and caves of the remote hills.

The shooting at Nqusa's Hill (a large double-humped hill, the name of which in Xhosa means "Backside Hill") was not entirely unexpected, it would seem. An Afrikaans-speaking trader living nearby said: "They had had this coming for a long time—it should have happened two years ago".

A missionary who has lived in the area for many years said that the meetings at Nqusa's Hill had been going on for weeks and, though they were illegal, the police had been attending them and making no effort to stop them.

The wounded, lying in the Holy Cross Mission hospital after the shooting, said that on the day of the big meeting they had all been warned by the organizers not to bring even their ordinary fighting sticks—though no Pondo likes to move about without one. They were told: "We are going to talk, not to fight."

On their way to the meeting they saw police trucks parked on the neighbouring hills, but they did not turn back. Mr. Mlothwana Ngxambane, who was lying in the hospital with both legs amputated after the shooting, said that aeroplanes had dived low over the meeting so often that the audience could not hear what the speakers were saying. A helicopter landed sten-gun police, and the police fanned out around them, reinforced by others who arrived at the same time in trucks.

No eye-witness we spoke to knew of any resistance offered to the police. They all said that they had thrown up their hands and shouted: "We are not fighting." But the police opened fire, and they continued to fire until there was nobody left to shoot.

They used rifles, revolvers and sub-machine guns at close range, and the tribesmen said that 30 died. The wounded were left where they lay until villagers with wooden sledges came and dragged them to the hospital seven miles away. Some of the wounded died when they tried to escape across a nearby river, some died in the bushes. After two days vultures showed the way to the bodies; and many were buried where they were found.

The police occupied themselves with raids on the tribal huts, looking for "instigators" as always, and with patrols in helicopters to prevent the press from reaching the scene. A police helicopter followed a car-load of African journalists until a police van caught up and took them into the nearest town—Bizana.

An African reporter who was 'phoning through a story from Bizana two weeks after the massacre was surrounded and arrested by no less than seven policemen, who cursed and manhandled him on their way to the police station, where they charged him with "failing to produce a reference book". He was acquitted.

In spite of the desperate efforts by officials and police to keep pressmen from getting at the news, word has now leaked out that Botha Sigcau, the controversial Paramount Chief, has attempted to resign.

He announced at a tribal meeting at Tabankulu that he wanted to resign in favour of his brother Nelson, but—according to Mlugwana Xolo, a spokesman for the local tribesmen—his speech was cut short by the local Native Commissioner and he was immediately whisked away by officials under heavily-armed police escort.

"The officials were unable to hide their shock," Mr. Xolo said, "but we have not seen Botha or any of his closest attendants since that day. We think the officials are trying to persuade him not to resign."

Meanwhile, brother Nelson said in Lusikisiki that he did not want the £1,400-a-year (and perqs.) Paramount Chieftaincy either. His brother, he said, would have to "sort out the mess first".

"The mess", however, seems to be taking the form of increasingly organized opposition by the tribesmen. Latest reports from the area say that regular meetings are once again being held by the "insurgents"—this time at Ndlovu's Hill, ten miles south-east of Bizana.

A "Committee" has been organized for the area, and systematic pressure put on clerks, schoolteachers and others who are classed as "literates", to pledge that they will not support Bantu Authorities.

They have been invited to attend the meetings, and those who have refused have been threatened with having their homes burnt. It is said that those who have been threatened are now paying "fines" to the Committee.

Typical of what happens to unpopular headmen is the fate of Dideni Rababa, a 45-year-old petty chief from the Umtata District. He went to the hut of a woman called Nomoto Mtsako one night—without his bodyguard. In the middle of the night the hut was surrounded by tribesmen, who poured petrol on it and set it alight.

When Rababa and Nomoto tried to escape they were forced back by tribesmen with assegais. He was burnt to charcoal on the spot; she died in the Sir Henry Elliot hospital at Umtata.

Men who have pledged themselves to fighting Bantu Authorities have handed over the responsibility for caring for their families to the womenfolk. Many "wanted" men still visit their families for a few hours each day or night and then disappear into the plantations again, tribesmen say. Each time the police helicopters land in Bizana, anxious women look at the weird machines to see if any of their menfolk have been captured.

Amusingly enough, the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. C. W. Prinsloo, has stated: "We are convinced that the disturbances are of the same nature as those which occurred in Zeerust and Sekhukhuneland a few years ago—the work of outside agitators."

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'Okay! All the world's a stage, but why should we get all the worst parts ?'

THE PATTERN OF SOUTH AFRICA'S EMERGENCY

ALAN RAKE

Former East African Editor of 'Drum', now on the staff in Johannesburg.

On the morning of March 30th, just over a week after the Sharpeville killings, a State of Emergency was declared in the Union of South Africa. During the preceding days, the initiative had been momentarily in the hands of the Africans. Pass laws had been temporarily relaxed, and there was a general feeling that their tyranny had now been broken forever. Urban Africans believed that the Government would at last be forced to lend a small ear to the people.

The Emergency cruelly shattered this feeling of hope. From 2 a.m. on the morning of March 30th, hundreds of people were arrested all over the country. Dozens of police cars darted about trim white suburbs and African townships alike. Detectives and armed policemen burst into sleeping households and made arrests. No warrants were produced.

If the hundreds of detainees had been counted on that first night, an outsider would understandably have believed that a vast plot against the State had been unearthed. The prisoners came from all walks of life, all income groups, all parts of the country, all political parties, both sexes. And the next day a Government Gazette Extraordinary officially declared a State of Emergency and announced that anyone could be arrested under it in the interests of public safety and order.

By April 11th, the Emergency regulations were enforced in 121 magisterial districts (of the 300 in the country) including all the large urban centres, where the African labour force had provided the organised opposition to the Government. There were gasps of astonishment in Parliament when Mr. Erasmus, Minister of Justice, announced that no less than 1,575 people (94 white, 24 Coloured, and 1,451 African) had been detained.

Still more arrests were to follow, however, and by May 16th the number had risen to 1,907. All these people were detained without trial, and could be jailed "for the duration of the Emergency or as long as the Minister pleases". As they were not charged, there could be no "official" reason for their detention; the State had detained them "for the maintenance of

public order''. They were put in prison, not because they had committed any crime, nor because they had added fuel to the tense situation in the country after Sharpeville, but because they *might* seize the opportunity to oppose the Government politically.

It has been suggested that all the detainees were politically minded; but some of them had no political or trade union connections whatsoever, while others had been interested in politics in a purely incidental way. There were three main categories: the non-political detainees; those who had not been interested in politics for a number of years; and members of anti-Government political parties.

Among the non-political detainees were such people as Myrna MacKenzie, the Cape Town correspondent of the London '*Daily Herald*' and wife of a staffman on the '*Cape Times*'; and Mr. Norman Phillips, Ass. Managing Editor of the Canadian newspaper, '*Toronto Star*'.

Another non-political detainee was Miss Hannah Stanton, a British missionary and passionate Christian who has since written that she ''never felt drawn to the political or 'public' aspects of the faith''. Before she went to South Africa, she felt that Huddleston and others probably exaggerated the racial situation. Nevertheless, she incurred the displeasure of top-ranking police officers by making complaints about the cruel and bullying attitude of the South African police. The Rev. Douglas Thompson worked for the Peace Council. Mrs. Kalk, a Witwatersrand University lecturer, had never been active in politics. It is thought that Gertrude Cohn was arrested solely because her husband had sent letters to the papers expressing liberal views and had signed himself G. Cohn.

In the second group of ''one-time-politically-active'' detainees were a number of ex-Communists. Archie Lewitton had been an official of the Communist Party, but he had had nothing to do with politics for fifteen years. A. Israel had not been in the C.P. since before the war. A businessman, Monty Berman, had taken no active part in left-wing politics since the years immediately after the World War. Ex-Senator H. M. Basner, a former Native Representative, had resigned his seat in 1947 and had only attended one political meeting during the 12 years since then.

But there were some who were definitely active in everyday politics. Many members of the South African Liberal Party

were arrested. Mr. Peter Brown, National Chairman of the Liberal Party, Dr. Colin Lang, John Brink who had put up Chief Luthuli at his home during the Treason Trial, Dr. Hans Meidner, and the Africans Elliott Mngadi and Franklin Bhengu, were members of a party which is strongly anti-Communist and pledged to use non-violent means to counter apartheid.

Two Liberal lawyers, John Lang and Ernest Wentzel, had begun to collect evidence on the Sharpeville shootings and were still taking statements from the wounded at the time they were arrested. R. I. Arenstein was another lawyer, who had defended the accused after the Cato Manor disturbances when several policemen were killed. Other lawyers—not all of them members of the Liberal Party—were also detained. Mrs. S. Muller had defended Africans in the cases following upon the Sekhukhuneland riots. As practically all the lawyers who had defended Africans in political trials were arrested, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that they were identified with the Africans they defended, and were thus somehow guilty in the eyes of the Government and punished by a period in prison.

There were other unusual detainees who do not readily fall into any category. Lionel Morrison, an ex-Witwatersrand University student, was just planning to go to Holland to resume his studies. Alf Every, an accountant, had been an organiser of the conservative United Party and was editor of a businessman's intelligence service—'Africa X-Ray Report'—at the time of his arrest. An African of some 90 years of age was also detained.

All the accused in South Africa's three-year-old Treason Trial and all the first batch of Treason Trialists were re-arrested. These were the easily identifiable, traditional enemies of the Government, and were detained together with remaining African National Congress officials and the leaders of the Pan African Congress under Mangaliso Sobukwe, Potlako Leballo and Matthew Nkonana. The latter were arrested at the time they gave themselves up to the police for not carrying passbooks and were quickly charged for passbook offences or more serious charges under the Emergency regulations.

The African political leaders received formidable sentences: Sobukwe and many of his followers a £300 fine or 3 years imprisonment for incitement; Matthew Nkonana and 142 others, £300 or three years for not carrying reference books; Peter Tema, £100 or 12 months for destroying another man's reference book; Dr. Menie Bernard Zondi, £200 or 12 months

or destroying his own passbook; others, £150 or 18 months for rging men to stop work on the national strike days. P.A.C. nembers refused to pay their fines and took imprisonment on rinciple. Almost all the other Africans were unable to meet neir fines and were therefore imprisoned.

The State of Emergency Relief Fund estimated that 400 amilies in the Western Province alone were left without any neans of support as their menfolk were detained. They had to ve on a diet of maize meal, dried milk, beans, sugar and flour. One mother and father were taken from their house in the middle f the night, leaving an eighteen months old baby alone in the rms of a ten year old boy. African mothers were deprived of neir husbands' wages. Indian mothers depended on their close-nit family groups to keep them going. Numbers of children ost both their parents; and both parents had to sign a letter sking the prison authorities every time they wanted to see their hildren. The majority of them only saw their children once uring the average three months of detention.

Visits to prisoners used to take place in tiny rooms, where x detainees and up to 12 visitors were all introduced at once. he two groups found themselves fenced off, and had to stand at pposite sides of the room and shout at one another. It was lmost impossible for any coherent messages to be conveyed t all.

Most of the white detainees in the Cape area and in Pretoria ound that their physical conditions of detention were not too ad; but at the Johannesburg Fort prison, they were appalling. On the night of their arrest, prisoners there were given filthy lankets and mattresses in the last stages of disintegration. They ere held four to a cell (10 ft. by 9 ft.) and shared one lavatory ucket, inside the cell, which was only emptied once every 4 hours despite the cases of diarrhoea which were prevalent.

Food was the principal topic of conversation among them. he male detainees in the Transvaal area collected and preserved representative selection of weevils, bugs and other impurities ound in the prison food. Mr. Justice Rumpff, inspecting the nch one day, found that detainees were being given nothing ut cold, congealed beans to eat. His lordship made a complaint at the beans should, at least, have been served hot.

The discussion of food intensified during the hunger strike, hich was started by the white women detainees at Pretoria to ring the attention of the outside world to their plight. The

men joined in sympathy and kept the strike going for ten days, though some of them were elderly and others were suffering from stomach ulcers. The prison authorities were greatly disturbed by the strike, which was finally broken when the women were divided into different groups, unable to communicate with each other, and when the doctors reported that some of them were in serious danger of death if the strike continued. Especially demoralising was an announcement in Parliament that the strikers were being fed on secret supplies smuggled in from outside.

While conditions for whites became at least tolerable when they were moved from the Johannesburg Fort to Pretoria, they were worse for Indians, and worse still for Africans. The white detainees ended up by sleeping on beds and mattresses, the Indians on thin palliasses and the Africans on hard mats. A similar colour bar distinguished the quality of the food.

Under the special prison rules "made in terms of the Emergency regulations", detainees were not allowed to "sing, whistle or make unnecessary noises, or cause unnecessary trouble or nuisance", or "cause discontent or excitement or insubordination among fellow detainees", or "be disrespectful to a person employed in the place of detention or to a member of the South African police force". Four people were kept in solitary confinement for three weeks because the Prison Commissioner had misinterpreted the Emergency rules which stated that detainees should be kept apart from other prisoners. Others were given solitary confinement as a punishment for breaking rules.

The prisoners were unable to discuss matters concerning detention with their advocates. At first there was some ambiguity about this rule. Finally one detainee decided to challenge it in court; but two days before the case was due to be heard a regulation was published specifically barring detainees from speaking to their advocates about detention.

Michael Mpeluza, who had been ill in bed for 18 months with heart trouble when he was detained, died soon after his arrest. George Z. Siwiza died on May 31st, and his family were not informed of his death immediately. When they finally managed to have his body exhumed on June 28th, the relatives were advised that it would be "difficult" to establish the cause of death. John Kamanga became ill in prison and died on June 17th.

The first major batch of detainees to be released consisted of 54 people; it was May 30th, almost exactly two months after ney had been arrested. A few further releases were made; nd then, on June 28th, the Government announced that 1,200 ut of the 1,600 remaining in detention would be rapidly set ee. It was officially announced that investigations had not een completed against the remaining 400.

From this Government statement it can be inferred that vestigations were completed against at least 1,200 others, ost of whom had not been charged in court and had been found nocent even by police armed with arbitrary powers. Under the mergency, these people had had their lives disrupted, their milies subjected to great strain, and their livelihood impaired. ne man who had played no active part in politics for 15 years nd had his business completely ruined. Naturally the Govern- ent proposed no compensation for him or any of the others. ut legal actions against the Minister of Justice are now likely take place.

The Emergency in South Africa is still not over, though Dr. erwoerd recently stated that it would be withdrawn before the publican referendum on October 6th. Many Emergency ws are still in force throughout the main urban centres of the untry. People can still be detained for the maintenance of ublic order. And a new type of "half-free" man has been eated—in the shape of detainees who have been released under strictions on their movement, curfews, and a total ban on olitical activity.

It was not until the Emergency had been in force for at least o months that people became aware of an entirely new type of rest under Emergency regulations. A new class of detainee as rapidly taking shape, to give the Government an additional ason for not wanting to end the Emergency in too great urry.

Africans were being picked up under Article 4B of the nergency regulations, which stated that 'any native that was tained, who did not have a reference book, a job, a place to y or a right to be in an urban area could be jailed for the ration of the Emergency or as long as the Minister pleases'. r. Erasmus informed Parliament that 18,000 had been rested under Article 4B, and later this figure increased to the ntastic total of 21,000. Of these at least 8,600 were detained.

These men were all claimed to be tsotsis, idlers or loafers The procedure was—and apparently still is—that the men ar arrested and taken to secret courts, where the press and publi are denied any entry. Magistrates are then summoned t decide whether or not the Africans—most of them picked o the streets—have passbooks, regular employment and a place t live. If any fail on any of these qualifications, they are detainec Magistrates have said that only loafers and "gangsters of the wors type" have been detained in this way, but many families hav reported the disappearance of law-abiding relatives and breac winners.

The authorities refused to disclose where these detainee were being taken, but they were finally traced to a disused min called Modder B near Benoni. The newspaper '*Contact*' outline the case of Cush Moloi who was picked up in this way and late released. He said that he had been taken to a mine near Benon (Modder B) where 8,000 men were held. He was tried befor a magistrate in a court inside the prison, where the only peopl present were a magistrate, a prosecutor and the policeman wh arrested him.

Meshak Nkosi, an African schoolteacher who spends most o his week-ends playing tennis, was another victim. He wa interned for a week before he was brought before a magistrat sitting in the camp. Though he was given no chance to consul an attorney and had to argue his case as best he could, th magistrate had no alternative but to find this non-politica schoolteacher innocent. How he ever got arrested as a "idler" in the first place remains a mystery, unless one consider that he was one of the Africans frequently interviewed and filme for overseas radio and television by correspondents visitin South Africa at the time of Sharpeville.

The conditions at Modder B, according to reports from th few who have been liberated, are very similar to the Keny detention camps at their worst. Both Meshak Nkosi and Cus Moloi reported continual beatings while they were in the camp The newspaper '*Contact*' went further and reported that sever Africans were shot dead and many more injured trying to escape The Deputy Commissioner of Prisons, Brigadier J. C. Steyn confirmed on July 31st that 18 African prisoners had died "pneumonia" in Modder B during the previous fortnigh "Whatever can be done is being done," he added. Of th there can surely be no doubt.

PRETORIA CENTRAL GAOL, 1960

HANNAH STANTON

N March 30th, 1960, and on successive days, men and women, uropeans and non-Europeans, were arrested and detained roughout the Union of South Africa.

I was arrested on March 30th at 3.15 a.m. There was a batter-g on my door at Tumelong Mission, Lady Selborne; I opened to find standing outside three men and a wardress from the ecial Branch, who told me that I would have to go with them ietly or they would take me by force. On my asking for their arrant to do this, I was told that a State of Emergency had been eclared and that a warrant was not necessary. In point of fact, e Emergency was not declared until the following afternoon. was taken to Pretoria Gaol where I spent the next seven-and-a-lf weeks. No charge was ever brought against me; I never new why I had been detained. I could only conclude that, as I d exposed police brutality whenever it had occurred during e past three years in Lady Selborne township, the police were w retaliating.

As a result of pressure by the United Kingdom Government, was allowed to consult my lawyer about my detention and a tition was brought on my behalf in the Supreme Court. This as dismissed. Neither I nor my legal advisers had expected any her outcome. But it was of value that the case should have been red in the courts. I was the only detainee among the 1,900 to e allowed to consult a lawyer about my detention. Eventually, May 19th, I was deported without any opportunity of appeal.

In Pretoria Gaol the European detainees, both men and women, ere kept in solitary confinement for three weeks—though this d certainly not occurred in the Johannesburg Gaol, the Fort, here detainees had been in groups since the date of their arrest. he non-European detainees in Pretoria were treated rather fferently; the women were at first in separate cells, though ear each other, while the men were put together, five in a cell.

Prison conditions were graded: Europeans had Class I treat-ent; Coloureds and Asiatics had Class II; and Africans, Class . Pretoria Gaol, I gathered, had a good name for the tolerable eatment of all racial groups; certainly from what I was told of e Fort, the food there, even for the Europeans, appears to have een uneatable.

Class I treatment in Pretoria Gaol included a breakfast at sev o'clock, when mealie porridge, brown bread and coffee we provided; lunch arrived at 11.30 and consisted of stewed mea quite appetisingly cooked, and two vegetables; the evening a last meal arrived at 3.30 p.m. (earlier on public holidays) a consisted of soup, brown bread, coffee and small containers fat, sugar and marmalade to be kept over until the next da The European women detainees had a bath a day; ten minut exercise after the first week, and then progressively more a more. We had a bedstead, mattress, blankets and sheets, a locke and a table and chair in our cells. We also had a sanitary buck with a lid which was emptied by the African convicts once a da Our lights were put out at eight o'clock and put on again at sev in the morning; during these hours, the only light available w what filtered in from the street lamp outside.

Class III treatment provided primitive prison conditions fi even the most cultured of the African detainees. The food co sisted of mealie meal porridge, a little sugar, mealies, beans very small portion of meat three times a week on the mealie pa and no bread: this followed a simple rural African diet to whi the prison authorities still think every African is accustome Grade III provided no furniture in the cells; a thin mat a blankets were issued for bedding; there was water in a pail an smelly tin without a lid for sanitary purposes. No facilities we given for baths and very little for exercise.

Class II treatment for Coloureds and Asiatics consisted o slightly better diet than Class III, a slightly thicker mat anc sanitary pail with a lid. One day I looked with interest at t buckets outside a cell shared by a Coloured woman and African woman; one bucket had a lid and one had not.

During the first few days friends were allowed to send sweets, orange juice, marmite, tinned food, and some boo This was soon stopped; but, in due course, after weeks of wait in my case, we were able to have money in our prison accou and to order extra food from the prison canteen. This w available to both Europeans and non-Europeans.

Physical conditions were bearable; to my intense relief cell had a window, heavily barred, which overlooked the pri recreation grounds and in the distance the Magaliesburg Mo tains. I stood on my locker and gazed at them for hours. I w horrified later to realize the very confined space in Mrs. Josep cell, considerably smaller than my own (mine was 8 ft. by 10 ft

ver the walls of her cell and stretching *under* her window was avy wire netting, so that there was no chance of her having the freshment of looking out of her window. At the end of three eeks we were put together, and it was an unutterable relief to ve her company; she joined me in my cell and was able to joy my window. We listened during the long evenings to the rican convicts singing, and shuddered at the brutal way the rdresses would shout at the African convicts. At times a nvict was punished, and we heard the groans.

In prison I had the support of the prayers of friends and the mework of church services throughout the day to follow. r me it was a spiritual experience which I shall not forget, I shall not forget the personal experience of helplessness and ustration which all of us shared, the men and women detainees all races.

During the first five weeks in gaol, I experienced to the full the ustration and anxiety over the disruption of a life's work, in y case as Warden of an Anglican Mission. This was work to nich I knew God had called me. I grieved for my work, for y staff exhausted and anxious, for my relatives and friends, for y missionary students at the Mission and for the welfare of all ose dependent upon me. But it was when Mrs. Joseph and I ere joined by a group of 20 women from Johannesburg, most whom were wives and mothers, that I realized the more acute ony of the mother cut off from her family. Seven of the women d husbands who were also detained; they thought of their ildren looked after by friends or relatives, missing immeasurly the care of parents.

In several cases parents had not been able to make adequate rangements for the care of children. One mother had had to ave her young son alone in the flat on her arrest. Another other had on her mind the condition of her only son who had ute diabetes: was he keeping to the rigid diet prescribed for m? Was he able to give himself his insulin satisfactorily? as he over-doing himself rushing to school for early classes?

A wife, whose husband was also arrested, heard that her husnd's job had been terminated at a week's notice. She and her sband had lately managed after years of saving to move into eir own house, on which they had paid the first instalments. ne hopes of years had to be abandoned. A mother of four ildren under the age of ten, heard that her husband, also tained, had been taken ill one night in gaol. His ulcer had

perforated, he had bled all night and his companions had bee unable to attract anyone's attention. In the morning he was in state of collapse.

Another mother, whose son had been involved in a moto accident shortly before and who in consequence had becom stone deaf, knew that without her and her means of contact wit him his whole rehabilitation would be endangered.

These are problems which mothers and wives face whenev illness or disaster means sudden unforeseen separation from the families. But here in prison, detained under the Emergenc regulations, week after week, month after month, witho charges preferred against them, without access to their leg advisers and with such problems ever on their minds, anxiet frustration and bitterness reached an aching agony.

I can only describe from personal contact and experience th feelings of a very few of the 1,900, and these all European wome The non-European detainees could not have felt any less frustrate and anxious, and had in any case far worse material conditions t put up with; in many cases there must have been more agony. Th majority of them undoubtedly had lost their jobs; their famili were literally starving and we heard of detainees' families who we being turned out of their homes in the Johannesburg location

When, in the sixth week of my detention, the group of 2 women were moved from Johannesburg to Pretoria, they arrive already committed to a hunger strike in protest against the co tinued detention without charges of all the detainees. Whe there was no response to their appeal to the Minister of Justic they started on their fast on May 13th, and continued this fo eight days, when they abandoned it on medical grounds. Durin this time they took no food at all: I was with them all the tim and can vouch for this. All lost considerable weight, one woma lost 16 lbs. They drank about eight cups of water a day, an towards the end of the fast some of them, feeling very weak, took few teaspoonfuls of glucose. It was during this time that they hea from their visitors that their children had been demonstratin on the steps of the Johannesburg Town Hall and had been arreste

Many of the detainees have now been released: 250, we a told, still remain. But it must not be forgotten that these me and women, 1,900 of them, were detained and that no charg were ever preferred against them. Lives have been endangere and interrupted, work has been irreparably damaged, acute mise has been caused; and to what end . . .?

A FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

NORMAN PHILLIPS

Norman Phillips, Assistant Managing Editor of the 'Toronto Star', left Canada for South Africa on March 21, the day of the Sharpeville Massacre. On April 8, the South African Government suppressed his report on police brutality at Nyanga and, on April 9, arrested him under the Emergency Regulations. Protests from the Canadian Government secured his release from Durban Gaol on April 12.)

THE "questioning" took place on the third day of my incarceration in Durban Gaol. At the end, my interrogator, Capt. van der Westhuizen of the South African political police, the Special Branch, attempted an ingratiating smile and said: "I guess you probably know more about us than we know about you."

It was an unusual compliment; the more so after the almost daily reminder from some citizen that no one could hope to understand the problems of South Africa without having been born, raised and confined within the borders of the Union.

The Captain was trying to extricate himself gracefully from a ludicrous situation. His chief, Maj. Gen. C. I. Rademeyer, then commander of the national police force, had ordered my arrest on the basis of a dispatch that had offended the sensibilities of a Durban postal clerk. External Affairs Minister Eric Louw had then got into the act by accusing me of poisoning Canadian-South African relations—a rôle for which I could not hope to rival his proven ability.

Mr. Louw was not in accord with his police chief (Rademeyer fell victim to a diplomatic illness and was replaced three weeks after my arrest). Despite my undoubted presence in Cell One, Block A of Durban Gaol, I was not—according to Mr. Louw—under arrest, but merely "held for questioning".

Here was an opportunity to demonstrate that Mr. Louw spoke the truth. If he said I was being held for questioning, questioned I would be; and van der Westhuizen, head of Security for Natal, had clearly been assigned to the task of grilling me. He was armed with carbon copies of everything I had written in South Africa, my notebooks and address lists. The setting was the cheerless Governor's office, and the Captain was accompanied by Head Constable Wessels who had taken me into custody.

They had some questions, the Captain began. In that case, I replied, I'd better have a lawyer. (Although I did not find it out until I returned to Canada, South African legal representation had been engaged for me by my employers.) Van der Westhuizen tried to assure me that the questions weren't involved and that I really didn't need a lawyer. Wouldn't I just try one or two for size?

I had one other reservation—my professional oath never to reveal sources of information. The Captain was almost eager to demonstrate his respect for this vow. The Head Constable was also impressed by this pledge and before the session was over was answering the Captain's questions for me: "You can't answer that because of your oath, can you?"

The interrogation took a scant fifteen minutes; and although it was obviously a device to save the face of the Minister of External Affairs, someone had briefed Capt. van der Westhuizen to include a homily on how to report conditions in South Africa. "You've been talking to all the wrong people," he complained.

I couldn't refrain from replying that his colleagues in the police force had been the worst offenders in leading me astray.

A foreign correspondent must go to the police for information and the first person I interviewed after my arrival in South Africa was a senior officer, Col. G. D. Pienaar, who had been nominally in command of the police at Sharpeville on the day of the massacre.

When I first met him three days after the shooting, in the police headquarters at Vereeniging, Col. Pienaar was nervous, irritable and under great tension. It was only after I explained that I had flown 10,000 miles to find out what had happened at Sharpeville that he consented to speak to me at all. His version was my introduction to the stock responses that (a) no one from abroad could understand South African affairs; (b) all Africans were savages; and (c) the demonstration preceding the massacre had been the work of Communist agitators.

Col. Pienaar's delusion that Communism was at the root of his troubles verged on hysteria. After we left him, my colleague Gerald Clark of the '*Montreal Star*', told me of his interview with the chief of police in Poznan, Poland after the riots there. Clark said the only difference between Pienaar and the Polish police

nan appeared to be that the latter was convinced all his troubles vere the product of Capitalist saboteurs.

Policemen are very much the same wherever you meet hem.

In Orlando Township outside Johannesburg I met two other olice types—Capt. J. De Wet Steyn, a vigorous, efficient fficer and a dead ringer for the best of New York's Irish cops; nd, under him, a dispirited detective, a man near retirement vho was watching his philosophy fail him.

The detective returned to Orlando on the night of March 28th, he windshield of his car shattered by a stone. He could not nderstand why it had happened to him, a man who had never sed the sjambok unnecessarily. Nor could he understand his wn son, who would not listen to him any more and was too big or his father to apply the corporal punishment on which his uthority depended.

Steyn showed no weakness. He was a professional, trained to leal with mobs, and had he been in command at Sharpeville here would have been no gunplay. I watched him break up a tone-throwing crowd at Orlando, and his technique was a lassically simple use of minimum force. He had full control of is men; and, as could be expected, the small disciplined force mposed its will on the larger undisciplined demonstration.

If I were a citizen of Johannesburg, I'd sleep better with Steyn in command than with the current chief, Col. Lemmer. saw him lose his temper one March night and expel Stephen Barber of the '*News Chronicle*' from his press conferences. It was ot an edifying sight. This was the first day of the Emergency Regulations, and the colonel was anxious to demonstrate that he vas a law unto himself, above the courts and certainly above roviding the simplest answer to a newspaper correspondent.

I did not have the pleasure of meeting Gen. Rademeyer, but saw evidence of his having gone over the head of the Minister of ustice. If South Africa had become a full instead of semi-olice state, he would have been a candidate for ruler; and it vas not surprising that after a month of Emergency Regulations, he politicians sent him into involuntary retirement.

Having tried the police, a foreign correspondent automatically ooks to the local press and wire services for information. For ts day to day news about South Africa, the world depends nainly on the U.S. Associated Press and United Press International

and on Reuters, which draws on the South African Press Association (SAPA).

In the freemasonry of the world of journalism, it is customary for the foreign correspondent of a reputable newspaper to receive every courtesy from local newspapers or local wire service offices.

The South African Press Association not only expressly refused Gerald Clark and myself an opportunity to look at the reports they were sending abroad, but also thought it necessary to call the South African Government Information Service and inform it of our presence in South Africa.

In contrast, the South African English-language newspapers were most co-operative. The only exception, and that was understandable, occurred at Capetown. At 2 a.m. one morning after we had written our stories, I called the '*Cape Times*' to check whether there had been any recent developments that we had missed. The editor to whom I spoke refused to speak on the telephone, but suggested that if we called in person and identified ourselves he would assist us.

We went to the newspaper office in an expectant mood, believing the refusal to talk on the telephone indicated that some major development was taking place. But no, it turned out that this was a routine precaution—for fear that the conversation would be tapped by the police and the paper accused of supplying information to overseas correspondents.

Once our attention had been called to it, telephone tapping seemed to be an integral part of the South African way of life. Figures were quoted for the substantial sums which the telephone service had invested in tapping and recording devices; private citizens displayed a reluctance to use the telephone except for the most innocuous calls, and I was able to hear for myself the sound of recording machines on the lines of people who took an interest in politics. Frequently, I was asked not to call a person by telephone but rather meet him in person.

From a professional viewpoint and a rather jaded one at that, the most refreshing experience in South Africa is encountering the magazine called '*Drum*'. In an era when newspapers seldom crusade and when reporters depend on public relations officers for information, '*Drum*' and its Editor, Tom Hopkinson, practise an intrepid and purposeful brand of fundamental journalism. In North America it would be called muck-raking, an almost forgotten tradition established by Lincoln Steffens, a relentless exposer of corruption of all sorts.

'*Drum's*' factual reporting, its enterprising unveiling of the eamiest aspects of apartheid and its delightful pin-ups form a nixture that rouses torpid instincts in any newspaperman. 'Why don't I give up my comfortable job,'' we say, ''and work or peanuts with these people?'' But, of course, we never do.

Most South African newspapermen I met knew the score and vould dearly have liked to write as they saw. Amongst them re some of the most courageous journalists in the world, but oo many have become inured to the daily indignities they see. Their shock mechanism no longer works. As one told me, ''We re immunized against shame.'' Another looked at me wide-yed and asked, ''Do you get emotionally involved in your vork?''

Perhaps one of my most embarrassing moments in the Union vas when an editor summoned an African office-boy to expose iis ignorance and indifference to politics. This performance vas intended to disabuse me of any misguided notion that the verage African wanted a vote. It only served to display the ack of communication between the white South African mployer and his black employee.

White South Africans I met in ordinary daily contact on the treet, in shops, or in buses and planes, seemed impelled to mpress a visitor with their colossal ignorance of black South Africans. Seldom have I met more courteous people; they vould walk blocks out of their way to guide me and, on the trength of a casual encounter, invite me into their homes.

The only abuse I received was at a Verwoerd rally, when an mpassioned Nationalist mistook me for an American and accused ie and the United States of plotting to invade the Union. We vere after the gold, he declared, and he, a government purchas-ng official, had instituted a boycott of U.S. goods. I could not onvince him that I was a Canadian, let alone persuade him that ur southern neighbour had no designs on his country.

Despite Mr. Louw's conviction that foreign correspondents ke locusts descend on the Union too frequently and with the ole intent of devastating the country, my experience is that ost of my colleagues lean backwards to give the Nationalist Government an opportunity to present its case. One rival of nine from a Conservative journal was presented with Father luddleston's '*Naught for Your Comfort*' on his departure from anada. He religiously refused to read it for fear of becoming iased. His eyes were opened when the Johannesburg Stock

Exchange took him to its respectable bosom and one of its members introduced him to an underground radio broadcasting unit.

My own repeated requests for an interview with Prime Minister Verwoerd or any of his senior Cabinet Ministers was treated with disdain by the South African Government Information Service. The best they could offer me was a briefing from a junior public relations man. Despite this rebuff, my paper persevered until the moss-backed Minister of Bantu Administration, De Wet Nel, granted an interview to my successor, Robert Nielsen, who immediately replaced me when my stay in the Union was cut short.

A Canadian correspondent, 10,000 miles from home, works under the disadvantage of being out of touch with his editors... Cable service is poor and telephoning nearly impossible... Whether it is preoccupation with recording devices or not, service between South Africa and London is vastly inferior to that between London and Toronto.

Feeling very much cut off from Canada and wondering about the quality of my work, I was cheered one day at lunch in Cape Town when I overheard two diplomats discussing the same problem. One of them said that he felt the best reports he had made to his government had been written during his first month in South Africa. His impressions had then become blunted, and it was not until after he had completed two years in the Union that he felt he had regained the same standard of objectivity as he had reached immediately after his arrival.

In my own case, I flew from Canada with the Rev. Ross Flemington, President of New Brunswick's Mount Allison University and head of the Federation of Canadian Universities. I had not seen him since the war, when he had been a principal Protestant chaplain with the Canadian Army overseas. Mr. Flemington stopped over in Nairobi and reached Johannesburg a day or two after my arrival. Each of us spent about three weeks in South Africa going our separate ways. We compared notes after we returned home.

President Flemington had one advantage over me. He had been in Hitler Germany in 1934 and had been shocked by what he saw there. South Africa in 1960, he said, left the same sour smell in his nostrils.

I could not have asked for better corroboration of what I had been trying to say.

DIARY FROM REFUGE

AN ANONYMOUS CORRESPONDENT

OR those on the run from the Nationalists, South Africa has no iendly borders. There are only those enclaves which by storical accident as much as anything fell under the protection the British Crown and are today the High Commission Terri-ries of Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland. Few of us ho crossed into the Protectorates during the first critical three eeks of the South African Emergency had any memory or taste r the early history of Moshesh, clamouring for British protec-on from Free State encroachment on his lands, of Swaziland as trophy, reluctantly garnered, of the Boer War, of Bechuanaland a British take-over to forestall the imperial German advance om Walvis Bay. Those who fled in the direction of Lobatsi, aseru and Mbabane knew that no passports were needed to cross e borders, that on some of the red-brown flying-dust roads mping into the Territories there are not even signposts showing here Verwoerd rule ends and Commonwealth Relations Office zerainty begins, and that immigration formalities would be slack non-existent, certainly at the time of the first influx of refugees".

This was no massed refugee movement such as poured across nema screens during the frightening days of the fall of France; t even like the white efflux from the Congo when the Belgian bble burst there a little while ago. But there were the elements the chase, the precipitate departure at a time of sudden shock, e split second decision after the thud or peeling ring at the door lls of 1,900 odd homes, African, White, Indian and Coloured, the raiding detectives shouldered their way into them in the all hours of the morning: "Public Safety Act—no warrants—t needed, Public Safety Act this time. No, no telephone calls." o questions answered. There is no point, after the first few, in king any. Questions are simply not encouraged during nergencies.

All the next day and for eight days after the Special Branch ntinued to haul in its catch, a ready-made silencer affixed to is lumbering police movement across the country. There is a n on all, husbands, wives, sweethearts, children, from breath-g aloud the names of those detained.

On How to Live in an Emergency. There are manuals on how to make friends and influence people, how to bring up children, how to do it yourself, how to make more money, to be a success . . . but nothing, yet, on how to live in an Emergency. This is the Alice in Wonderland world of sentence first, charge and verdict to follow. Arrests first, and the gazetting of the Emergency powers afterwards. There is the on-and-off-the-merry-go-round spectacle in court of lawyers filing *habeas corpus* papers for the release of detainees while the Crown assures the Court and the country that the Emergency is being proclaimed at that very moment, the regulations should arrive any minute, they are surely on their way. So on and on through the entire day and till after midnight, with one release application after another being trundled through only to be blocked by the Special Branch, which formally releases the bulk of the first detainees and then, as they move down the counter in a bolted and barred Marshall Square police headquarters, arrests them again—that orthodox laying on heavy hand on shoulder not omitted. At long last police action and State of Emergency are formally pronounced man and wife, after a ceremony long delayed while the bride caught up with the errant groom to drag him to the altar. The prisoners, briefly out of their cells, are back in again; and the Emergency is at long last recorded in cold black government printer's ink.

Some, very few, had not been home that night of the raids and these do not wait for a return visit from the same men in the tall hats. Where they can, they cross into the Protectorates: a half dozen to Bechuanaland; more to Basutoland; most, Africans and whites, to Swaziland.

Others, even fewer, were the subjects of the first *habeas corpus* applications and, released from custody, do not wait long. The journey begins. The seat of boldness is nowhere near the heart. Apprehension lies uneasily in the stomach and it is the quivers and gnawing there that turn the swift journey towards the mountains, the semi-desert, or the rolling hills of Swaziland from being the conventional long tripper's trek into South Africa's interior to a flight towards refuge. Even the most imperturbable feel that constriction in the stomach lessen as the journey draws to an end. The eager-beaver Sunday journalists, muted on other topics by Emergency conditions, ferret for the refugee-story and on the whole, are disappointed. There is the trade unionist who crosses into Basutoland through the Caledon River, his boots and small roll of clothes on his head; but this sort of copy is hard to

come by. For most who leave the Union, the Emergency is too serious to angle for front page "human interest" stories.

Throwing off Emergency nerves takes time. Refuge brings a lifting of tension at first, then a surging back of anxieties, old and new found. Minor decisions create major conflicts. Homes have been left standing, office desks abandoned, commitments deserted, telephones ringing, meetings unattended, bills unpaid. The painful scars of this and any such emergency are the spouses and friends behind bars, broken families and bewildered children.

Later, weeks of refuge bring an obsessional preoccupation with the endless round of trivialities and chores. The daily programme allows for little variation: washing up, budgeting, pooling of food and rent to stretch resources. Guavas grow wild on the hillsides outside the town, best market days are Wednesdays and Saturdays. Milk is fetched from the chemist and newspapers from the outfitters. The never-ending search for accommodation; a fifth levered into a room crowded by four. New sleeping arrangements with an extra mattress here and a stretcher there, all set for the weekend when the door opens and three new arrivals walk confidently in. The hunt for jobs is given up early on by most, for residence permits mean no jobs. Some live on reserves for the most part, and a fund committee dispenses aid sent by Christian Action for the penniless. From roughing it at first with enamel mug, tin plate and sleeping bag, the refugees climb higher to the refinement of sending for the range of cooking pots from home. Some try to carry on businesses at long distance. There are garbled trunk calls, the fevered decisions for a changing business world three hundred miles away. Despite our status as refugees, white skins and income still remain the open sesame to comfort—a guilty thought while 1,900 detainee families are without breadwinners. The post is late today; no letters from the Johannesburg Fort for 11 days, and the hunger strike now in its sixth. The evening meal sticks in the gizzard. Refugee life is rootless, workless, even shiftless. But there are no interrogations, no cold beans on tin plates, no cement floors in grey cells. No barbed wire thicknesses through which to peer at relatives and then to bellow in a confused chorus of family news and good cheer. Not the claustrophobic curtailment of exercise-yard strides. The only contact with Authority is the controlled courtesy and easy calm of the government official, traditionally removed from the bullying bluster of his Union counterpart.

Months spent here are a gash in time. Suspension in safety till life returns to normal. Will normality ever return? Isolation fattens rumour, and rumour feeds fear. For some comes the realization that at an age and time they did not choose, they need to build a new life in a strange country. But how travel away from South Africa without a passport? Papers, permits, birth certificates, yellow fever certificates, any papers, documentary proof of anything, as in a post-war transit camp, become certificates of status and intention. For most, however, plans are vague and amorphous, linked with the duration of the Emergency, and all the refugees really want is to go back home to South Africa to work again at the rounds that bring meaning into their lives.

The chit-chat ripples back from the bar counter and from that pub to the next. "You people should have stayed to take your medicine. Why didn't you face what was coming to you?" Ghosting the remonstrations is the debate on Bishop Reeves. Wrong to desert his flock. Right to leave in time, in safety, to complete urgent missions. Had he faced his challenge, or failed it? Had we? For the Bishop, say his detractors, it was meddling in politics to pass judgment on group areas, job reservation, and race classification. Reply his defenders: but these are Christian principles which reach from pulpit and pew to public place and personal conscience. Does one serve a cause better by being imprisoned or free? The public school attitude to the Bishop and to us is "play by the rules, face the music, you cad"—this presuming that it *is* all a game, that there are rules, and a white dustcoated umpire to guard their observance. But the rule of law is suspended in the Union and the niceties and conventions of evenly balanced teams and the rule book have been dispensed with altogether. Gone are witness box, open court, defence, court protocol. Emergencies respect no rules, no understanding between gentlemen. This has not been a flight from fair trial. Nor has it been flight from principle, or desertion of a cause, but a move surely to fight another day for both.

An adventurous Special Branch man infiltrates into the capital from the border post and is seen in the block of flats where most of the refugees live, though his rap on the door lacks that peremptory summons it would have had on his home ground. The wife of a refugee, seriously ill for months, faints in the doctor's consulting room downstairs. The two stories converge on one another and appear as cause and effect in one of Johannesburg's dailies. "Refugee faints at sight of Special Branch" runs the version

he chatter about the refugees grows more daring. Into one f Swaziland's weeklies '*The Swaziland Chronicle*' some of the hit-chat spills. In the PUB CHATTER column, 'Barfly' writes:

"There are too many refugees in Swaziland. The Passover is over—time some of them passed back."

There is a steady weekly stream of provocation and insult. is rumoured that there is a price on the heads of the refugees, nd a well-lined purse awaits any intrepid Swazilander who elivers a human trophy to the border post. Gossip commandeers ct. The refugees are spreading sedition in Swaziland. They ave been seen addressing meetings at the Market Square. "How id you know they were refugees?" "Oh, we knew, they wore eards. . . ." At supper time the bearded refugees, three in all, re subjected to close scrutiny by the whole accusing table. ll three solemnly shake their heads. For the most part the local opulace is indifferent to our presence. Some are warmly sym-athetic, some undisguisedly hostile; and for this latter group he hearsay deeds grow in enormity with the telling.

Even now, six weeks later, the Emergency is still very much ith us; and the Union's Minister of Justice, Mr. Erasmus, rings it sidling closer. Another of those tirades sweeps the nion Assembly based on the technique of making the charges rst and then issuing orders to the Special Branch to prove them terwards. This time the Minister gives Parliament five earnest easons why the Emergency cannot be lifted at once; amongst hem, one that nibbles at our asylum only five driving hours away. o long as wanted persons who have taken refuge in the Protec-orates have not been extradited and the Union Government is nable to fetch them, the Emergency must continue. Adds the linister: the Government is negotiating with the British overnment for the extradition of these persons.

Post-haste the day after comes the first slight retraction. No quest for extradition had yet been made to Britain, but on May h "a verbal request was made to a senior member of the staff the High Commissioner of the United Kingdom for the names persons who had crossed into the Protectorates to escape the ovisions of the Emergency Regulations, and a reply was ceived that a 'reply will be given in due course'."

Extradition, say the law books learnedly, relates to the sur-nder by one State to another of persons who are fugitives from stice. Under British practice, no person accused of a purely

political offence can be extradited. But the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881 governs the surrender of fugitives by the Commonwealth Relations Office and here, the pundits say, political offences are *not* excluded.

Inconclusive maze-winding arguments by sea-lawyers on the law and its meaning are inevitable among the refugees; and the issues echo in the Lords and Commons, where assurances are given by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations that the British Government will not turn anyone from the Union over to the South African authorities on political grounds. The point which troubles questioners, however, is the precise dividing line between what would constitute "political grounds" and what would constitute a criminal offence.

Mr. Gaitskell: If South African legislation makes political acts a criminal offence, does that in any way weaken the Minister's assurance that only persons who might be charged under the South African Criminal Code will be sent back?

On this point, say our press reports, Mr. Alport was not at all clear, even after repeated questioning. Heads move together round the dining-room table while the refugees, each with a competing favourite phrase, compose their retort to the extradition demand of the Union authorities.

We are not criminals in flight, but fugitives from injustice.

We are required not because we have committed offences against laws normally found operative in democratic countries, but for alleged violations of political laws that are peculiar to South Africa. In the past 12 years the Union Government has passed a number of Acts of Parliament creating special and unusual offences designed to make any political opposition to the Government, particularly by non-whites, a crime.

We have committed no crimes. We have sought political asylum not out of any consciousness of guilt but because of the arbitrary and haphazard way in which, under the Emergency, innocent people whom the Government knows it cannot successfully prosecute, have been summarily detained. We are certain that the object of the Government in seeking our extradition is not for the purpose of trying us, with due process of law, but indeed to deny us fair trial and imprison us indefinitely under the Emergency Regulations.

As for the Minister's charge that while in the Protectorates we are engaging in subversive activities against South Africa, this is sheer

invention intended to prejudice us in the eyes of the British Government. We are living through a miniature 1960 frontier war in which the South African Minister of Justice tries to turn three scattered little groups of political refugees into hostages for the lifting of the Emergency.

Britain will do no bargaining over the bodies of the refugees, he House of Commons is assured a week later. Meanwhile, in he Union, the Nationalist Party press and lobby have been reminded that upheaval in a seething country can be reduced to the vork of "agitators"—either those sheltering in the Protectorates r others still to be uncovered. It's the old story: lock up the gitators and the "Bantu" will be contented; charge the spokesnen of the strikers and the factory hands will find their wafer-thin ay envelopes enough; censor the press and South Africans will ncounter nothing but goodwill abroad. Wrongs are not wrong ntil someone writes or talks about them, for only when agitators" verbalize dissatisfaction does it exist.

The Union's political police, the Special Branch, operate on ne same "agitator" principle.

"Who," Special Branch interrogators asked successive detainees hauled up in the prisons for questioning, "*Who* is the Master-Mind?"

For a week the newspaper skirmish with the British Governnent on the subject of refugees becomes a useful diversion from ne Emergency proper. Posses of police are drafted from the outine exercise of harassing Africans for passes and digging for licit beer in township back yards, and are posted on duty at olice barriers across all roads leading into the Protectorates. roof of identity is demanded of drivers and passengers, while ar interiors and luggage compartments are searched. Routine ops at the police posts become part of the journey to and from waziland, like stopping for petrol. A mischievous Swazilander nnot deny himself the joy of announcing "Van Rensburg" when s name is demanded, to roar aloud at the rapturous shout of the olice patrol: "Jirrah! We've got one", and then to roar again conds later at the crestfallen look on the face of his disillusioned ptor. The borders have been slammed shut after the refugees ve fled, and the Union authorities are saying ominously that ey will wait for 20 years if need be to get their hands on them, hile they carefully seal off all such escape routes from the nion.

Slowly refugee routine and Swaziland routine begin to converge. Uprooted and third generation settlers alike share the speculation about how near or far off the projected rail-line is; the spectacle of the spit-and-polish smartness of the African police parade for the Queen's Birthday celebration; and the twice a week queue in the local library. There's comfort in identification with the conventional round, and there is reassurance in the head-nods during the slow progress up the main street, although conversation rarely moves beyond the polite exchange of slight neighbourly acquaintance. Refugee preoccupation with jails and police raids, censored letters from cells, the deportation of African youngsters from the cities on the grounds that adolescent idlers graduate into adult agitators (even Master-Minds?) are on the whole—with some warming exceptions—not at all the subjects for polite talk. Hotly expressed revulsion with Nationalist policies is a welcome binding agent between refugee and Swazilander, but there remains a puzzling self-righteousness about Swazilanders that this is a land of *no politics*, as though it constituted superior taste or finesse to keep the atmosphere clear of controversy. Some of the advocates of *no politics* are the violent few who mutter darkly in corners against the refugees, since their very presence in asylum is held to import undesirable issues into the country. Then, surprisingly, this same group turns out to be the small clique from which emanates the plot to return runaways, kidnapping them back to the Union if need be. Do the people who insist on *no politics* really mean "no arguments against my politics?" The kidnap threats do not come to anything, although two heavy-booted Swazi policemen spend several cold nights pacing the pavements before the refugee-occupied block of flats while the refugees, to their shame, hold an uproarious party upstairs, with the excuse that it is easier to guard everyone in one place and, while we are all together, why not be jolly?

Three months, one quarter of 1960, draw to a close, and the permit issue looms. When first refugees crossed into Swaziland the Immigration Law was amended to enable the High Commissioner to by pass the Immigration Board procedure and issue special permits, entirely at his discretion, subject to withdrawal at any time and to any conditions laid down by the High Commissioner. On the day that the three-month period expires for the first of the refugees, the set of conditions is produced and an undertaking requested that the permit holder will take no part in

olitics in the Protectorates or in any territory bordering upon hem. With the conditions of release for the first Union detainees et out of prison still fresh in our ears, the conditions for asylum rom the Nationalists have an ominous ring.

We have no intention of becoming involved in Swaziland politics. But the right of self-defence and of reply to false attacks, which the conditions of the permit will deny us completely, is another thing altogether. We recognize that the right to engage in Swaziland affairs is the prerogative of its own citizenry. We appreciate that we are the guests of the High Commission authorities and of Great Britain. We want to continue to enjoy political asylum in Swaziland. We have no intention of converting Swaziland into a base from which to launch "subversive attacks" on the Union, as charged by the Union Minister of Justice; nor would we be able, even if we wished, to organize and control the affairs and activities of Union political bodies from a Protectorate. Yet we do feel that we cannot accept restrictions on our right to defend ourselves when under fire. What does the term "politics" embrace? The undertaking gives little guidance on precisely what we are permitted to do and to say, so that we may find we have breached it in ignorance and are therefore liable not only to expulsion but to criminal prosecution. Where the undertaking is specific, it seems it would preclude us from drawing attention to our plight, or from campaigning for the repeal of the Emergency Regulations, for the release of relatives and friends who are detainees, and for our right to return to our homes and families without hindrance. The undertaking would prohibit us from commenting on, or writing articles for the press in the Union, Britain, or further afield on any issue relating to events in South Africa.

We are only too conscious that we must not take any course which would justify the authorities in terminating our asylum and we are anxious to consult with the authorities about the wisdom of any stand we might wish to take. The power of the High Commissioner to terminate the permit of any refugee whose actions offend is the ultimate sanction and surely safeguard enough against the development of any embarrassing situations. We add, politely, that we find the undertaking vitally objectionable and will not sign it.

The issue of how to treat political refugees should be relatively imple for a country like Britain that has a time-honoured radition of giving asylum, from the days of Mazzini before modern taly, to Kossuth in the time of Gladstone, even to Marx. What bedevils the issue? Policy towards Nationalist South Africa is one of the touchstones by which the emergent African continent

judges the stand of the world powers; and where she has to choose between the Union and the rest of Africa, Britain has already shown that obscurantist Nationalist Government policies are expendable. It is the delicate relationship between the Union and Britain over the Protectorates which clearly inhibits Britain in handling the problem of the refugees (a small problem, admittedly, if one counts the number of refugees involved, but as large as any point of principle). Is it not out of consideration for Union attitudes that Britain imposes these severe conditions on the refugees?

Since Union in 1910, the three High Commission Territories have been like the children of a broken marriage. Britain has custody of the offspring; but South Africa has remained the belligerent father, unreconciled by the terms of the separation agreement or the passing of the years, seeking pretexts again and again to reclaim custody. When there are no pretexts, the Union Government will invent them; for, like the Republic, incorporation of the Protectorates is one of the few diversionary items left in the Nationalist Party cupboard—food to take the minds of impatient party supporters away from real issues in the Union. In the Africa of 1960, there is no hint that Britain would agree to any changed status for the Protectorates. The Nationalists are further than ever from getting custody. But any hint of concession to Union pressure, on whatever issue connected with the Protectorates, will be an open invitation to the Union to press her claims more strongly. The economic links between the Union and the Protectorates, the heavy dependence by the three countries on the Union's labour market, even the dual rôle of the High Commissioner as Britain's diplomatic representative to the Union and at the same time chief protector of the Territories, have all helped to blur the fact that the Territories remain independent of the Union. Harbouring refugees from Nationalist injustice might be "embarrassing" for a power that would rather no extraneous issue interfered with a well-ordered pattern of relations between the two governments. But the best-ordered relationships are disturbed by Emergencies; and, in the Union, Emergencies are endemic, like typhoid in the jails. In the April 1960 crisis the patient's temperature leapt to the top of the graph and his convulsions were alarmingly violent, but the patient has lived to convalesce until the next fever mounts. For those in the vicinity, on her borders, on the same continent, in the same world, no safe immunisation from these epidemics has yet been found. They threaten to touch us all.

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REFERENDUM FOR A REPUBLIC

L. J. BLOM-COOPER

Legal Correspondent for ' The Observer ' and ' The Guardian ' ; sent to report on the South African Treason Trial for ' Justice '.

In 1942, amid the global clash of arms, the Nationalists of Sou Africa gave their followers and opponents a foretaste of what w to come with their advent to power. On January 23rd, at t zenith of German prowess in the world war, they propagat their idea of what a modern State's constitution should lo like. Neither Hitler nor Mussolini would have disavowed t brainchild of their champions in Southern Africa.

Both '*Die Transvaler*' and '*Die Burger*' of that date carried their columns, with the authority of Dr. Malan, a draft repub can constitution. The architects of that remarkably sinist document were Mr. Strydom and the then editor of '*Die Tra valer*', Dr. Verwoerd. In the ensuing years, with the decline Nazi power in Europe and the all-important South Afric election on the horizon, both Dr. Malan and Mr. Strydo attempted to escape the consequences of having associated the selves with the draft constitution. But even Dr. Malan w moved to admit that it did represent a rough outline of what t Afrikaners aimed to achieve, though he claimed that it was o a draft and a malleable document. As far as I know, no su disavowal has ever been known to pass the lips of Dr. Verwoe who has now at last thrust upon the white electorate of the Uni a referendum for a republic. What must be of especial sign cance to the South African of 1960, now expected by Nationali to ignore the 1942 draft, is how many of the broad aims of t constitution are already a part of the law of the land. After a the constitutional struggle with the Courts over the Ca Coloured voters may have appeared to be a trifling issue o which to rend the nation in two; but it clearly reflected t provisions of Article 3 of the draft constitution which stated "the white subjects who are acknowledged as members of State by the Government will be called 'burgers' with distinction of race" and "only 'burgers' can obtain the right vote with regard to the government of the republic as such . .

Article 11 (d) has also been achieved by the parliament accretion of power over the lives of all Africans in the Uni This article says that the "attitude of whites over against bizarre and ironical inarticulateness on the part of the Afrika

raftsman) non-whites is being regulated in the spirit of hristian guardianship by the former over the latter. The rinciple of no mixing of blood and of segregation must be aintained as of fundamental importance for the future existence a white civilization in the Republic of South Africa''.

If English-speaking people in South Africa and other opponents the Nationalists were not greatly perturbed by the appearance the draft constitution in 1942, the implied effect of a vote for publicanism in 1960 is a very real threat, whether or not ch a draft constitution is waved in their faces. To those ritish South Africans whose attachment to the Crown has robably never been more vigorous than now, the coming of a public is one more step in the long line of defeats suffered at e hands of the Afrikaner 'volkseenheid'. After the declaration of a republic, there may come that government control of ducation which has been increasing ever since the fatal day in 948 when Dr. Malan and his henchmen were swept into power. But worse still in the minds of the English-speaking South fricans would be the demotion of their language. If they could e certain that a republic was merely the removal of the symbol British domination, they might be less willing to exhibit their position at the ballot boxes on October 5th. But the draft nstitution must dispel any thought that the Nationalists would eep their predatory hands off so large a prize. As a matter of riority in the draft constitution, ''Afrikaans, as the language of e original white inhabitants of the country (an historical accuracy, since High Dutch prevailed as the Afrikaner's ngue to well into the twentieth century), will be the first fficial language. English will be regarded as a second or supplementary language and will enjoy equal rights, freedom and rivileges with the first official language everywhere and whenver such treatment is judged by the State authority to be in the est interests of the State and its inhabitants''. If evidence ere needed that the Afrikaners are in earnest about this rovision and that there has not been any change of heart in this spect since 1942, one need only look to the Courts. Whereas e majority of Court judgments were delivered in English until ry recently, the reverse is now the case. The Chief Justice, r. Justice Steyn, in fact makes it a practice to deliver every dgment in Afrikaans, even though all the parties to the action e English-speaking and the whole of the proceedings have en conducted in that language.

Thus to the English-speaking peoples it must appear that th referendum is their last-ditch stand. Once this incursion made and conceded, their own culture will have been submerge in an Afrikaner sea. But if that is not enough to convince th South Africans of the results of republican status, the fascis style draft constitution—taken with the record of apartheid thes last 12 years—is the surest indication of the aim to produce National-Socialist government in South Africa in order t maintain the supremacy of the white race.

Article 11 of the draft constitution needs only to be read to b believed. The provisions require no comment. "The publ tone of the life of the Republic is Christian-National withou any forcing of conscience, and the honouring of this tone of li is demanded in all public activities which have a formativ influence upon the spirit of the people. The propagation o any State policy and the existence of any political organizatio which is in strife with the fulfilling of this Christian-Nation vocation of life of the people is forbidden". The article goes o in that vein throughout and significantly adds: "the Republ acknowledges the freedom of the organization and governmen of churches, provided that their acts do not disturb the publ order, undermine the national morals or attack the authority o the State".

While all the aims of the draft constitution can be, and som indeed have been, achieved without the act of becoming republic, there is a deep significance in the referendum. Isol tion from her neighbours in the world would become complet if the act of republicanism were to result in the expulsion o South Africa from the Commonwealth. And the relations wit the wider international community would hardly be improve It is in fact South Africa's attitude towards her internation responsibilities that could tip the scales against a vote fo Dr. Verwoerd.

After deciding initially to exclude the whites of South-We Africa from the referendum, the Nationalist Cabinet reverse that decision on the ground that the slender majority expecte from the four provinces needed strengthening by the few tens thousands of white voters in the mandated territory—but practice fifth province—of South-West Africa. From experien since 1949 when the whites of the territory had representatio in the Union Parliament, white South-West provides a sol block of Nationalist support.

The International Court of Justice declared in its advisory opinion of 1950 that the mandate status of the territory persisted and that the obligations owed by South Africa to the League were transferred automatically to the United Nations. It was therefore wrong for the Union to regard South-West Africa as a fifth province of the Union. While the Union Parliament was strictly entitled to legislate for the mandated territory, it could not unilaterally alter the status of the territory. Sovereignty may not with the Union, but probably with the United Nations or at least in suspended animation. South-West Africa is therefore a foreign country in relation to all constitutional issues within the Union. Granting the right to white South-West Africans to vote in the referendum is as though the British Government allowed all Frenchmen with incomes over £3000 a year to vote in a British general election. It is unthinkable that the destinies of Britishers should depend on the vital vote of a few Frenchmen. To claim the contrary in South-West is to show that South Africa regards the mandated territory as part of the Union. This is in defiance of the ruling of the International Court of Justice and the United Nations.

The challenge to the Nationalists to justify their grant of a referendum franchise to the white South-West Africans and the projected assault upon the Union Government's failure to carry out its obligations towards the United Nations when the General Assembly meets in September may prove at last that the mandated territory is in reality the Achilles' heel of apartheid.

THE SACRED TRUST OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA

THE REV. MICHAEL SCOTT

Director of the Africa Bureau and Petitioner for the non-white peoples of South West Africa at the United Nations.

No question coming before the 1960 General Assembly coul be more clear-cut in terms of right and wrong than that o South West Africa. Yet in terms of action, of procedure, o politics and international law, the answer is no more definit today after fourteen years of debate than it was in the year th United Nations was born. Failure to resolve it has become reproach to the Western world (for it is peculiarly a Weste problem) and to Western concepts of the scope of internationa law and trusteeship. What has been happening in this obscur corner of Africa during the fourteen years that it has bee debated in the U.N., is the outward and visible sign of an inwar and spiritual disgrace. The disgrace is none the less because has grown to its present magnitude while fear of Communis has so engrossed the United States and Britain that their own vita principles of law and justice have been undermined by neglec

It will be recalled that it was on account of the tragic conse quences of Germany's first attempts to carry the doctrine of th herrenvolk to its practical conclusions in South West Afric that the Hereros were reduced from eighty thousand to fiftee thousand men, and that women and children and the Nama an Berg Damara tribes were similarly massacred. This so outrage the conscience of the civilized world at the end of World War (*vide* the British Government's Blue Book C.D.9146) that th decision was taken by America, Britain and the other Allies t establish the principle of international accountability for th former colonial possessions of Germany and the Central Powers

Today in many parts of Africa there is being reaped the whir wind that was sown half a century ago. The white man, in h pride and often ruthless self-aggrandisement when remove from his own native soil, failed to understand the giganti human problems he was creating by his own impact on Afric For he was doing much more than bringing to Africa a gospel deliverance; he was rolling up the blinds on a new culture th revealed new satisfactions and demands. He did not understan the effect on the Africans of liberation from something ve much more than slavery by the impact of modern civilizatio

d new political institutions and ideas. Instead of recognizing e political corollary of his religious and educational policies African self-government, he sought to retard politically those nom every other influence he had brought with him was lvanising into new intellectual life.

If the white man's morality and political philosophy in the rly twentieth century had been able to match his progress in e physical and applied sciences, Europe would not have been ought to the brink of destruction twice in our generation by arrogant nationalism and the power of an irrational myth hich, however demonstrably nonsensical and "unscientific", is yet capable of the worst crimes against humanity ever rpetrated. We must continually remind ourselves—in ewing the problem of South and South West Africa—that the anned destruction of no one knows now how many millions of en, women and children was the act, not of a primitive and ckward people, but of one of the most highly developed and chnically advanced States in the world.

Thus it is that although the South West African Mandate may em a small and obscure question on the U.N. agenda, it is g with implications for Africa and the Western world. The resent generation of white people in South Africa will inherit e whirlwind sown by our forefathers in the inadequacy of eir religion, morality and politics, unless there are some who n rise to the challenge of the African tomorrow. For to-orrow is born out of today. It is a tomorrow in which the hite man could have a far different role to play in the con-ruction of a new civilization with new values to match the w techniques of the coming nuclear age.

In terms of procedure, it seems as though the independent frican States will seek a judgment from the International Court of ıstice on South Africa's non-fulfilment of the Mandate. This is eing done because all previous recommendations both of the eneral Assembly and the International Court of Justice have been nored by South Africa and by those members of the Common-ealth—such as the United Kingdom—who are most intimately ound to her and to the sacred trust of the Mandate, through e British Crown to which the Mandate was originally entrusted.

It may be, therefore, that a judgment will have to be sought in vo different stages. The first would be concerned with tablishing the extent of United Nations jurisdiction, including necessary its power to revoke the Mandate, as well as the

standing of individual Member States of the former League of Nations, to settle whether their rights under the Mandate treaty extend from particular questions affecting them as individual States to the whole application of the Mandate.

It seems unlikely that the Court would give an advisory opinion on whether South Africa's present administration constitutes a violation of the Mandate. This would in part be the subject of the judgment which it is then proposed to seek in the face of South Africa's rejection of all the resolutions of the General Assembly over fourteen years and of the three advisory opinions of the International Court on the status and continuing responsibilities of South Africa towards the United Nations and the Court under the Mandate.

The purpose of seeking such a judgment of the Court would be to terminate South Africa's jurisdiction over South West Africa and so enable the United Nations to assume direct administration of the Territory, with the aid of all its specialised agencies, until the people as a whole are able to govern themselves.

In this connection, the opinions of two British judges of the International Court, Sir Arnold McNair and Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, should be quoted, together with the conclusion of the United Nations Committee on South West Africa.

In a separate opinion published with the advisory opinion of 1950, Sir Arnold stated: "Although there is no longer any League to supervise the exercise of the Mandate, it would be an error to think that there is no control over the Mandatory. Every State which was a member of the League at the time of its dissolution still has a legal interest in the proper exercise of the Mandate. The Mandate provides two kinds of machinery for its supervision—judicial, by means of the right of any Member of the League under Article 7 to bring the Mandatory compulsorily before the permanent Court, and administrative, by means of annual reports and their examination by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League . . ."

In 1955 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht said: "A State may not be acting illegally by declining to act upon a recommendation or series of recommendations on the same subject. But in doing so it acts at its peril when a point is reached when the cumulative effect of the persistent disregard of the articulate opinion of the Organization is such as to foster the conviction that the State in question has become guilty of disloyalty to the Principle and

Purposes of the Charter. (Such a) State . . . may find that it has overstepped the imperceptible line between impropriety and illegality . . . and that it has exposed itself to consequences legitimately following as a legal sanction".

The conclusion to which the U.N. Committee on South West Africa has come after six years' exhaustive study of the problem may be summarized in the words of the Committee's Report to the General Assembly for 1959.

"The Committee has become increasingly disturbed at the trend of the administration in recent years, and at the apparent intention of the Mandatory Power to continue to administer the Territory in a manner contrary to the Mandate, the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, and the resolutions of the General Assembly . . .

"The Committee considers it essential to the welfare and security of the peoples of South West Africa that the administration of the Territory be altered without undue delay in order to ensure the political, economic, social and educational development of the whole of the population and the application of the principle of equal rights and opportunities for all of the inhabitants. Having examined conditions in the Territory for the sixth successive year, however, the Committee cannot fail to conclude that such an essential change in the administration is not likely to occur, owing to the intransigence of the Mandatory Power and its exercise of uncontrolled authority over the Territory. The Committee accordingly recommends, with a view to the protection of the fundamental rights of the inhabitants of the Territory under the Mandates System, that the General Assembly should consider means of ensuring the fulfilment by the Union Government of its obligations under the Mandate and the Charter with respect to South West Africa in the event that the Union Government persists in its rejection of the supervisory authority of the United Nations over the administration of the Territory."

While it is true perhaps that South West Africa is part of the larger problem of South Africa's whole race policy and has been referred to the Security Council for action that is still awaited, the Mandate debate offers and necessitates another procedure. Even if long drawn out it may prove as challenging to South Africa in the end as anything that the Security Council may be able or unable to do in the very near future.

THE HORROR OF MOÇAMBIQUE

CHIKOMUAMI MAHALA[5]

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SINCE 1951, Moçambique has ceased to be a 'colony'. On June 11th, 1951, the Portuguese Government decided that the 'colonies' should become 'Overseas Provinces'. But what is it that has changed?

When in the last years of the fifteenth century the ships of Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape and reached at last the Moçambique coast, the Portuguese found Arab and Indian traders already installed in the northern part of the territory. These had arrived several centuries earlier, and had for long traded with the Africans, particularly in gold and ivory. And though the Portuguese may have taken to the high seas in order to discover a route to India, it is certain that they had already heard of the ivory and above all the gold of this 'fabulous realm of Monomotapa which stretches from the highlands of the Zambesi down to the sea at Sofala.' For from the first they sought to establish trading posts along the coast, to serve at once as supply stations on the route to India and depots for trade with the Africans.

Little by little the Portuguese set about dislodging the Asian merchants from their positions. They would first make war on the Oriental Sultans, then on the Africans themselves. With the trading stations, the fortresses, the Ambassadors of the Crown with which they surrounded the African kings, the first missionaries would arrive, and an army of occupation.

Right up to the first years of the nineteenth century, the Portuguese had full control only over the trading stations along the coast. The only area in which they established themselves in numbers was on the Zambesi, where they laid areas under cultivation—the Prazos. Soon however a new phase of colonial history began. The effects of the industrial revolution were making themselves felt, and the commercial companies put in their appearance. In order to retain trade monopolies over whole regions, it was no longer enough to have trading posts: the occupation of the hinterland became essential. Thus, when towards the middle of the nineteenth century the imperial powers in Europe were feverishly preparing to occupy and exploit the African interior, Portugal also redoubled her efforts to conquer the hinterland and prevent Britain from overtaking her.

By exploiting differences between African kings, multiplying treaties,' 'protective alliances,' and 'punitive expeditions,' the Portuguese sought to overcome the resistance put up by the African peoples, who had up till then managed to contain them in the fortified trading posts on the coast. A powerful obstacle, and the last great bastion of African liberty, then confronted them: the Vatua empire, founded by Manicussi about 1833. In the wave of unification which swept the Bantu society of the time, Manicussi and his successors Muzila and Gungunyama had built an empire extending across the regions of the Limpopo up to the Pungue river, and perhaps right as far as the Zambesi. Despite the technical superiority of the Portuguese, their victory over the Vatua army was an arduous one, and was not complete until 1897, with the heroic death of Maguiguana, the Vatua general who organized popular resistance after the capture of his sovereign, Gungunyama.

However, the 'pacification' of the territory had still to continue for some twenty years, as each tribe heroically defended its own freedom.

For the Africans, defeat meant the end of their hopes of remaining free men. Their whole existence was now to be ruled by the determination somehow to survive. The Zambesi continues to flow in its bed as wide as a great sea, but its waters no longer carry the gold from Monomotapa. From the Congo, through Angola and Rhodesia, its waters now carry the sweat and the suffering of men in the mines and the fields. To its banks cling villages in the middle of the bush, with their huts, their raised granaries and here and there a palm tree tall in the sun. Leaving the last cotton fields and palm trees of Moçambique, it throws itself with jubilation into the immensity of the ocean. It is as if the river itself understood the necessity for reminding men every day of the need to strive towards freedom.

The whole cultural wealth of the peoples of Moçambique bears witness to their refusal to perish. It is proof of their will to survive in spite of everything. In spite of the presence of the Portuguese, the tom-toms still sound in the Batuques on moonlit nights. The woodcarvings of the Makondes have already been seen all over the world, reproduced in specialist publications. Chope music has been set down in note form, and the sound of the famous 'tambilas' (balaphones) of the Chope musicians is still heard throughout Moçambique.

The black people have guarded well their inmost treasure, which is their language. For language is the collective memory

of a people. The African languages have been the vehicles of the countless proverbs, stories, fables, poems, and songs which make up our heritage of oral literature.

But today the African languages are deprived of any status... Teaching in the vernacular is permitted only in so far as it is a medium for learning Portuguese. Nevertheless, from end to end of the country, barely 1 per cent of the African population knows Portuguese. For if the Portuguese forbid the teaching of African languages, they do not favour the teaching of their own language to Africans either—quite the contrary. To the Portuguese, all that is important is 'native' labour, cheap manual labour.

Approximately 90 per cent of the Africans live off the soil, for Moçambique, like all African countries, is essentially agricultural. Since traditional methods of agriculture are today of very little commercial value, the land is largely divided up into huge 'concessions' and 'plantations', which belong solely to Europeans and produce the main export crops. These plantations belong to large agricultural companies, and some of them are highly mechanised, employing a large African labour force. Among the most important are the Incomati Sugar Estates, the Companhea Colonial do Buzi, the Sena Sugar Estates, all producing sugar; the Companhea do Boror, and Sociedad Agricola do Madal producing copra; and a large number of other plantations of sisal, jute and tea. Several of them, such as the Companhea do Boror, are enormous industrial enterprises. With its 89,324 hectares and its two million trees producing 13,000 tons of copra annually, it is the world's biggest copra plantation owned by a single enterprise.

The 'concessions' are different. They are vast regions of small holdings, in which the peasants are compelled to produce a predetermined quota, which is assessed and imposed by the administration. In a region 'conceded' by the State to a 'concessionary' society, which holds the purchasing monopoly over the total produce, the African peasant is obliged to cultivate certain crops—such as rice or cotton—at the expense of all other, food-producing, crops, so that he is entirely at the mercy of fluctuations in the international market, as well as the caprices of the seasons.

It even happens, in the case of rice for example, and in years when the harvest is poor, that the peasants are forced to sell all their crop. If they need cereal for their own personal con-

umption, they must pay for it on the open market at six or even times the price for which they sold it.

The export of cotton is all channelled through Lisbon. Cotton grows sporadically everywhere, but mainly in the northern egions of Nyassa. Because of the very large areas it occupies, he great number of manual labourers required, and the way in vhich production is organized, cotton cultivation remains of onsiderable significance in Moçambique. The State fixes the rice, insists on a monopoly over exporting it, and through rotectionist laws guarantees sufficient supplies to industries in ortugal. The Portuguese textile manufacturers thus find in Moçambique a source of raw material produced by cheap anual labour, at a price lower than that on the international narket. These are the very same manufacturers that later xport 'African' cotton cloths to be sold in the market-places f Moçambique.

Agricultural products are at present the primary source of evenue to the country. They are nearly all condemned to xport, because Moçambique remains to this day stagnant in n industrialising world. Portugal is itself an under-developed ountry of course, and cannot therefore be the motor for any nportant economic development in Moçambique. One quick ance at the colony's external trade establishes only 28 per cent f imports as coming from Portugal. The rest comes from other ountries, such as the United States, Union of South Africa, ngland and Belgium. And while the goods imported from ortugal are consumer goods, such as textiles, clothes, wines, ms, it is the other countries which sell agricultural and dustrial equipment, vehicles and fuels to Moçambique.

An important part of the capital invested in Moçambique is qually not Portuguese. Of the three banks trading there, only ne is Portuguese (Banco Nacional Ultramarino); the two others e Barclay's Bank and the Standard Bank of South Africa. ght of the 23 insurance companies are not Portuguese either. apital for a large number of agricultural and industrial enter-rises is wholly or partly foreign.

Only a very small proportion of raw materials is absorbed on e spot. There is a small textile factory belonging to a sub-diary of a colonial cotton development company whose incipal is in Portugal. A few small industries can also be ted, which produce flour (from manioc and maize), beer, ound-nut oil, soaps, cement, as well as plants for refining

sugar, polishing rice, processing rubber, and making Italian pastas.

Coal is the principal mineral wealth at present being exploited, and production attained 218,299 tons in 1956. The Companhea Carbonisera possesses a capital of 1,360,000 dollars, shared mainly by the Belgian Société Minière (40 per cent), the Companhea do Moçambique (private Portuguese capital—30 per cent) and the Portuguese Government (10 per cent).

To these activities can be added stock-breeding, fishing, and fish-curing, the exploiting of oil and of metals—but all at a very low level of production.

The common factor among all these different activities is manual labour. Black, poverty-stricken manual labour. Whether in the plantations or in the concessions, in the extractive and processing industries or in the building trade, it is the black man who provides the labour. To Europeans come 'naturally' the administrative posts.

Several writers, like Basil Davidson and John Gunther, have described the organisation of labour in Portuguese colonies. In particular they have denounced the new form of slavery in the forced labour imposed under the 'contract' system. We shall not go over this ground again. Let us recall only the mechanism. The planters put their demands to the administrative authorities, and these are responsible for forcibly recruiting enough labour in the villages to satisfy the demand. Thus the negro is no longer a slave—today, he is a 'Contratado'.

Official statistics show that African male workers in agriculture are paid from 3 escudos 70 centimes per day, and women from 3 escudos 50 centimes, children 2 escudos 10 centimes. In the mines, workers are paid from 5 escudos 50 centimes, and in some processing industries as much as 8 escudos 70 centimes. The same statistics show that wages for Coloureds and 'assimilados' vary between 370 and 900 escudos per month; and those for Europeans between 1,600 and 3,900 escudos, reaching 5,000 and 7,000 escudos per month in industry.

To this picture of forced and underpaid labour, must be added the unpaid compulsory labour imposed 'in the public interest'. The law actually lays down that prison sentences may be replaced by compulsory labour. As any excuse is good enough to arrest an African, the State is assured of a considerable supply of workers without spending the smallest sum.

The 'Native Tax' is one of the means used for obtaining free

labour. Every black man being compelled to pay tax, he must therefore somehow find the money. He will search for work either in the plantations or in the mines or factories, or even among European families as 'boy'. However, as the annual tax is usually as high as, if not higher than, the monthly salary, an appreciable number of Africans never manage to collect the necessary sum. They are then arrested, and for six months they build roads, railways, houses, working free for the State.

By the Convention of September 11th, 1926, with the Union of South Africa, and that of June 30th, 1934, with Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese Government is bound to send to these countries a quota of approximately 160,000 workers. In return, South Africa and Rhodesia agree to channel a large proportion of their exports through Moçambique to the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques. This emigration forms a source of foreign exchange, 'an important source of revenue' for the Portuguese Government, as Henrique Galvao and Carlos Selvagem express it in their study '*Imperio ultramarino Portugues*' (*Vol. IV*).

To legal emigrants must be added the thousands of illegal emigrants. The worker often prefers to emigrate, for the other side of the frontier wages are higher, despite everything. But he will avoid being enrolled in the official contingents, if he can, because that may be worse than staying behind. He thus chooses the secret way. He can join the labour market in the adjoining territory, and defend his own interests better than the Portuguese labour recruiting agents are likely to do.

In January 1947, Henrique Galvao—then deputy of the Uniao Nacional, Salazar's Party, and today a political refugee in Brazil—said in the National Assembly, in a report that was scathingly critical of the methods of recruitment and conditions of work in the Portuguese colonies in Africa "that entire frontier regions are being depopulated, and only old people, sick people, women and children are now to be found there." And he went on: "The most accurate description of this impoverishment (of population) is given us by the catastrophic fall in the birthrate, the incredible level of infant mortality, the growing number of sick and infirm, as well as the mortality figures due to various causes, the most important being the conditions of work and the recruitment of labourers."

Such assertions are all the more convincing because they come from the mouth of one who, although now opposed to the policy

of the fascist Salazar Government, remains in favour of retaining the colonies.

The 'Natives', 98 per cent of the total population, are in fact the pariahs of Moçambique. Just as in the Union of South Africa, they are forced to carry passes. They may not change their place of residence, nor leave one village for another, without prior permission from the administrative authorities. In the towns they are subject to a permanent curfew after nine o'clock. Whatever hospitals, crèches, rest homes and retreats there are in the territory all remain the exclusive privilege of the white minority.

Education for Africans—so-called 'rudimentary' education—is almost exclusively confined to the Catholic Missions. It is on these that devolves the full responsibility for 'training' the Africans to the level of Portuguese 'citizenship.' Rudimentary education consists of teaching African children Portuguese, and the customs and way of life of the Portuguese . . . without forgetting, of course, that there is no salvation outside the Church, and that to be 'civilized' is first to be Christian, and what is more, Catholic. After passing through the rudimentary schools, some African children will learn a trade of some sort, and become carpenters, shoemakers, or even 'boys'. Or else they will simply return to their village.

The Coloureds and 'assimilados' only reach the technical secondary schools, or with much more difficulty, the grammar schools. Rare are those who succeed in pursuing their studies as far as a Portuguese University—for there is no University in Moçambique.

In the administration and the economy, the same stratification obtrudes itself. On one side are the Europeans, occupying the high and middle ranks of power and supervision; these are the masters of the country. On the other side are the 'Natives', the vast majority of the blacks, the peasants on the concessions, the workers on the plantations and the mines, the 'boys' in the homes of the Europeans. Between the two extremes, one finds the intermediate layer of the Coloureds (30,000) and the 'assimilados' (4,000–5,000), who are the skilled workers and petty officials. To this group can also be added the Indian minority (from Goa), whose social status is almost identical with that of the Coloureds, although on the whole their standard of living is higher.

Effectively, the law divides the inhabitants of the colonies of

uinea, Angola and Moçambique into two categories: the itizens' of Portugal, who enjoy full rights; and the Portuguese latives', who possess no rights outside their traditional rican institutions—or whatever remains of them.

The first category is made up of Portuguese by birth or by scent. In the same category (but in fact with far fewer rights d all the economic and social limitations already described) e the Coloureds and 'assimilados'—blacks who have attained izenship. The Natives, so hypocritically described as 'Por-guese', are the rest, that is, practically the whole black pulation. The Natives can theoretically attain the status of itizen' if they fulfil certain very elastic conditions, which nd to make them renounce their African characteristics. They n then join the category of 'assimilado'; but it should be ted that the status of 'assimilado' cannot be transmitted from her to son.

The 'assimilado's' position is in fact a complete violation of personality of the African, and the certificate of assimilation a certificate of depersonalisation. The African is expected know how to read and write Portuguese, and to forget his n ways and customs in order to adopt those of the Portuguese. is in fact expected to cease to be himself.

But this is not all: promotion to citizenship is a gigantic nfidence trick. For even if an African can read and write rtuguese and has learnt 'white manners'—even if he fulfils the conditions laid down by law—he does not automatically come a citizen. He must make an application to the admini-ation, and authorities only grant citizenship when they choose. A friend who was a doctor in a town up-country, told us a story a male nurse who wished to become assimilated. For four cessive years he put forward his request in due and proper m. The doctor himself endorsed it. And four times he was used what under the law was his right.

The reason for the refusal is simple enough: if the nurse uld become an 'assimilado', his salary would increase at e six-fold, and would be nearly equivalent to that of a white se . . . this in addition to the outrage of the European nurses having a 'nigger' as colleague. For there is one Portuguese stronger than any other, as fantastic and yet as real as the bab tree—and that is the law of racial segregation.

Portugal has absolutely succeeded in keeping the African out of direction of the affairs of his own country. Without in any

way wounding the conscience of world opinion—complaisant as that may be—she keeps the Africans at a proper distance from the reins of power. And even if the 'Regulos' (customary chiefs) remain in charge of their villages, they have today become mere petty officials of the Government. The traditional customs of succession have been overturned, and the Regulos know only too well that at the least opposition to the administration they will be destooled.

At present the organs of political power are the Governor General, nominated by the Minister for Overseas Provinces in Lisbon to represent the Portuguese Government; the Governing Council, presided over by the Governor General, and forming an Executive for the colony; and the Legislative Council, the national assembly, composed of 24 members, of whom 8 are appointed and 16 elected.

Of the 16 elected members, 7 are chosen by corporate organisations and economic interests (for instance the Patronnat or Employers' Federation, and the Trade Unions, which are of the classic fascist model and involve only Europeans), while nine are elected by so-called direct universal suffrage, one per administrative district. However, only 'citizens' can elect and be elected. The African—'Portuguese' or not—is not a citizen but a Native, and can enjoy neither privilege.

Of the eight Council members nominated by the Governor General, two are Africans, chosen from among the Regulos, to represent the entire African population of six million. There are 22 European members to represent the 70,000 whites. The Regulos at present sitting are those of Manhica and Zavala, and they have one thing at least to distinguish them—they are the only Regulos who can read and write Portuguese.

Like the other 'Provinces', Moçambique elects two deputies—Europeans—to sit in the Portuguese National Assembly in Lisbon. As all laws are promulgated in Lisbon, it is there that colonial policy is actually dictated.

The present concern of Portuguese leaders is to 'protect' the Portuguese colonies from the evolution which has taken place or is taking place in the other parts of Africa. The wording of the laws affirms, and Portuguese spokesmen constantly underline, that 'the Portuguese nation extends from the Atlantic through the African and Goanese provinces, right to Macao and Timor.' And President Salazar himself never stops proclaiming that 'the Nation is one and indivisible.' For him

e changes taking place in Africa are 'the work of communist ents.'

But, unless the wish is simply being taken for the reality, ese hollow declarations can have no other purpose than to assure international opinion. In Moçambique itself, sections the P.I.D.E. (the Portuguese political police) have been ationed for ten years, keeping a close watch on the Africans as ell as on liberal Europeans. An airborne army unit, complete ith parachute detachments, has recently been installed in the untry, while military reinforcements are busy in large numbers trolling the frontiers with Nyasaland, Tanganyika and the hodesias.

Portugal cannot hope to convince anyone that Independence ovements in Moçambique are the work of 'agents of com- unist subversion.' These arguments are too well known these ys, and too well worn. The French, the English and the lgians have used them before—and Guinea, Ghana and the ngo are independent today. The Portuguese leaders know is well enough, and are doing their best to increase the mber of white settlers in Moçambique as fast as they can. uropean settlements are being hastily created in the valleys of e Limpopo, and in the north. The aim is to build up a fficiently numerous European population on the spot to resist rican nationalist demands. The rulers don't hide the fact: he presence of a large number of settlers,' they say, 'is a edge of our presence here, and an effective guarantee against bversion.'

But it is clear that nothing can prevent Moçambique from llowing the path trodden by Ghana and Guinea. The Portuguese ay retard the movement, but they cannot stop it. The blackout posed by the authorities over all Moçambique (even ordinary rrespondence with people overseas is 'controlled') cannot event news from filtering through. The underground litical movements continue their agitation, perhaps in no y spectacular or forceful manner, but actively all the same; d the people of Moçambique are confident in the solidarity of e Afro-Asian nations, indeed of all democratic countries, in eir efforts for the final liberation of their country.

Translated from the French.

A PORTUGUESE LETTER

JOAO CABRAL

Representative in London of the Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

On the very borders of South Africa lie two territories where race oppression is both more extreme than in the Union and less dramatic in its results. At least, whatever mass violence there has been in Angola and Moçambique has never splashed its way across the headlines of the world's press: for the Portuguese colonies constitute Africa's "zone of silence". The news that does escape is spasmodic—usually through a visiting journalist or missionary who has managed to penetrate the curtain of security —and, recently, through the few African exiles who have managed to escape abroad. Five delegates from Angola attended the All African Peoples' Conference in Tunis this year.

To disguise the tragic situation in the colonies, Portugal, like South Africa, has developed a "newspeak": since 1951 the colonies have been known as "overseas provinces"; the colour bar operates under the name of "assimilation"; and the series of massacres since 1953 have been perpetrated in the pursuit of "peace and national harmony." A few years ago, Portuguese officials were boasting that Portugal was the first country to set foot in Africa and would be the last to leave; today a new mystique has been developed—that "the essence and the soul of Portugal is to be a country spread over the four continents."

It is this very mystique which makes Portugal the most vulnerable of the colonial powers. The myth of "one nation and one country" forces Salazar to disperse his limited military and administrative resources over a widely scattered empire, from Macao in China, Timor in Indonesia and Goa in India, to Angola, Moçambique and Guinea in Africa, and the S. Tomé and Cape Verde Islands. Besides, these eight colonies are not compact land units, but rather diffused administrative entities, most of them consisting of a number of small enclaves. Goa, for instance, which is called pompously "Portuguese India", comprises Goa proper and two enclaves: Daman 350 miles, and Diu 450 miles north of Goa. While only Goa was the scene of organised national struggle, Portugal could hold her own. She concentrated 12,000 troops (their arms received from N.A.T.O.), and a large number of P.I.D.E. agents there, to terrorise half a million Goans. Portuguese terror means torture in the crudest form—nationalists have been tied to a jeep and dragged to the nearest

vn, petrol poured upon them and set alight (1957). But now the peoples of the other seven territories are intensifying their struggle for liberation. Nationalist movements, most them still weak and unco-ordinated, are emerging in Angola, inea, Moçambique and the S. Tomé Islands (after the ruthless pression of a spontaneous nationalist rebellion in 1953). e *Uniao das Populacoes de Angola, Movimento Popular para a ertacao de Angola, Movimento Africano para a Independencia da iné* and *Movimento Anti-Colonial* are today organised nationalist vements, and the beginnings of co-ordination between them se with the formation of the *Frente Revolucionaria Africana a a Independencia Nacional das Colonias Portuguesas* (F.R.A.I.N.) the Second All African Peoples' Conference. The Salazar tatorship is simply not in a position to resist a united effort by overseas territories for independence. Not only is Portugal most backward country in Europe, but the Government resents no more than a small clique within the metropolitan ntry itself. Resistance to Salazar is growing in Portugal, he cannot count, as other colonial powers have been able do, upon the backing of a comparatively united population home. Nor can he even count upon Portuguese settlers oad. Six Europeans, for instance, are among the 57 leaders sted for offences against the State in Angola. There are *assimilados* and coloureds among them. For Portuguese icy over the last ten years has tended more and more to force dentity of interest between the *assimilado* and the unprivileged. e so-called anti-racialist policy of encouraging a minute proion of Africans to adopt the Portuguese way of life and aban- their own (a legal qualification for assimilated status), has re and more given way to a classic colonialist policy—the lement of the African territories with the population over- of Portugal. Poor whites are now doing work that *milados* did; and colour discrimination takes the more obvious rtheid forms. The *assimilados*, by reason of the downgrading heir social status if for no other, white settlers and profesals because they too are victims of a fascist rule, are making mmon cause with the Africans in the new liberation movents. Among the 57 Angolans are civil servants, students, hers, accountants, engineers, clerks, printers, an architect a well-known European doctor (Dr. Julieta Gandara). The can rank and file have of course no right to a trial—they are ply massacred or deported to the concentration camps of

Bie and Baia dos Tigres. Over 200 Africans, captured with the 57 leaders, suffered such fates.

This professional and racial variety among the rebels is an indication of the growing strength of the resistance. That resistance exists at all illustrates the intensity of nationalist feeling. For since 1953 the Government has indulged in a campaign of violent repression which would do credit to the Gestapo. Two hundred people from the Cabinda district of Angola have been arrested or reported missing; 100 more Africans have been arrested since March 1959 in other African colonies; 14 are in exile; and more than 1,000 killed in massacres in S. Tome in February 1953, and more than 50 at Bissao, Guinea, in August 1959. Thousands of Bakongo from Northern Angola are refugees in the Belgian Congo. On July 25th, 1960, the first of three trials involving the 50 Angolan nationalists and 7 Portuguese, accused of endangering the external security of the State, began in Luanda. Dr. Palma Carlos, the Lisbon lawyer briefed to defend 8 of them, was prevented by the P.I.D.E. from leaving Portugal. These prisoners had been arrested in 1959; and in the same year, in June, 52 other Angolans were arrested, among them Dr. Agostinho Neto, doctor and poet who was actually flogged by the Chief of Police in front of his family and neighbours; and Father Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, Chancellor to the Archbishopric of Luanda, who was deported to Portugal, no lawyer having been allowed to see him since his arrest.

Salazar has, of course, realised the limitations of his forces. For the last four years or so, he has been strengthening his alliances, particularly with South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Spain. These are the countries with a real stake in the maintenance of the Portuguese empire. They are also the countries where the majority population has most to gain by its dissolution. Any major disturbance within the empire may well bring Salazar's fascist regime tumbling down—Franco can then hope to survive for little longer; and South Africa and Southern Rhodesia are left with their defences wide open. The withdrawal of N.A.T.O. aid to Portugal might well by itself bring about the end of one of the worst dictatorships in colonial history; and a determined effort by a united front, in Portugal and the colonies, such as is already forming itself, may have far-reaching effects indeed throughout Southern Africa and Western Europe.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA EXPLODES

ENOCH DUMBUTSHENA

Southern Rhodesian Journalist and Member of the National Democratic Party

o weeks after telling the settlers that "no one in Southern odesia need be afraid that what has happened in the Congo ld possibly happen here", the Prime Minister of Southern odesia, Sir Edgar Whitehead, called all able-bodied white men join a new army reserve and a special constabulary. These l form new security forces to maintain peace and order, or, other words, to suppress any future African riots. Sir Roy lensky, Federal Prime Minister, has called upon Europeans to the three European divisions of a new army inspired by the s in the Congo. The Federal Government will spend an itional £3 million on this army and on equipment. None of three territories of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland nds as much as £3 million on African education. Last year thern Rhodesia spent only £2,641,000 on African education. t is interesting to note that Sir Roy's three white divisions re the first indication that the army is now being organized the defence of white people against Africans in the Federation Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Two years ago Sir Roy Welensky ke of a "Boston Tea Party" should the Federation fail to get independence; and it can be assumed that he meant by that possibility of some settler rebellion against Great Britain. v the army and the police, in the name of maintaining peace order, will be used to keep the Africans down.

Confused by the consequences of his own foolhardy policies, Edgar Whitehead took the drastic step of declaring a racial and arrested three leaders of the National Democratic y—Mr. Michael Mawema, president-general, Mr. Sketchley kange, treasurer, and Mr. Leopold Takawira, chairman of the are Branch—in order to show that he was tougher than Harper, leader of the opposition Dominion Party, when it e to dealing with Africans. After all, the National Demoic Party had forced Sir Edgar to accept a constitutional ference. He had seen African intellectuals, business men tribesmen rally behind the NDP banner, and his fingers t have twitched to slap down African nationalism shortly

before his intended election next May. The extent of African support for the NDP shocked him, and he immediately summoned all white people to form a laager inside of which to defend white supremacy.

The editor of the '*Evening Standard*', a Salisbury newspaper which supports Sir Edgar's Government, wrote soon after the Prime Minister's broadcast that called all settlers to rally in self-defence against the Africans:

"The picture given to the dispassionate observer is that the white man in the Rhodesias is ringed with hostile forces and is preparing to withstand the siege. It is the 'laager' complex and unfortunately the Prime Minister's broadcast aggravated it. Please do not let us lose our heads. The situation between the races is critical. The races must get together to see whether the causes of complaint and grievance can be removed. But ringing ourselves with security forces in a laager will not do that. It will only make the situation more critical."

There can be no question at all that Sir Edgar Whitehead himself sparked off the riots which led to the killing of twelve Africans in Bulawayo. He was just carrying his policy of intimidating African political organizations to its logical conclusion. First there was the sudden swoop on the offices of the N.D.P. and the houses of its leaders. Then followed the arrest of three top leaders of the party. Astonished and angered by the arrests, Africans at once demanded to see Sir Edgar Whitehead. He promised to come and address them, and then sent his police instead. A disciplined mass estimated variously between 20,000 and 100,000 people tried to march to his house. Police and soldiers stopped them. Africans spent two days without food and in the bitter cold of July nights waiting for the Prime Minister. He sent a message to say that the meeting had been banned, and his troops exploded tear-gas into the crowd, till the infuriated crowd began rioting. Children were sent home from schools in Highfields and Harare; but in support of their parents, they joined in the riots and became the most obdurate opponents of the police and soldiers.

In Bulawayo a meeting of the N.D.P. advertised for Sunday morning was banned on Saturday night, but Africans were not advised of this. Police used their batons and tear-gas freely on the gathered crowd, riots broke out and, before they were quelled, twelve Africans had been killed by security forces and European residents. While fires raged in the African township

e police sealed off the European areas to protect white lives d property from Africans, till the frustration and bitter spair of the rioters burnt itself out within a ring of bayonets d guns.

There are more than 500 Africans who were arrested during e racial flare-up. The figure reminds one of the 500 leaders the African National Congress arrested and detained on bruary 26th, 1959. Among those arrested are Africans who ve worked for the principle of partnership, knowing well that was never the intention of the governing United Federal rty to implement it. They include Stanlake Samkange, ce-president of the Central Africa Party.

Sir Edgar Whitehead said in Parliament afterwards that the .D.P. was guilty of "the calculated distortion of history" and at their arguments were "becoming more and more blatantly ilitant and anti-European."

"The theme is that Africa is only for Africans, that Europe is r Europeans, and that all Europeans should go back to Europe. his coupled with the insistence that the land belongs to the ricans, plus the parrot cry of 'one man one vote', is the core the movement." ('*Evening Standard*', 26.7.60.)

Leaving aside the accuracy of certain of these observations, hich seem to have been hatched in Sir Edgar's personal cloud-ckoo land, or the iniquity of others, conceived by the mother parliaments herself, it seems much more likely that the aders of the N.D.P. were arrested to save Sir Edgar the nbarrassment of sitting together at a constitutional conference ith African representatives whose policies are opposed to his. e never wanted a constitutional conference; it was the N.D.P. legation to the Commonwealth Relations Office that put rward the idea.

Sir Edgar knew full well that the N.D.P. was busy preparing r that conference, and he wanted to destroy any chance of bling evidence and arguments to dispute his own. He knew at the whole African population was behind the N.D.P. He as astonished at the support the party was getting from African tellectuals, some of them in the process of being turned into "shock-absorbing middle class" housed in segregated African eas. And if he did not allow himself to believe it before, he ust now know that despite his attempts to suppress it—through e Unlawful Organizations Act, the Preventive (Temporary ovisions) Detention Act, the Public Order Amendment Act,

the Subversive Activities Act, the Native Affairs Amendment Act, and all the other laws directed against African politicans and organizations—hostility to the blind rule of race is growing all the time.

Sir Edgar's answer to the racial tension that he himself has helped to create is to arm all whites, to carry out a crash programme of house building and to ease unemployment. That is not what Africans want. They want nothing less than a democratic government for themselves and for their children. They are not looking for the removal of pin-pricks. They want the vote, for they know that without it neither they nor their children will enjoy either peace or advancement.

In Southern Rhodesia, as in the Belgian Congo, there are no African commissioned officers in the police and army. There is *de facto* job reservation, which hasn't even the courage to come out into the open as in the Union of South Africa. And there is a fancy franchise which, while not mentioning race, so discriminates against Africans through the high financial, property and educational qualifications demanded for the ordinary voter's roll, that there are today 70,000 voters out of a European population of 211,000 and 2,500 voters out of an African population of over 2,000,000.

Sir Edgar has now asked the British Government to remove from the Southern Rhodesia Letters Patent, 1923, powers reserved for the British Government to disallow laws discriminating against Africans. He has also proposed a second chamber consisting of settlers and "stooge" Africans elected or appointed by the Government. This was rejected by the N.D.P. delegation to London in their memorandum:

"(c) The only alternative way to effect an acceptable government is not the substitution of the proposed second chamber for the reservations in the Constitution, but the substitution of majority rule for the said reservations. Nothing less will do."

Southern Rhodesia has had self-government since 1923. Since that time its Parliament, as in the Union of South Africa, has been the exclusive preserve of the white man. With Sir Edgar and Sir Roy calling all white men to arms, Africans see no chance of sharing power; and the recent arrests ordered by the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia only re-enforce their view.

It was this state of hopelessness that prompted Mr. Joshua Nkomo, Director of International Affairs for the N.D.P., and

he Hon. Mr. R. S. Garfield Todd, former Prime Minister of outhern Rhodesia, to send a memorandum to the Secretary for Commonwealth Relations. This memorandum stated among ther things:

"Because of our deep concern to see harmony between the aces and justice and opportunity for all citizens, we ask . . .

1. That an immediate statement be made to the effect that ler Majesty's Government will intervene in the affairs of entral Africa to establish democratic governments so that the ill of the people is implemented.

2. That the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia be set aside nd a democratic order substituted for it."

The United Kingdom Government has a clear legal right to uspend the Constitution of the self-governing Colony of Southrn Rhodesia. The British Government did this in British uiana in October 1953, because Ministers there were accused f threatening and plotting violence. Now, while the Governent of Southern Rhodesia is arming whites against Africans who emand and organize for effective political power, can the British overnment refuse to intervene and yet disclaim all responsibility r what may result?

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THE ONLY TURNING

The Hon. R. S. GARFIELD TODD

Former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia; former President of the Central African Party.

SOUTHERN Rhodesia became a self-governing colony in 1923; but Britain, even 37 years ago, was sufficiently aware of the dangers of government by a minority not to surrender the whole responsibility to the local Europeans. It was true that there was nothing in the law to prevent Africans from registering as voters, if they possessed certain qualifications of education and income; but only three years ago there were fewer than 500 Africans on the voters' roll. The main reason for this, of course, was that few Africans possessed the required qualifications, but it is also true to say that few Africans showed much initiative or demonstrated a desire to share in government.

Twenty years ago the African people, as a whole, showed little interest in education and there seemed to be a very limited desire to share widely in Western civilization. The Land Apportionment Act was designed to ensure that the indigenous people were provided with land on which to live according to tribal custom. There was plenty of land, and Africans who came to work for Europeans did so because they wanted extra money to supplement the income from their cattle and crops in the Native Reserves.

A few years ago, therefore, it was true to say that almost all blacks in Southern Rhodesia were primitive and uneducated and without the will to challenge the white man's government. Soon after the war, however, the Asian and African peoples were manifestly on the march. There were many reasons for this change. Britain and France had gone to war in the cause of liberty, and their propaganda had resolutely denied the claims of the "master race". The whole theory of inherent racial superiority was scorned, and great sacrifices were demanded of free men that they might not lose their freedom. Africans and Asians were encouraged to assist the Colonial Powers in their struggle for freedom: but for whose freedom, many of them asked, was it a struggle?

There is no doubt that the propaganda and the war itself made an enormous impact upon Africans. Miners and farmers, as well as teachers, missionaries, officials and, of course, the newspapers kept Africans informed on the progress of the war—of the bad

ermans who would enslave men and of the good British who ould free them.

During the past 20 years the educational system has been idely expanded; and today almost half a million children are in hool. Where 20 years ago it was difficult to find Africans who uld speak English or read newspapers, today all that is changed; d world influences through radio, newspapers and magazines veep across the country.

But a third factor, equally significant, has been the growing ortage of land. At the turn of the century there were hardly lf a million people in Southern Rhodesia; today there are ore than two and a half million Africans alone, and the total of e land available to them is not only less than half the country t less also than the area of land available for settlement to a hite population of some 200,000 people. It has been the happy task of Native Commissioners to implement measures med at conserving this land; and in attempting to do this, it s been necessary to cut down individual land holdings, reduce decree the number of cattle any one man may own, and sometimes even to dispossess men of land which they hold. Much tterness has emanated from this situation, and today an ominous mosphere broods over even remote areas of the country. It ay well be true that most of the rural Africans are not interested the machinery of the vote and do not clearly understand the orkings of a democratic system. On the other hand, it is nwise to discount the dangers in a strong and widespread feeling deep injustice based on such vital issues as land and cattle.

There is a fourth factor which must also be admitted: the fluence upon Southern Rhodesia of events in other parts of frica and of the world attitude to racial discrimination. We now how rapidly countries throughout the continent have oved towards self-government; and we must recognize that the olonial Powers have had no option but to act quickly and hope at the devolving of responsibility would force the peoples inlved to learn from experience the realities of government. At e same time, the Communist threat has forced Western countes to give all possible help in order to ensure that the new tions stay with the democracies; and this undoubtedly enurages Africans to believe that their way to self-government will t be too difficult.

Africans in Southern Rhodesia, pressed by land shortages, nable to acquire freehold in the towns, excited by the new

thoughts which experience and education have brought, and confronted with the accomplishments of black men throughout the rest of Africa, have decided that there must be at last real changes in their condition. They are strengthened in their determination by world-wide criticism of the Union of South Africa, for they recognize that much of the criticism which is levied could be turned, with equal justification, upon Southern Rhodesia.

The whites in Southern Rhodesia thus face now an entirely new situation, different in almost every way from the conditions of 1950 and changed in vital respects from what it was even in 1958. The changes have taken place with an embarrassing and threatening speed, but there has been no way to slow them down; we have been called upon to co-operate with the inevitable. And we have refused to do so.

We whites must now recognize that tens of thousands of Africans in Southern Rhodesia have decided that racial discrimination, in every form, has got to go and that it will be expelled by force if it is not rejected by reason. We should recognize, too, that our unreadiness to face realities has already built up a strong reaction against us and that our position, long since morally untenable, will soon be politically and economically so as well.

From time to time whites in Southern Rhodesia have been exhorted to share political power on a much broader franchise, and they have been warned that the colour-bar, in all its manifestations, has got to go. Some changes have been made: but an African Minister here and desegregated Post Offices there are crumbs which do not satisfy a people determined to advance as their brothers are advancing all through the continent; they do not quiet, they merely provoke to anger. We should note also that the recent agreement upon a new Constitution for Nyasaland has thrown into high relief the utter unreality of the electoral position in Southern Rhodesia.

In Southern Rhodesia, Africans have enjoyed much better educational facilities than have been available in Nyasaland, and economic opportunity has provided jobs in "white" areas for 600,000 African workers. If large numbers of Africans are now to be enfranchised in Nyasaland and no similar action is taken within the Federal area and Southern Rhodesia itself, then a further measure of discontent will add to an already explosive situation.

I have worked for 14 years within the present political framework. From 1953 to 1958, as Prime Minister, I experienced the

ressures of an almost exclusively white electorate; and, although recognized that we had only a limited time in which to make asic changes, I failed to make them. There is no doubt that we hites are now prisoners of our own political system—a system hich advances inexorably, like a Greek tragedy, to its calamitous onclusion.

I worked within the political system for two years after I had ecognized its failure, even though I had recognized, since early n 1957, that the attitude of a majority of the whites would robably wreck any possibility of establishing a non-racial egime.

When the Government of Southern Rhodesia declared a State f Emergency early in 1959, the red light flashed and immediate ction should have been taken to extend the franchise, to elimin-te all racial discrimination and to tackle the land problem. What appened instead was that the courts were closed, political risoners were detained, the police force was strengthened and ir Edgar Whitehead, the Prime Minister, set out to assure the ountry that all was well in Southern Rhodesia—that the ordinary uman emotions, the desire for liberty, were not present in the frican people of our country. Despite the assurances of the rime Minister, however, African discontent steadily increased nd inter-race contacts withered as the whole climate of race elations deteriorated.

The crisis came with the arrest of three National Democratic arty leaders. Once blood was shed, there was no use in deluding ne's self any further; strong and decisive action alone could elp. The Prime Minister probably believes that he took the trong and decisive action needed; but the quelling of riots has nly a limited significance. No doubt the Government will be ble to quell riots for the next year or two; as we Europeans ecome increasingly afraid, our methods will become more fficient and more brutal. But what will this solve? And for ow long can we hope to maintain ourselves this way?

Must we go along this road of cruelty and disaster? It seems hat we must, for the whites will not change and the British overnment appears determined to shelter behind a Constitution hich is now outdated, which no longer serves the country's need.

Africans will continue their pressure and, as the months pass, ill less and less consider the feelings or the future of the whites. n the last resort Britain must intervene, and the point at which he will take appropriate action will depend upon a definition of

"last resort". What will be the terms of this definition in human suffering, in economic chaos, in racial bitterness? I believe that British intervention now could change the whole course of events in Central Africa.

There are precedents in British history for intervention, and such action would be welcomed by almost every country in the Commonwealth. If, on the other hand, British concern for the pride and baseless fears of a quarter of a million whites leads to a decision to let well alone, then succeeding crises can only damage the prestige of Her Majesty's Government.

Some alternative to the setting aside of the Constitution might be suggested, but any effective action must lead immediately to a wide sharing of political power with the African people. This is not only unacceptable to the majority of Europeans, but is becoming ever less acceptable with passing weeks.

If action were taken now to ensure elections that would establish a Government supported by a majority of the people, then I believe that no more than a couple of years would convince Europeans of how groundless their current fear is of non-racial rule.

When so much is at stake, dare Britain stand aside? Can she stand aside when 92 per cent of our people depend upon her intervention for their only hope of peaceful change?

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THE DOCTOR'S DISCARDS

DENIS GRUNDY

'Dead, dead, they are all of them dead! The Monckton Commission, the Federal Review, Federation with Southern Rhodesia, hey are all dead and buried. We will have nothing to do with hem."

This summary epitaph was pronounced by Mr. Orton Chirwa, ounder of the Malawi Congress Party, at Dr. Banda's final press onference the day after the end of the Nyasaland Constitutional Conference. That end came, be it noted, on August 4th. The ress conference was held at 13 Prince of Wales Terrace, Kenington on the premises of the "Union of Democratic Control". eneath their name-plate on the door was another announcing oint occupation by the " Euthanasia Society".

Despite such auguries the mood of the platform was highly uphoric. This is scarcely defensible in logic, since Dr. Banda, he only political leader involved to come out publicly in advance, rmly and repeatedly, with a list of detailed and decisive demands, ppears to have lost out on most of them. If he has certainly ecured control of the new Legislative Council for Malawi, he as not done so by the overwhelming margin he had stipulated. he variable composition of the Executive Council does not look ike providing him with a majority there. Worse than that, it is ot to be of cabinet status responsible to Legco as to a democratic arliament. Its function will be purely "advisory" to the Goveror. Moreover, if he runs into difficulties, the Governor can 'pack" both bodies "in the interests of good government". In hort, there is an hiatus between the two Councils, and a gulf set etween both of them and the Governor. Real effective and xecutive power remains where it was, with the Governor.

As for the suffrage, here is yet another "fancy franchise" conderably inferior to the grail of "one man—one vote". Still, it plain, practical and commonsensical compared with the ncomprehensibly fashioned articles worn by some of the neighours. Nor is there any ostensible communal element about it, as the case with Kenya, though the Colonial Secretary admitted hat the minor "A" roll would for the moment be likely to elect nly Europeans to its eight seats. The wide qualifications for the B" roll (20 seats) largely by-pass the usual barriers of education nd income, and will probably recruit 100,000 Africans, the vast

majority adhering to Malawi. Perhaps this was the most satisfactory feature of the eleventh-hour, eleventh-day compromise so suddenly and dramatically accepted by Kamuzu.

The atmosphere of the last United Federal Party press conference, held earlier at Carlton House Terrace, was definitely *piano*. All along this old-style, conservative-colonial delegation of three Europeans and one Nyasa had shown signs of strain, and even distaste, in seeking to come to terms with the new African age. Between them, and behind masks of reservation, the Europeans—M.L.C.s, civic dignitaries and company directors—rather grudgingly explained their party's acceptance of the joint undertaking by all delegates, to work the new constitution for a reasonable period, which had come out of the blue only the afternoon before. Banda's intransigence and intimidation, they said, had nearly wrecked the conference. They had failed to get any firm definition of "reasonable period", and were afraid that Malawi thought of it in terms of six months. There were dangers that a situation would develop like the present one in Kenya. The U.F.P. did not want another conference for at least five years, when a further instalment of self-government might be expected. Independence—perhaps in 1970. The Colonial Secretary, of course, had the last word in such matters, but they certainly regarded the Colonial Office as a necessary evil to be got rid of as soon as was convenient. Africans were very slow and backward and had everything to learn about practical politics and administration. The Belgian Congo was a terrible object lesson. But they were quite prepared to train them over a proper period of probation.

Mr. Dixon said he was pretty confident that Sir Roy Welensky would be happy about the terms of agreement, and Mr. Blackwood, when taxed, hastened to add that it was "purely a Territorial matter". Mr. Little said that Malawi did not believe in the Federation, which had come to stay. The Nyasa, Mr. Matthews Phiri, who at a previous meeting had produced Chief Chikumbu to testify that all the chiefs of the official delegation, except himself, had been silenced by intimidation, now announced that the chiefs were content with the settlement. When asked if they were still intimidated, he replied that they were.

In between this sedative and the heady stimulant provided by Malawi, Mr. T. D. T. Banda (no connection, of course) of the minor Congress Liberation Party held his closing session. He was assisted by two aides, neither of whom was the well-known

gure of Mr. Wellington Chirwa, still presumably in the party. Mr. Banda called himself an African nationalist as distinct from a an-African. He said, with complete truth, that the conference's onclusions represented his party's official programme very losely. He spoke of continuous personal intimidation and de- ounced the flagrant bribery and terrorism employed by both Malawi and U.F.P. to recruit party members. He expected to ecure a satisfactory number of seats in the new Legco. He ended y stating that Dr. Banda had "accepted defeat", would fail to ontrol his extremists, and would fall.

Back to Kensington. The Doctor was buoyant, confident, motional. He had his own rather individual interpretation of he outcome of the Conference. Intending originally to boycott , he had attended in a spirit of give and take. Naturally, the esult was a compromise. His followers in Nyasaland would be atisfied. They were, in fact; there were telegrams to prove it. fter all, the control of the legislature would be with Malawi. People will take anything from me. They trust me. I will never et them down."

The U.F.P. were a bunch of eighteenth-century squires trying o ignore the wind of change. They had banked on his walking ut of the Conference. There were only three hundred Euro- eans in Nyasaland who could be called true inhabitants. The elegation of chiefs had been brought over by the U.F.P. to ppose him. Three of them, and the two African members of egco, were "government stooges". He had been accused of holesale intimidation. It would require genius to collect a illion members, including eleven thousand Asians, by threats.

He had felt absolutely confident about Mr. MacLeod ever since he Colonial Secretary had released him from prison against the ishes of Welensky and the Governor. Welensky (the word ame out like spittle) had plotted to keep him inside until after he Federal Review. The Colonial Secretary had been mis- eported as saying that it would take the working-party nine onths to prepare the new voters' roll. It should be ready for an lection in December. He would be in power before the ederal Review, and there would be no Federation. Never, never ould he take the government whip in favour of Federation with outhern Rhodesia. That was dead. Federation with African tates in East and Central Africa was another matter. The whole elegation was off almost immediately to Dar-es-Salaam as guests f Julius Nyerere.

Finally, he recognized no set time-limit for the trial period of the new constitution. "To us, it is just a beginning. The majority must rule."

Amongst the many absurdities of this conference, surely the greatest has been the conspiracy of silence surrounding the master problem of the Federation's future. When Orton Chirwa condemned the findings of the Monckton Commission to death before they are born, he was doing no more than repeat the sentence of the main Rhodesian nationalist parties when they boycotted the commission's proceedings while it was in Africa. This, it should be noted, did not deter Lord Monckton from proclaiming in Salisbury that he had received a good cross-section of opinion.

If, as informed opinion anticipates, Lord Monckton eventually presents recommendations that will not please the extremists of either wing and colour, he may be in danger of losing his reputation as the greatest "fixer" of the day. For in Central Africa it is the extremists who are now very much in the ascendancy. The formal retention of some sort of federal structure with merely vestigial powers, capable perhaps of underwriting the British Government's guarantee of the huge Kariba indebtedness, will infuriate Welensky, who is pressing for stronger central government, and scarcely likely to mollify the Dominionites or the Africans. If, on the other hand, and this seems the only alternative short of Federal dissolution, there is a re-allocation of functions and responsibilities—the devolution, for instance, of the management of Health, European Education and Agriculture upon the separate Territories—this will have to be compensated by a strengthening of the central hand over the armed forces and police. And this would inevitably lead to open rebellion.

Although Dr. Banda seems to regard him publicly as a species of Billy Graham, everybody knows that Mr. MacLeod is a long-headed bridge-player. With the Monckton dummy-hand unexposed—at least to his opponents—he has won a game cleverly, taking some fine finesses, "roughing" rather toughly, and forcing some valuable discards—particularly in clubs and spades. But he has not won the rubber; and, in the next game, the Doctor may pick up some of the honours he threw away and rather change the score.

THE CONGO (III): AFTER INDEPENDENCE

COLIN LEGUM

Correspondent on African Affairs for the London 'Observer'.

ALMOST all that could have gone wrong in the Congo went wrong. The country was spared only the worst—*Abako* did not exploit ne Katanga's secession movement to force its own demands for federal constitution.

If the Lower Congo had laid siege to the Republic at the moment hen Katanga raised its independence flag, it is difficult to see ow the situation might have been retrieved.

The Congolese still have something to be grateful for in a tuation that otherwise has given little cause for satisfaction and at has undoubtedly made things much more difficult for the ationalist movements in Central Africa and the Union.

It would be useless to pretend that it is yet possible to attempt confident analysis of the events leading up to the final disaster. his contribution is a preliminary attempt at dealing with the uestions that must one day be properly answered if we are to derstand what really went wrong on the morrow of the ongo's independence. To resume from where this account ft off in the last issue of '*Africa South*', here briefly are the ain problems that faced the Congo on the eve of its inde-endence.

First, the new Republic was still without an agreed consti-ution; this was to be the first task of the new parliament.

Secondly, the elections were supposed to indicate the respective rength of the unitarians (favouring a strong, centralised type of overnment) and the federalists.

Thirdly, there was little prospect of a national movement's oming to power with sufficient authority to control the whole f the country.

Fourthly, the security and administration of the country sted entirely on the Belgians.

Fifthly, there was a considerable danger that the way in which ne Belgians were interfering in the elections might estrange em from the Congo's new leaders.

What was not foreseen in my last article ('*Africa South*', *Vol. No.* 4) was the danger of a revolt in the Force Publique, and at it would be M. Tshombe rather than M. Kasavubu who ould threaten the integrity of the Republic.

The election results produced no major surprises, except possibly for the Belgians. They were hoping for Lumumba's defeat; instead he emerged (with 36 seats in a parliament of 137) as the leader of the strongest single party. Although his position was not a commanding one, the MNC succeeded in winning seats in all of the six provinces, quite independently of its allies. It also was the only party to win outright control of a province (Eastern).

The political leaders and parties in whom the Belgians had put their faith—M. Jean Bolikango's PUNA, M. Boya's PNP, and the Parties of Local and Traditional Interests—did very badly; much worse than had been expected. Of the parties sympathetic to the Belgians only two registered conspicuous successes. M. Tshombe's Conakat Party won 25 of the 60 seats in Katanga's Provincial Assembly; with his allies, he had an overall majority. And M. Kalonji's breakaway MNC won 21 of the 70 seats in the Provincial Assembly of Kasai, most of them from the Baluba area.

With acknowledgements to the 'News Chronicle'.

The only other significant result in the provincial elections was in Leopoldville. The PSA (led by Mm. Gizenga and Kamitatu) won 35 of the 90 seats; the *Abako* won 33; M. Lumumba's MNC Cartel won only three. The distribution of these seats is important. *Abako* won 7 of the 10 seats in Leopoldville itself, a remarkable performance since the Bakongo constitute a minority of the total population; they also won all 14 seats in the Lower Congo. The PSA, on the other hand, won 32 of the 34 seats in Kwilu, and only three of the 13 seats in Kwango.

Thus total control in the Leopoldville Province rests with two well-organized tribal-based parties (*Abako* and PSA), leaving M. Lumumba with virtually no strength in this important region, except through such alliances as he may be able to make.

There are two final points about the elections for the National Assembly. Although they failed to produce a substantial majority for any single party, they reduced the plethora of contesting parties to less than a dozen with any claim to substantial support. Also they showed that a majority of voters favoured the parties with unitarian ideas. Nevertheless, federalist strength in four of the provinces (Katanga, Leopoldville, Kasai and Kivu) was substantial; it could not easily be ignored when the time came finally to decide upon a constitution.

By the time the election results had been announced, there was much bad blood between M. Lumumba's supporters and the Belgians over the alleged efforts of the dying Administration to favour the MNC's opponents. Even his triumph did not altogether soften M. Lumumba; hence his calculated rudeness to the King of the Belgians at the formal ceremony of independence on June 30th. Later he repented sufficiently to explain he had intended no discourtesy; but still he did not apologise.

The Belgians, despite belated efforts to befriend M. Kasavubu whom for months they had been denouncing alternatively as a communist agent and a tool of M. Soustelle's French neo-fascists!), were out of favour with *Abako* too. And their friends had gone down heavily in the elections.

The Governor-General, called upon to perform his last important job in finding the leader of the first independent Government, was restricted to a choice between M. Lumumba and M. Kasavubu. He really had no option but to send for M. Lumumba first.

The week of hard bargaining that accompanied the election of the first Government contributed greatly to the subsequent events. M. Lumumba cannot escape his share of responsibility.

At first he claimed the right to form a Government of his own on the grounds that he led the largest party, ignoring the fact that his support nevertheless constituted a substantial minority. His roughshod methods further exacerbated relations between himself and other Congolese leaders. Statesmanship would have shown that at that moment only a National Government could guarantee the Congo's peaceful transition to independence. But with the instincts of the ' strong man ' (albeit in a weak position), M. Lumumba chose to play the role of politician rather than statesman. The result was a political free-for-all at a time of crucial importance. This period of bargaining in Leopoldville promoted sharp rivalries among the parties in the provinces, piling up more trouble for the future.

It is difficult to understand how M. Lumumba thought his tough attitude towards his colleagues could succeed. In the event, they did not; he was compelled to withdraw into seeking alliances. This was the moment for his opponents to behave with equal toughness and with an equal lack of tolerance.

M. Kasavubu at first played his famous role of Cincinattus. No amount of bait would induce him to leave his tent; he was willing to wait his moment until the increasingly exasperated M. Lumumba should throw in his hand. It is worth recalling that at this stage the federalist-minded politician most anxious to do business with M. Lumumba was M. Tshombe. For a time it seemed as though together they could command a majority.

But just at the moment when M. Lumumba felt he was on the point of success, the Belgian Governor-General did a remarkable thing. He suddenly discharged M. Lumumba from the task of trying to form a Government and sent for M. Kasavubu.

This was the final blow to M. Lumumba's strained confidence in the Belgians. From that moment his ambivalence turned to enmity; his suspicions of Belgian policy hardened into certainty that they could not be trusted. Now there was no going back. With M. Kasavubu's subsequent failure to form a Government and his decision to accept M. Lumumba's belated offer to make him President, chances of effective Belgian co-operation with the new Congolese Government were almost gone. What finally clinched matters was the revolt of the Force Publique. But before

ıling with this *deus ex machina*, it is necessary to bring the sive M. Tshombe back into focus.

Abandoned by Kasavubu, Tshombe was isolated; all he could ınt on was Kalonji's breakaway MNC. He was still tempted take the olive branch held out by the somewhat chastened mumba, now as anxious to secure a National Government as lier he had spurned it. Moreoever, Kasavubu urged Tshombe join the Government as the best method of inducing Lumumba accede to their federal demands.

But M. Tshombe chose this moment to play for high stakes. demanded a number of Ministers far in excess of his party's ngth; much higher, in fact, than M. Lumumba could posly concede without upsetting the rest of his coalition.

Up to this point M. Tshombe was negotiating purely on nbers in the Cabinet; there was no question of principle, eral or otherwise. Why did he insist on putting his demands impossibly high that they could not be granted?

The ace up his sleeve was the secession of Katanga. What was his mind when on July 11th he first proclaimed his intention breaking away? Was he only intending to force Lumumba's d to yield to his extravagant demands? Was he trying to npel him to negotiate for a federal constitution? Or was he ady committed to riding Katanga out of the Congo as an pendent State? To these questions one can return no fident answers. But there are fairly solid grounds for culation.

Two separate points need to be cleared up—M. Tshombe's tionship to the Belgians, and the Belgian attitude to Katanga's pendence.

t is convenient to regard Tshombe as a stooge of the Belgians; all practical purposes he might just as well have been their nt. But the needs of accuracy demand a more satisfactory lanation of his actions. He is fundamentally an opportunist; is clearly shown by the record of his negotiations with humba. But his opportunism is based on definite ideas. As ibal nationalist, he all along sought to secure the interests of people of Katanga against 'outsiders'; hence his belief Confederation. As a traditionalist and a business-man mittedly not a very successful one) he wished to see close with Belgium. Many of the Belgian *colons* in Katanga shared e aspirations which suited their book as well as Tshombe's. as this identity of interests that brought Tshombe and the

colons so close together. But was Tshombe their stooge? There is a strong case for suggesting that the Belgians were more used by Tshombe than he by them. It was the tail wagging the pie-bald dog.

But we must be quite clear about which Belgians we are talking about in the Katanga context. Before the Round Table Conference in Brussels in January 1960, an influential group of *colons* in Katanga, including a number of leading business people, had considered creating a secession movement in Katanga. To achieve this purpose they knew they would need African allies and Tshombe was their choice. But there was one fundamental difference between them and M. Tshombe; the *colons* thought it might be useful to secure a strong alliance and they naturally alighted on the Central African Federation. But Tshombe was never a party to this proposition; on the contrary, he strongly repudiated it. When Sir Roy Welensky advertently leaked the news of his having been sounded out on the idea, the Belgian Government reacted angrily. Not only did they denounce Welensky, they also protested to the British Foreign Office.

The Big Business interests in Katanga (*Union Minière* and others) were divided. The majority were against the secession move when it was originated. Their own long-term profit lay in maintaining the integrity of the Congo. They threw their weight behind unity at the time of the Brussels Conference in January 1960 when the Belgian Government insisted, as one of the conditions for independence, that the country's unity had to be maintained. There is no reason to believe that the Belgians had some Machiavellian plot to surrender control over the Congo only to make away with Katanga. Up to the time of the final breakdown of law and order in the Congo, the Belgian Government resolutely denounced the Belgian groups who continued to work for Katanga's secession. It is on record that one of the last acts of the Belgian Governor-General was to crack down on the plans of the *colons* to dismember the Congo.

It was only after the failure of his negotiations with Mr Lumumba that M. Tshombe began to associate himself actively with the secession plan; but he still firmly ruled out any design for linking Katanga's fortunes to those of the Central African Federation.

Throughout this sorry story M. Tshombe kept the initiative in his own hands. He was not above trying his hand at political blackmail when he tried to compel Belgium to recognize the

ependence of Katanga. To its credit and good sense Belgium, vever sorely tempted, did not fall into his trap, although it headlong into most others. Nevertheless, by lending themves to M. Tshombe's manoeuvres, the Belgians succeeded in lly destroying what was left of their goodwill and influence the rest of the Congo. Once having mounted M. Tshombe's er, they could not climb down.

The Katanga story is not a tidy one in which one can discover eep-seated, cunning plot and a simple-minded stooge chosen lend it verisimilitude. It is a muddled story. If M. Tshombe s the villain, he played his role as an independent-minded ican with purposes of his own. The tragedy of his rôle lies the fact that, unlike Kasavubu, he was willing to rely on btful colonialist elements to achieve his ends.

t must not, however, be supposed that M. Tshombe was hout a large measure of African support in Katanga. Had he sued his not unrespectable aims of achieving a federation by g different methods, he might have done much more for own cause and for that of Africa as a whole.

The revolt of the Force Publique was the final act of folly. are asked to believe two totally different versions of its gins. On the Belgian side, there are those who fix responsity on M. Lumumba; on M. Lumumba's side, the blame xed on the Belgians.

Why should M. Lumumba have wished the Force Publique to olt, within a day or two of his decision to enforce their ipline under Belgian officers, and immediately after his gh dismissal of a delegation from the Force who came to ask more pay and for their own officers? Had he suddenly ome afraid of a plot whereby the Force was to be used to him and to re-establish Belgian control?

he evidence for this charge is extremely thin. On the first of the revolt in Leopoldville, the rebels were denouncing Lumumba; they were certainly not praising him. At the e time, they were demanding the dismissal of their Belgian ers. When M. Lumumba and M. Kasavubu undertook their sion of pacification, the rebels did not at once rally to their . They remained fractious and undisciplined.

he charges against the Belgians are equally insubstantial. Force was the last ' effective ' instrument in their hands. y surrender it? If they had planned the revolt, how unt for the fact that it was immediately turned against

themselves? The suggestion is that having tried to instigate the Force against Lumumba, the Congolese soldiers rounded on the Belgians, accusing them of wanting to destroy Lumumba's Government; but they did not then rally to its defence, even though M. Lumumba at once conceded this earlier demand for Congolese officers.

The difficulty one finds in trying to piece together the evidence is that the revolt occurred at widely different places almost simultaneously. Nor did it follow the same pattern. The only consistency was the way in which the men turned against their Belgian officers.

Does this not offer us a clue to the real state of mind of the Force? There was no loyalty at all between the men and their officers. And this is a remarkable fact. In every other comparable situation, the colonial armies remained loyal to their military leaders, even when they were put into action against the independence movements. The Force showed no reluctance to follow its officers in brutally repressing *Abako* after the Leopoldville riots in 1959. The triumph of military discipline is that it usually succeeds in instilling unquestioned loyalty to the commanders. The Congo proved an exception. The reason for this must be sought in the personal relationships between the officers and their men.

Indiscipline in the Force Publique was no new thing. The soldiers had revolted against their officers in 1946. Their ruthlessness, often complained of by the Congolese though little regarded by the Belgians in the past, has been notorious.

Another clue to the Force's morale is provided by the brutal indiscipline after their revolt. Their insensate attacks on Belgians of all ages were calculated to humiliate and degrade. They displayed a bitter desire for vengeance. Nobody was spared; neither the officers, nor their wives and children; neither nuns nor priests. The only exaggeration of the events appears to have been in the number of the victims. Of the 70,000–80,000 Belgians still in the Congo, the number of victims totalled only a few hundreds. It is also worth noting that the mobs did not restrict themselves to attacking whites; they plundered and assaulted Africans as well.

The dangers in just such a blind desire for vengeance against whites were foreseen in the report of the Belgian parliamentary commission to which my last article in '*Africa South*' drew attention. That it should have been unleashed by the Belgians

security forces is bitterly ironic. The lesson of this for er parts of Africa is dismally plain.

ecause of the speed with which independence was ushered in, e was no time to plan in advance the reforms necessary to ure loyalty and discipline in the new State. The Congolese ers had neither the time nor the authority to suggest what sures might be taken to prevent a breakdown in law and er. They were compelled to rely on the machinery provided he Belgians; that the machinery was maintained in the same dition as under the colonial regime can only be regarded as viding a dangerously shortsighted reliance.

or the Force Publique nothing had changed on June 30th. ir rank was what it had always been: the pay, a meagrely os. od. Their most senior officer was still only a Sergeant-or. Here was fertile ground for anybody who wished to e mischief. In all probability it will be found, when all the ence has been sifted, that the revolt grew out of the dis-ent of the African non-commissioned officers and their men. tever other reasons or excuses might be given, the fact ains that the conditions for indiscipline were rank; and the who were trained to disciplined ruthlessness were twice thless once their discipline broke.

is easy at a safe distance to criticise the Belgians for panicking the experiences of the revolt. Undoubtedly their mass uation directly contributed to the crumbling of law and r, thus turning confusion into chaos and thereby further ngering security. I for one doubt that I would have be-d much differently from the ordinary Belgian in Thysville tanleyville once security had gone, which would make it critical of me to judge their actions.

e rapid disintegration of security undoubtedly caught the an Government off-guard. In their most pessimistic ents, they had not imagined that all they had so patiently ed could have crumbled away so swiftly. Whatever the s and the wrongs, they were faced with the fact that tens of lands of Belgians were in danger. It would have been ising if any Government had remained passive in such a ion. Little did they foresee what the ultimate results d be once they decided to commit Belgian troops to the o.

hat must have looked to Brussels as a purely prophylactic a appeared to the Congolese as military aggression. The

fault lies in the loss of confidence and in the festering suspicion which had come to mark relations between the Congolese leaders and the Belgians.

The secession movement in Katanga, contrived by M. Tshombe and connived at by the more truculent of the *colons*, was the culminating folly in a situation over which the Belgians had lost control.

M. Lumumba, never the most patient or trusting of men, was faced with a crisis which would have tried the most experienced and shrewdest of statesmen. His physical presence was demanded at the same time in a dozen different places over an area as large as Western Europe. His movements were conditioned by the willingness of the Belgians to fly him from one part of the country to the other. On all sides he faced obstruction, insults and indiscipline.

His first task was to reason with, and to conciliate the Force Publique; at the same time he had to deal with a revolt in his precariously based coalition Government and to quell an insurrection in Katanga. He could see his insecurely based authority slipping through his fingers and the strength of the Republic draining away at its birth.

If he behaved erratically at times, is it to be wondered at? Whatever criticisms might be levelled against him (and he cannot be exculpated for his failure to appreciate the force of the federalists' arguments and their capacity to assert themselves), it remains incontestable that he was the only Congo leader capable at that moment of arresting the drift to disaster. The loyalty shown to him in those difficult weeks by his rival for power, M. Kasavubu, is a tribute to both men.

Given M. Lumumba's complete loss of confidence in the Belgians and reciprocal loss of confidence by the Belgians in M. Lumumba, the situation called for outside intervention. Who was to supply it?

In his weary exasperation, M. Lumumba called on the Russians: there at least was a force that would have none of the Westerners' reluctance to expel the Belgians which had become the top priority fixed in M. Lumumba's mind. But if he was driven to desperation, M. Lumumba's anxious African friends could see things more clearly. The African bloc of independent States knew precisely what was required; their Secretariat at the United Nations was ready to offer a solution; through the mediation of Dr. Nkrumah's emissaries in the Congo quiet

eement was won so that M. Hammarskjöld, responding to appeal to summon the Security Council, had in his pocket ecipe to ensure that the Congo would not be engulfed by the d War. Neither Russia nor America and Britain could refuse withold their assent to the unanimous proposals entrusted to Hammarskjöld by the African States. It gave him complete stery in the diplomatic negotiations that preceded the first urity Council meeting, and again when he had to summon second time.

Here for the first time Pan-Africanism operated as a major ce in the international field. Its undivided strength com-led an unaccustomed unity in the Security Council. East West had perforce to accept the prescriptions of Africa.

At this moment, the Congo story is still a long way from its ; what chapters still lie ahead cannot even be guessed at. if there is any comfort to be gained from an otherwise nfortless chapter, it derives largely from the role of the United ions, and particularly from the manner in which it was anized into purposeful action by the African States.

don,
ust 1960.

The Lost Dream by Peter de Francia

RETURN TO THE CONGO

FRANK BARBER

Correspondent on African Affairs for the 'News Chronicle'.

July 1st the Congo was still substantially a Belgian territory. army was officered by Belgians. Belgians occupied all key tions in the administration. The huge industrial and com- cial monopolies were directed and staffed by Belgians. The golese relied on Belgium for their lawyers, doctors and ialists in a score of fields. The proclamation of independence une 30th had done little more than give the Congo a Head ate and a Prime Minister whose names were scarcely known de the big towns.

week later the Belgians were in headlong flight. The masters, givers and teachers were vilified and humbled. Their collapse swift and total. Nothing remained but street names in ish and French.

ced with such a staggering debâcle, we might be excused for ng an explanation at once simple and all-embracing. Did Belgians themselves plan it in order to prove to the Congolese were unfit to manage their own affairs? Was it the Com- sts, intent on penetrating black Africa? Could it have been ce Lumumba, seeking to revenge himself on the Belgians, stage-managed the mutiny of the Force Publique?

is only necessary to set down such propositions in order to gnise their inadequacy. There is no simple explanation for happened in the Congo. My purpose is to describe what ened as I saw it, and from the telling it will perhaps become why it happened thus and not otherwise.

eturned to the Congo towards the end of May, after an ce of three years. The Belgians had changed. Three years hey had been confident, even smug, about their Congo; was no political freedom for the African, no thought of ing him to be a doctor, lawyer or administrator; for as far as one could see, he would be a sub-citizen in the Belgians' ri-La. Now, however, he was about to become the master, he Belgians were frightened and behaving contemptibly. Belgian immigration officer at Elisabethville airport kept us g while he got rid of his Congo francs and bought Rhodesian s. "It's my money and I'll do as I like with it," he answered I suggested that his conduct scarcely befitted a government .

It was the same in Leopoldville later: civil servants and private citizens alike could hardly wait to be introduced before begging you for dollars and sterling with which to evade the currency regulations.

There were other little things too. The hostess at a small dinner party, apologising because we were having to share spoons, explained: "I've sent the silver back to Belgium." As often as not, the wives and children went back with the silver, while the men remained, equipping themselves with guns.

They did not trust the Congolese, and they said so. Those people, they said, would take their money, their jobs and their homes.

Whether or not they had good reason to mistrust the Congolese, it is certain that by their actions the Belgians helped to create the very situation they professed to fear. The Congolese servant who saw the silver being packed for Belgium, the airport clerk who watched the daily departure of European wives and children, and the politician who heard of the white men's purchase of arms could hardly be blamed for jumping to the conclusion that someone was preparing for a fight; and there must have been many a Congolese who speculated on the advantages of striking the first blow.

It was at this point, when the Belgians and the Congolese were eyeing each other with mutual mistrust and fear, that Mr. Walter Ganshof van der Meersch arrived in Leopoldville early in June.

He brought with him the reputation of a strong man, largely derived from his successful prosecution of Belgians who had collaborated with the Nazis during the war. There seems little doubt that the Belgian Government, dismayed by the crumbling of Belgian authority and the spreading disloyalty of its citizens in the Congo, had sought a man of unassailable reputation who would win the confidence of Africans and Europeans alike. Mr. Ganshof van der Meersch, however, was so unsure in his grasp of Congo affairs that when I interviewed him all his replies to my questions were supplied by a secretary.

Still, he was the strong man who, as Belgium's Resident Minister, on June 14th took up the task of helping the Congolese to find a Prime Minister. His sole visible achievement was to deepen Congolese suspicions of Belgian motives.

He sent for Patrice Lumumba as leader of the largest party in Parliament, and he gave him until 6.30 p.m. on Friday, June 17th to find out if he could form a government. But two hours before the deadline expired, he sent for Lumumba, withdrew the mi

e and revealed that he had already invited Joseph Kasavubu, der of the *Abako* tribal party, to form a government instead. Van der Meersch offered no adequate explanation for this usque rejection of Lumumba. Lumumba himself was convinced t he had been sent for in the first place solely in order to mis- d the public into believing that he had been given a chance and led, that the Belgians had never wanted him to become Prime nister.

Whatever the motive, the manoeuvre failed. Kasavubu was liged to confess to van der Meersch that he did not have a rliamentary majority, and Lumumba had to be sent for again. This episode, if it did nothing else, certainly increased mumba's dislike of the Belgians, but not until the morning of he 30th were we permitted to glimpse the depths of his bitter- s and resentment. Independence day, instead of becoming a of reconciliation, widened the gulf between the Belgians and Congolese. Lumumba answered King Baudouin's praise of pold II with a denunciation of Belgium's colonial record. It s only with difficulty that the King was persuaded to remain for rest of the day's ceremonies.

Thus the Congo was launched into independence in an atmos- ere of suspicion, confusion and recrimination. And scarcely Lumumba installed himself in the official villa on the banks of Congo river when Leopoldville was torn by a series of tribal shes.

The Force Publique handled these with its usual competence: ned soldiers descended on the battling Africans, clubbing and king them before carting them off to the nearest police post. h a state of affairs was not abnormal in the city, and even vided the Belgians with a certain reassurance. After all, they said often enough that the Congolese were brutal savages vented from slaughtering one another only by the loyal, gian-officered Force Publique.

The Force Publique—that was all the Belgians had left now. there were signs that even that was not sacred. On Sunday, 3rd, a Belgian officer who had ordered the arrest of a dozen icans for rioting in the suburb of Ngiri Ngiri suddenly found nself confronted by the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Christopher enye, who professed to believe that the Belgians were delib- tely allowing the Africans to batter one another to pieces. twenty minutes he argued furiously with the Belgian, while soldiers stood around smoking cigarettes and listening.

Even so, all was well. General Emile Janssens, commander of the Force Publique, said so. Laughing and joking, he appeared in full dress, rows of medals on his chest, at the American Embassy's Fourth of July cocktail party. "The Force Publique? It is my creation. It is absolutely loyal. I have made my dispositions. Disorders will be firmly suppressed."

Twenty-four hours later the soldiers of the Leopold II barracks in Leopoldville were in revolt. There had been murmurings of discontent during the day, and in the evening the soldiers met to discuss their grievances. Belgian officers ordered them to disperse and, when they refused, attacked them with tear gas.

June 6th—Before dawn the Belgian officers at Leopold II had been disarmed, and troops at Thysville, the Force's main arsenal 100 miles down the Congo river, had joined the mutiny and arrested their officers. These officers, with their wives and children, numbered one hundred and were held as hostages. A 28-year-old African sergeant announced: "I am a soldier and I like to see discipline, but there has been too much discrimination between Europeans and Africans."

In Leopoldville, groups of soldiers, with their uniforms unbuttoned and swinging their swordbelts, roamed the streets attacking Europeans and overturning cars. They invaded the parliament building, demanding the dismissal of General Janssens. They complained that the Belgians had told them independence was for civilians and that the soldiers would continue as before with white officers.



radually other grievances came to light. They protested at g given extra parades for independence. They objected to salaries M.P.s had voted themselves—some £3,000 a year expenses. They believed Lumumba was going to offer gians positions in the Ministry of Defence. Some reported ours that Lumumba intended to invite the Russians to take the country. True or false, no rumour was too wild to be eved by the soldiers. But in the end all these were consumed neir devouring hatred of their Flemish masters.

he Flemings, Catholic, stubbornly devoted to their Dutch ect, jealous of the sophistication of their French-speaking ntrymen, had over the years secured a position of ascendency elgium. That ascendency was reflected in the Congo, where nings occupied the most important positions in the Force ique and the civil service and where they showed themselves neral as boorish, grasping and unimaginative. It was to them the saying was attributed: "Knowledge of the whip is the nning of wisdom—for the black man." And it was against Flemish that the Congolese soldiers let loose the full fury eir resentments. On this first day of the mutiny, roaming s of soldiers appeared in the village of Inkisi and, hunting h the Flemish families, beat up the men and raped the wives.

ne 7th—During the night Leopoldville police joined the neers and expelled their white officers. From a score of s in the Lower Congo came reports of attacks by soldiers on ed farmhouses. Before the day was out the Belgians had doned any hope of recovering control and were thinking only scuing their womenfolk. A convoy of 20 motor cars accom-d by a Congolese Minister of the Leopoldville provincial nment set off for Thysville. A train also left Leopoldville hysville.

this stage, Lumumba and his colleagues still seemed to think prising could be checked. Lumumba promoted every soldier e force immediately and met all the other demands of the neers for the expulsion of Belgian officers. But the mutiny hued.

e at night the blacked-out train returned from Thysville. stood on the darkened platform watching the women, en, babies in cots, and nuns emerging from the carriages. n a few minutes everybody had heard the story of the rape lisi. Men began to shout and laugh hysterically. A govern-official with me wept. "What have they done to our

Congo!'' he sobbed. ''Those apes!'' A few minutes later I noticed him checking his revolver.

More refugees from the Thysville area arrived in the motor convoy soon after midnight, and this started fresh rumours of violence and rape. Hundreds of Belgians gathered in the main square of Leopoldville outside the Belgian embassy. They shouted for Belgian paratroopers to be brought in. More people arrived in cars.

Suddenly two white officers of the Force Publique appeared, shouting: ''The blacks have seized the armoury and they're marching on the town.''

Panic swept the crowd. Men shouted, ''To arms!'' Women clung to their husbands screaming. Drivers crashed and bumped their cars as they tried to get away. More and more people appeared, drawn by the noise and the headlights. At two o'clock the rush for the ferry began: shopkeepers, government officials, engineers, doctors, wives, typists, hotel chambermaids—all had but one thought and that was to get to the ferry which would take them across the Congo river to the safety of Brazzaville.

The soldiers appeared. They stopped every car, they searched every European, they invaded the hotels and turned us into the street, and everywhere they went they demanded: ''Where is your gun?'' The Belgians, who had for so long talked of standing and fighting, meekly handed over their guns or fled to the ferry. Through the night the ferryboats went back and forth across the Congo, and in Brazzaville French gendarmes searched the refugees, so that when dawn came the beach was heaped with pistols, revolvers and sporting rifles.

June 8th—The mutiny was now rolling irresistibly across the whole country, and everywhere the pattern of behaviour was the same. The troops turned on their officers, and took as their special victims the Flemish. Then the city workers, the labourers and the clerks, joined in demanding the dismissal of their Belgian managers.

Everywhere the Europeans were in flight. Grey-faced Flemish priests climbed out of helicopters at Leopoldville airport and told how they have been tied and beaten. A few nuns and wives went to the airport medical officers and asked for injections against venereal disease. Nobody denied the atrocities. Lumumba himself said that those responsible would be punished. The argument was to come later—about the numbers. I can make no estimate. I spoke to only six women who said they had been

aulted. The medical officers at the airport said that, of the ns of thousands who passed through as refugees, some two ndred and fifty asked for injections against V.D.

June 9th—By the week-end it seemed certain that the Lumumba vernment was tottering towards its collapse. When Lumumba ed to address the troops at Leopold II barracks he was booed d chased away. He never once appeared in public, as his reign Minister, Justin Bomboko, did often enough to persuade mobs to disperse. Persistently, Bomboko turned up and cued groups of Europeans seized by the mutineers. But there s no organised authority. Army and police had disintegrated, civil servants had fled and government offices were deserted. taxes were collected and nobody worked. Lumumba was eping in a different house each night.

July 10th—Ganshof van der Meersch reappeared from Brussels. brought with him an ultimatum; but was never allowed to de- r it, for Lumumba refused to see him. Nevertheless, it was clear t the Belgians had decided to intervene with their soldiers.

As the planeloads of refugees arrived from the Congo and the ries of brutality were told and retold and embellished, public nion in Belgium became irresistible. But when the Belgians t in their soldiers, they provided Lumumba with the classic lation which unites a country. The sight of Belgian soldiers the streets of Leopoldville was something every Congolese ld understand. The Belgians had come to take away the pendence they had so recently granted. That day, and for y days afterwards, you could not find a Congolese who had a d to say against Lumumba.

The Belgians who had never wanted Lumumba as the head of Congo government, had at last succeeded in turning him into tional leader.

Already, of course, we are being carefully taught the lessons of Congo and being warned against granting independence too has- to other African territories. No doubt the Congo can teach us y lessons. But surely the most important of them all is that for years the Belgians held the Congo by force, never even know- —since they permitted no freedom of expression until it was oo late—just how great the hatred was that they had earned. would seem that the Belgians were guilty not of granting dom too soon, but of withholding it for too long; of giving when they were forced to give, and then giving without rosity or grace.

AFRICANISATION

R. M. KAWAWA

President of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour

The term Africanisation is already an established part of African political vocabulary. In Tanganyika—where many people of Asian and some of European origin have chosen permanently to live—the use of this term has caused occasional concern, especially because those who use it are actively engaged in the struggle for political, social and economic justice, and these are predominantly members of the black race, the indigenous population of Africa. Until recently, of course, the other races living in Africa have—with a few individual exceptions—always identified themselves with their countries of origin, and, to my knowledge, have never wished to be called or considered African. The word "African" has always been identified with the socially and economically backward, the politically unrepresented black people. In all industries and public services wages and conditions of employment were—and still are—divided into three classes, starting at the very bottom of the scale with the African and climbing through the Asian rungs to the European at the top. Indeed, terms such as "African Nurse", "African Assistant Medical Officers", and "African Field Assistant" are in common usage.

Hardly any Europeans and Asians living in Africa have identified themselves completely with the exploited blacks. The Europeans have settled in great numbers almost invariably where their own metropolitan powers have ruled: the Belgians in the Congo, the Portuguese in Angola and Moçambique, the English in East, Central and parts of West Africa. The colonial powers have always given greater protection and supplied more assistance for development to people of their own racial origin than to those they were colonizing; it is therefore hardly surprising that the Europeans have enjoyed greater social and economic advancement than the indigenous people amongst whom they settled. The Asians on the whole have kept silent and interested themselves mainly in trade. Some leading Asians, however, have in the past—some of them still do—come out openly on the side of the colonial power. Fortunately, a change is coming over multiracial Africa in the track of the continental awakening. The ten-

African has now acquired a much wider meaning. It extends beyond the indigenous black population to all those who have chosen Africa as their home and, even more importantly, have identified themselves with the struggle for political, social and economic emancipation that is surging across the whole of Africa. The name "African" is no longer as degrading to European and Asian as it was before this struggle began, for the African today is speedily regaining his lost dignity. The African has proved to the world that there is no such thing as an inferior man or an inferior race, and that he is as capable of learning and creating as men in any of the other continents. An Asian or a European living in Africa today may be proud to call himself an African; but this is surely not enough. The mere fact of living in Africa and acknowledging it as home cannot convince the black people that such Asians and Europeans who have chosen to do so are their fellow Africans. Talk by itself is meaningless, it is what is done that means so much more.

The demand for Africanisation is made by the black people and means a replacement by them of those of different origin. Despite the wider meaning that the term African has acquired today, the blacks are still at the bottom of every ladder and identify themselves completely and practically with the struggle for change. To ask the indigenous Africans to forget the agony of their past is to ask them to ignore the lesson that their experience has taught them. Asians and Europeans are crying in Tanganyika today for non-racial parties, but just how practical is this? Those non-racial political parties which have been formed in Tanganyika have never succeeded, for they never aimed at emancipating the African, but only at deluding him into satisfaction with the lowest rung. It is the experience of the present that will constitute African reaction in the future; and the place that the Asian and the European will build for themselves in Africa will be governed by the degree of sacrifice they are prepared to make for the cause of a life in joint advancement and dedication with and amongst the Africans. Theirs must be the initiative, for theirs are the means with which to help the others. The social and economic backwardness of the blacks is not only their challenge, but a challenge to the white and to the brown. There can be no peace and no security where there are some who suffer for their labour and some who enjoy. In Tanganyika the African leaders have advocated racial co-operation in the past and will continue to do so. In the trade union movement, we have adopted a non-

racial policy and trade unions are open to workers of all races. It is particularly unfortunate that those Asians and Europeans who cry repeatedly for racial harmony have not seized the opportunity so offered them, in a field which provides such practical examples of inter-racial living. On the contrary Asians and Europeans have often acted as strike breakers during African strikes.

It is on the plane of social and economic activities that the true spirit of African fellowship will be discovered. In Tanganyika the right atmosphere already exists for effecting such a fellowship. Politically the races are advancing towards the objectives without which there can be no final peace, no proper harmony. If the people are to be persuaded to build up a non-racial society, in which man will neither climb nor fall by the colour of his skin, an opportunity must be seized at once practically to show them this. Africanisation is a racial demand only because advancement has been and still is a racial prerogative.

JANHEINZ JAHN

Muntu

the outlines of Neo-African culture

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NIGERIA AND TOMORROW'S AFRICA

AKIN MABOGUNJE

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TWEEN 1860 and the end of the century, various European wers carved out the African continent into spheres of influence thin which they gradually came to achieve not only commercial premacy but also political hegemony. In short, the late nine-nth-century scramble for Africa imprinted on the continent a tch-potch pattern of political groupings such as existed in rope. Out of these groupings have emerged the new States of rica, each of them reflecting in diverse ways characteristics of colonising power. Today, less than a hundred years after the ramble, international excitement has again shifted to Africa. erywhere the cry is for independence or self-government; and thin merely five years of 1955, no fewer than 12 States have come independent or self-governing.

This rapid increase in the number of newly-independent untries has had the effect of dividing Africa into two political cs. To the north and west (except for Algeria) are countries ed by their indigenous inhabitants. Here the Europeans form a hority, insignificant both in terms of number and political portance. To the south and east are countries where the Euro-ns, although still a minority, exercise important political wer out of all proportion to their numbers and where the ican majority is more than ever before conscious of the itical rights denied it.

t is into these evolving African conditions that Nigeria is to thrust on October 1st as the single most populous independent ican State. With its population of almost 40 millions—out of tal of some 230 millions for the whole of Africa—Nigeria's mier position on the continent is almost assured. Yet its claim leadership is unlikely to go uncontested, and it is daily be-ning more patent that sheer size of population will not by itself fer a leader's rôle on the country. If Nigeria intends to me a guiding place in Africa, it has to take its stand forcefully the new and sometimes indeterminate political concepts ent throughout the continent today.

II

The first of these concepts is that of Pan-Africanism, dating from just before the First World War when the American Negro, Dr. William DuBois, began to expound it as a political philosophy. Its real impact, however, only began to be felt after the Accra Conference of independent African States in 1958. As a political philosophy, Pan-Africanism does not lend itself to clear-cut definition. The late George Padmore analysed its essential elements as national self-determination for African States, individual liberty and democratic socialism. Judging from the pronouncements of its more recent exponents, two main ideas seem to lie behind Pan-Africanism. The first is that Africa belongs to the Africans. In this context, an African is either a member of a race as far as is known indigenous to the continent, or a member of a migrant race whose movement into Africa took place more than eight centuries ago. Thus, whilst the Arabs of North and East Africa who arrived between the seventh and twelfth centuries are regarded as Africans, the Europeans of South, East and Central Africa who moved in since the fifteenth century are not. The second idea follows from the first—that all non-Africans on the continent must either leave or be prepared to accept an inferior political position, corresponding to their numbers, in the country of their domicile.

The proponents of Pan-Africanism see the next decade as crucial, since it must witness the extension of their ideas into those areas of the continent where the European minority still wields enormous power. They realise that it will be a decade of struggles, of crisis after crisis, even of violence. Any independent African State that does not merely profess Pan-Africanism, but intends to lead others in making it a reality, must be prepared for such eventualities. Ghana, which is in the vanguard of the movement at the moment, is giving both the psychological inspiration and concrete, if modest, material aid to further the cause. It is sponsoring the growth of a Pan-African Trade Union Movement as an effective weapon for realising these ideals. Nigeria, if it is to enjoy any leadership, must be able to do more than this. It must be able to inspire Pan-Africanism with new and constructive ideas that have a good chance of early realisation.

A Nigeria prepared to assume such a rôle will have to look at the rest of the world through the spectacles of Pan-Africanism. Any non-African country which shows genuine sympathy for the cause of Pan-Africanism will thus have extended to it the right

hand of fellowship. For Nigeria to view its international political elations in this way, however, would cut across the existing vorld division into two power blocs, since countries which are ikely to show genuine sympathy and understanding of the African ituation will be found on both sides of the iron curtain. This is ound, therefore, to lead Nigeria into the camp of the positively eutral countries, such as India. In spite of this logic, one cannot gnore the persistent statements of various political leaders in the ountry that they profoundly prize their association with the Western powers. How these declarations can be reconciled with an-Africanism will doubtless depend on the attitude of the Western powers to the grave human problems in Southern Africa. f they show an eagerness to help resolve the present injustice ndured by the Africans in these areas, they might find in Nigeria willingness to pursue a foreign policy which, though neutral, ill leans heavily towards the West.

An almost parallel movement to Pan-Africanism with which ligeria will be involved is that of Negritude. This movement nvolves principally people of Negro origin and for a long time emained on the purely literary level. The exponents of Negri- ude are to be found not only within Africa itself but also in the mericas and the Caribbean and wherever there are people of Negro stock. The movement has given rise to a literature both in rench and in English which seeks to give to the rest of the world n African interpretation of existence. Leading names in the novement, such as Aimé Cesaire, Leopold Senghor and Alioune Diop, belong to the French-speaking West Indies and West frica. A few Nigerian poets, writers and playwrights, such as ennis Osadebay, are mentioned; but their writings are included nore as typical of the general movement than as giving any pecial lead in this realm of ideas.

Out of these two concepts—Pan-Africanism and Negritude— as emerged the desire to project the African personality to the est of the world. At the bottom of this desire is the dim feeling hat the African, in re-discovering his lost dignity, has something pecial to teach or tell the rest of the world. Those who share his feeling are trying to give it shape and communicate it, whether the field of international diplomacy or in matters of culture nd religion. At present, what is more evident is a straining to roject something, and something that is still rather elusive. hana, for instance, is trying to remodel Western democracy to it what she claims to be the African condition; and only time

can show whether what is achieved affects the very substance of democracy or merely its trappings. There is as yet no indication of any Nigerian interpretations of the African personality, and the many statements on the subject by Nigerians are distinguished only by their extreme vagueness.

III

A much more immediate way in which Nigeria's position might affect the shape of tomorrow's Africa is its stand on the much-discussed union of West African States. Two schools of thought have developed in the last few years, one led by Ghana and the other by Liberia. The Ghanaian school emphasizes that for West Africa to carry much weight in the comity of nations a political union of all its component States is essential. As a profession of this conviction, the Ghanaian Government inserted a clause into the new Republican Constitution of the country providing for the submission of the country's sovereign rights to such a union whenever formed; and, as an earnest of its determination, it entered into a form of union with the Republic of Guinea when that State became independent in 1958. More recently, Lumumba has indicated a desire to see the new Republic of the Congo associated with this union.

The Liberian school of thought believes such a political union to be undesirable and bound inevitably to give rise to unnecessary problems and struggles for leadership. At any rate, such a union looks unattainable to Liberia short of military action by a West African State powerful enough to subdue all the others. Instead, therefore, she proposes a customs union of West Africa States, with increased co-operation among them in various specified fields of human endeavour.

Nigeria has nowhere yet declared which of these two schools it supports. From the enthusiasm shown during the visit of the Liberian President, one might be tempted to believe that it leans strongly towards the Liberian point of view. Yet one must not discount the presence in the country of a strong body of opinion which believes that the future of the African continent lies in the political and military might of a United States of West Africa. Nor is this belief of recent birth; it goes back to those inter-war years when students from all parts of British West Africa met in Britain or the United States to consider the future of their countries together.

Tomorrow's Africa, then, must be seen as a continent needing oth political and cultural leadership. Because of the general w level of economic prosperity and technical skill everywhere, ere is not likely to be any considerable economic leadership r some time to come, except where economic aid is used to rther political ambitions. At this juncture, therefore, we may k what particular advantages Nigeria possesses for continental adership.

A major advantage, of course, is Nigeria's population. A nation at can speak with the voice of 40 million people is one that ust command a hearing. But for this potential strength to be anslated into practical politics requires the emergence of a tional leader, and one who must possess particular attributes. ithin the country he must provide in his person the rallying int for all that is progressive in the national aspirations. On the ternational plane, he must be a leader possessed of enough agination to appreciate the vital rôle of Nigeria in shaping the ture of Africa. Above all, he must have the unflinching courage pursue the path which the appreciation of this duty dictates in e face of opposition from the fairly powerful conservative ement in the country.

Such a leader is still far from coming onto the stage. Up to w, the essentially regional slant of Nigeria's three main political rties has provided obstacles; while the nature of the present deral Government has hardly been conducive to the emergence such a personality. This Government, a coalition between the nservative Northern Peoples' Congress (N.P.C.) and the more ogressive National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons .C.N.C.) is—like all coalitions—a government of compromise, which the more extreme policies of both parties tend to be rown overboard.

IV

The absence of a forceful and imaginative Federal Government s accordingly left the thinking about Nigeria's rôle in Africa gely in the hands of private organisations made up of intellec- als, professionals, labour leaders and various youth bodies. e lack of co-ordination among these different groups, however, s blunted the impact that they would assuredly otherwise have ve had. Nonetheless, it must be counted to their credit that ring the Sharpeville crisis in South Africa they succeeded in luencing the Federal Government towards the strongest state-

ments of hostility to the actions of the South African Government.

V

In spite of all this, there are three ways in which Nigeria might substantially influence the shape of the new Africa. The first springs from the very weakness of the country at present—its federal system of government. The emergence of really powerful and nation-wide political parties, with nationally known and acclaimed leaders, may not be as far in the future as the gloomy suggest. And in a continent whose peoples belong to thousands of different tribes, an enforced unitary system of government might give rise to more problems than it solves. It has been asserted by many political observers that if the Belgian Congo had opted for a federal rather than a centralised system of government, some of its grave political problems still awaiting solution might not have arisen in the first place. At any rate, if the constitutional development of Nigeria can be seen as evolutionary and if the country can make a success of federalism which, by its very nature, seems to weaken the chances of any dictator's emerging, the country may yet become a real bulwark of democracy in a continent many fear may crumble one day into small dictatorships.

The second form Nigerian influence may take is over the issue of West African Union. As mentioned earlier, the present leaders of the country seem to side with the Liberian school of thought, choosing co-operation among West African States rather than a political union. Some of the leaders are, however, prepared to accept that such co-operation may be the first step on a ladder leading ultimately to political union. After independence, Nigeria will have to decide on the scope and strength of this co-operation. If all that is envisaged is co-operation on the old lines, institutions such as the West African Airways, West African Currency Board, West African Institute of Cocoa Research and various other semi-governmental organizations, the result will be hardly noticeable. For greater effect, Nigeria must conceive of co-operation on a much more extensive and high-powered plane. There are two fields especially in which the effect of such a new conception of co-operation can be made decisive.

The first is the economic field. Most of the exponents of inter-State co-operation talk in terms of a customs union and the removal of artificial political barriers to the free movement of

ople from one part of West Africa to another. Nigeria can one step further and promote the concept of West Africa as a gle economic region. Nigeria's coal, for instance, which is at esent finding only a small domestic market, can be diverted to pply the needs of those parts of French West Africa which now port their coal from Europe. The total effect of such a move uld be to create a common market of some 80 million people produce from all parts of West Africa. To realise such an bition, Nigeria must spear-head a movement for a unified and proved system of transportation—not only between the interior d the coast, but also from one part of West Africa to another. must also encourage the free movement of capital and labour r the whole of West Africa.

The second field in which the country can provide a lead is litary. For if history can provide any guide, it is that a militarily ong country commands more respect from the rest of the rld than one which is weak, while military strength is known be sufficient deterrent to any aggressor. Nigeria should there- e champion a move towards a West African defensive alliance lich would guarantee the integrity of the whole sub-continent inst enemy attack. This idea would prove fruitful in another se. Since for some years to come, West African countries must pend for military armaments upon outside sources, the presence a unified military control should simplify the purchase and dling of equipment.

And this brings us to the final way in which Nigeria may uence the shape of tomorrow's Africa. So far, Nigeria's itive contributions to the cause of Pan-Africanism have been ngre in the extreme. Yet this need not always be so. Nigeria, ecially if it can realise those economic and military ends in st Africa previously outlined, can promote the declaration of nething like a Monroe Doctrine, opposing any foreign inter- tion in the political affairs of the African continent. From a tion of strength, it could regard as an infringement of her reignty any violation of the integrity of any African State. till lacking, however, would be some solution to race nny in South and Central Africa; and this task, fraught as it is h enormous difficulties, would have to be faced not only h courage but with great imagination. The three and a half ion or so Europeans who have made their homes in this hern half of the continent cannot be expected to pack their gage and depart. And yet, conditions in these places are such

that the present rule by race of the many by the few, cannot be allowed to continue.

The greatest test for Nigerian statesmen, in fact for all African statesmen during the next few years, will be the improvement of human relations in South and Central Africa without the dangers of economic and political chaos. The white minority who are still in power are, of course, the people from whom a change must be compelled. The economic pressure now being exerted on the South African Government must accordingly be seen as a means rather than as an end in itself. The objective must remain not the expulsion of the European from Africa, but the establishment of non-racial communities where white-dominated ones at present exist—societies where the rule of law will be guaranteed irrespective of race, and liberty and equality no longer made conditional on colour.

Nigeria's vital rôle in bringing this about will lie in its interpretation of Pan-Africanism. If it can help to expand the scope of this concept to embrace all those living in Africa irrespective of race, colour or creed, it will make an invaluable contribution to world peace and to the shape and destiny of tomorrow's Africa.

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HISTORY IN AFRICA

BASIL DAVIDSON

AFRICANS have no history." This familiar assertion has always ed as a justification for denouncing Africans as savages—or as ar to savages as makes no difference.

It must therefore be a vital part of the African awakening to over the memory and the fact of African history. That is why first conference of independent African States, held at Accra 1958, did good service to the cause of emanicipation when it lared that: "We shall encourage and strengthen studies of ican culture and history and geography in the institutions of rning of the African States . . ."

What are the independent countries—more numerous now n in 1958—doing to make good this pledge? The answer is t they are doing something, but not much. Not enough.

There is plenty of reason to excuse this. To begin with, they e had very little time to elaborate and realise programmes of earch in the fields of history and archaeology. Such programmes uire long preparation, skilled workers, sacks of money. All se desiderata have been necessarily lacking in independent ica. Even if the Government of the Republic of the Sudan, for mple, had felt able to devote a considerable slice of its slender burces to the saving and excavation of the great sites of ancient h and Nubia—sites now threatened with imminent inundation he projected high dam at Assuan—it could have achieved only ihe of the work. The best equipped of States and the wealthiest Governments would need long years to recover the complex wledge of the past that these sand-buried palaces and cities oubtedly conceal.

nd aside from time and money, independent Africa needs olars and workers who are trained in the necessary disciplines—here again the lack of these cannot possibly be made good er quickly or easily. It must also be a serious question whether ly-independent States ought to encourage their all-too-rare graduate students to concentrate on historical studies which, ever important for the ultimate growth of African culture, ot in the nature of things yield rapid results.

et it would be wrong to imagine that nothing is being done. na, for example, has lately provided funds for a long-term ramme of historical research into the origins and culture of

the Akan peoples who compose so large a part of her population. This programme will be a valuable companion project to the historical studies now being pursued by Nigerian scholars under the sponsorship of the Federal and Western Regional Government of Nigeria. One of the best African history books of recent years has come from the pen of a Nigerian historian; and it must be an encouragement to all historians that Dike, its author, should now preside over the fortunes of Ibadan University College. This—like the presence there of Biobaku, another Nigerian historian—is a guarantee that continued interest in Nigerian history will not fail.

In the same way one may note with pleasure that the Sudanese Government, though unable of its own resources to recover the grandeur of Meroe, has facilitated the work of foreign expeditions; and one of these—that of Hintze of the Humboldt University of Berlin—is already deep into Meroitic discovery. In East Africa there is new scope for the study of *African* history at the University College of Makerere in Uganda; and the British Treasury's agreement to provide a substantial annual grant towards the foundation and expansion of a new East African Institute of History and Archaeology is another good sign of the times. Steady results are also coming to hand in several of the French-speaking countries of Africa. Even in strife-torn Rhodesia—Southern and Northern—archaeologists like Clark and Summers and Robinson have found means to throw much new light, these last few years, on the true beginnings and nature of the great stone-building cultures of the southern African Iron Age. Lately too, the Nuffield Foundation has provided grants for the staff of the Rhodes-Livingstone Museum to conduct valuable research into Northern Rhodesian Iron Age sites; and Chaplin and Fagan are now embarked on work of great importance in this field.

All this—and here I have offered only a few stray examples—makes a valid contribution to Africa's rediscovery of itself. The importance of history is very much in the air of nationalist Africa today. Only a few weeks ago an African from Moçambique, briefly visiting London, went out of his way in conversation to emphasize the importance which, quite rightly, he felt should attach to a proper archaeological survey of Moçambique—a country, one may add, that is practically blank on the archaeological map but is certainly rich in Iron Age sites and ruins. And one could surely double this observation in any African land where the wind of freedom blows.

This new interest in Africa is happily paralleled by a new erest in Europe. At least half-a-dozen important studies in e-European African history are now going through the press Britain and France. History books for the general reader have gun to appear in London and Paris; and, so far as one can lge, they are being widely read. Much credit for this develop-nt must go to the School of Oriental and African Studies of ndon University for its two memorable conferences on African tory and archaeology, one in 1953 and the other in 1957. At least one important lesson now clearly emerges. It is that study of African culture in the past cannot sensibly or help-ly be limited to separate and unco-ordinated research within new national frontiers. Many of these frontiers are merely the eritance of arbitrary colonial divisions; and some of them, at st, are bound to disappear in the near future. One or two tably between Senegal and ex-French Sudan, and between tish and Italian Somalia) have already disappeared. The study African history is manifestly the study of a great diversity of ieties—but it is also, and no less, the study of an underlying essential unity between many of these cultures. No scholar longer expects, for example, to be able to explain the walls Zimbabwe by merely Rhodesian data: for the origins and erning motives of the men who built these walls, research v looks increasingly beyond Rhodesia—to Angola, to the ngo, even to Nigeria. And one could apply the same lesson to er African cultures which have achieved greatness in the past. One may well ask if the time may not have come when inde-dent Africa should go a step beyond its pledge of 1958—and some practical confirmation, in the field of historical studies, his fact of unity-in-diversity. If London University can hold nsely rewarding conferences that range far and wide across ca for their themes and discussions, may it not be right for can Universities to begin to do the same? Is the moment ly premature for the foundation of a co-ordinating centre, in ca, for historical and archaeological research? Would not sort of co-ordinating central institution be a strong and use-ncentive for young graduates to choose careers in history and aeology? As things stand today, there is a desperate shortage frican graduates who are qualified to collect African tradition, rite the story of their own countries, re-interpret the findings he past, and build for the future a picture of their Continent is true, dignified, and complete.

REBELLION AGAINST RACIALISM

HENRY LEE MOON

Director of Public Relations, National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People.

It is significant that the revival on the American campus of extra-mural activity challenging the *status quo* should stem from Southern Negro students. The concern for off-campus problems had never been as keen among American students as among those in Europe, Asia and Latin America, and such as existed had atrophied during the era of McCarthyism. Complacency ruled the American campus. Security became the chief concern of students.

This apparent indifference to vital political and civic problems came to an abrupt end on February 1st when four students of the all-Negro North Carolina Agricultural and Technical College at Greensboro, in defiance of long-established custom, sat down at a lunch counter in Woolworth's variety store and asked for service. They sat for an hour, until the stored closed, and still were not served.

Woolworth's, like other stores in the region, solicits and welcomes Negro trade unsegregated at every counter except where food is served and obeisance duly paid to the Southern taboo against Negroes and whites eating together. In Southern cities generally, it is impossible for a Negro shopping downtown or on any business that takes him out of the Negro ghetto to sit down for a snack or a meal or even a glass of water at a lunch counter or in a restaurant patronized by white persons. In some places he may be served standing up but not sitting down. There are seldom eating places in the heart of the city open to Negroes. Accordingly, they must go thirsty and remain hungry until they return to the restricted Negro area.

For the most part there are no laws in the South or elsewhere requiring the exclusion of Negroes from public eating places. It is merely a practice embedded in custom. Such laws as exist are of questionable constitutional validity. On the other hand there are no laws in the South, such as have been enacted in 20 Northern and Western states, forbidding racial discrimination in places of public accommodation.

The present revolt, started in Greensboro, spread rapidly to other cities in North Carolina and to other states until, in one form or another, it encompassed every state in the U.S. where the pattern of racial discrimination in public facilities prevailed.

ithin a month there were "sit-ins" and other demonstrations inst discrimination at lunch counters, public libraries, art leries, and election polls in a score of cities. Negro college and h school students, sometimes aided by young white collegians l Negro adults, conducted the non-violent demonstrations inst racism.

By the end of April, protest demonstrations at lunch counters, the beach or in public institutions had been conducted in 58 es across the South, with repeat performances in many of them. ncipally, the demonstrations were directed at such chain iety stores as F. W. Woolworth, S. S. Kresge, S. H. Kress and T. Grant. Local stores and state and regional chains were also ject to the "sit-ins", as were the lunch rooms of such public ldings as courthouses and state capitols.

The non-violent passive resistance demonstrations were met in riety of ways by the store managers, the police and the public. most places, the lunch counters were closed once the Negro dents occupied the seats. In some instances the stores were red and closed. This procedure was followed particularly re there had been false alarms of hidden bombs or where te hoodlums precipitated or threatened violence. The Negro dents and the few white allies who joined them in the demon- tions were subjected to abuse and even attacks by teenage and lt white hooligans. The demonstrators never retaliated, while ce arrested no more than a handful of the hoodlums.

More than 1,300 demonstrating students, however, including ore or more of young white men and women, have been sted and fined a total of $103,400. A few of these have lutely refused bail and payment of their fines, preferring to e their sentences as an expression of their determination to tinue the struggle. Not only have they faced the abuse of ate citizens, but also that of the police. Tear gas, fire-hose, police dogs have been used in efforts to break up the demon- ions.

most instances bail money has been raised and lawyers pro- d by local citizens or units of the National Association for Advancement of Coloured People or directly by the NAACP l Defence and Educational Fund. Charges against the students ed from disorderly conduct and trespass to a conspiracy to ruct trade (Nashville, Tenn.). The state legislatures of rgia, Mississippi, Arkansas and Virginia hastily enacted new pass measures, making it a misdemeanour for anyone to refuse

to leave an establishment when ordered out by the owner or manager. Similar laws already existed in some of the other states.

The legal right of the students to stage "sit-in" demonstrations has not been firmly established. Charges of trespass against 43 Negro students for demonstrating on company-owned sidewalks in a Raleigh (North Carolina) case were dismissed on April 22nd on the basis of a United States Supreme Court decision which held that the owner abrogated absolute control over such property once he opened it to public use. Out of the pending cases will come, almost certainly, a test of whether an establishment, having invited a customer in for general purchases, can legally charge trespass when the customer seeks a service denied him solely on account of his race. The 350-year-old case of the six carpenters in an English suit is cited in defence of the students against trespass charges. The store owners and law enforcement officers are depending upon a recent federal district court ruling in a Baltimore case that "a restaurant has the right to select its clientèle and make the selection on the basis of colour if it so desires."

The students, however, are not so much concerned with legal as with moral rights. Their objective encompasses much more than the right to sit down at a lunch counter for a sandwich and a cup of coffee. Their real goal is the establishment of respect for the dignity of the Negro as a person, entitled to all the rights accorded his fellow human beings. This goal, they fully realize, is unattainable within the framework of segregation. At the heart of the movement is discontent with the whole *status quo*. The students, belying the claims of many Southern white politicians and editorialists that Negroes are satisfied with their position in Southern society, reject not only the philosophy of segregation, but the practice as well. They are refusing to co-operate any longer with a system they consider undemocratic and unChristian, cruel and degrading.

Theirs is a revolt against a rigid caste system which relegates Negroes to an inferior position, permitting escape neither to the individual on a merit basis nor to the masses on any basis at all. Segregation is the instrument through which the system has been maintained. Indeed, the maintenance of the system, and not separation of the races, is the primary purpose of compulsory segregation. Within the framework of caste, Southern whites and Negroes have been by tradition intimately associated with one

nother. The Southern white woman who entrusts her children o the care of a Negro nurse commonly rebels at the idea of her hildren going to school with the children of the very black urse who so closely and for so long looked after them.

The "sit-in" demonstrations dramatize the students' rejection f this archaic system, while the demonstrators assert both their mericanism and their essential humanity. Their impatience is orn of the conviction that they have already had to wait too long or rights justly due to them. Nothing less than recognition of heir full citizenship rights will still their demands.

It is this conviction which has given to the movement the olour of a crusade. The students are prepared to pay whatever rice the victory entails—abuse, violence, expulsion, imprisonment. They are not prepared to compromise on the principle f the oneness and equality of all humankind. They scorn laws nd customs which set them apart from other human beings of hatever origin. They refrain from hate and retaliation under xtreme provocation. They affirm their dedication to the basic rinciples of political democracy and the teachings of their hristian faith.

The manner in which they have conducted their campaign, heir dependence upon non-violence, their poise and their ourage, have won for the Southern Negro student surprising pport even in the South. Students from Southern white olleges as well as white students attending predominantly Negro olleges have participated in the "sit-ins" and given moral and nancial support to the movement. Certain Southern newspapers ave indicated the moral justice of the students' position. '*The aily News*', published in Greensboro, N.C., where the present ovement began, observed that " . . . the only sensible course is o find some way to serve all those customers who want to be erved" and called for counsel "to help North Carolina dispose f this sometimes ridiculous controversy over where and how eople have lunch."

The Richmond (Va.) '*News Leader*', a strongly pro-segregation ewspaper and originator of Virginia's "massive resistance" to ublic school desegregation, commented:

"Many a Virginian must have felt a tinge of wry regret at the state of things as they are, in reading of Saturday's 'sit-downs' by Negro students in Richmond stores. Here were the colored students, in coats, white shirts, ties, and one of them was reading Goethe and one was taking notes from a biology

text. And here, on the sidewalk outside, was a gang of white boys come to heckle, a ragtail rabble, slack-jawed, black-jacketed, grinning fit to kill, and some of them, God save the mark, were waving the proud and honored flag of the Southern States in the last war (the Civil War) fought by gentlemen. Eheu! It gives one pause."

On a statewide telecast, Governor Leroy Collins of Florida indicated that the store owners had a legal right to deny service to Negroes, but questioned the morality of an establishment which solicited Negroes as customers for a variety of goods while rejecting them as lunch room guests.

"As far as I'm concerned," he said, "I don't mind saying that if a man has a department store and he invites the public generally to come into in his department store and trade, I think then it is unfair and morally wrong for him to single out one department and say he does not want or will not allow Negroes to patronize that one department."

The Governor announced the appointment of a bi-racial committee to work on the state level in order to improve race relations. He called upon communities throughout the state to set up similar local committees. His appeal won wide support within the state as well as elsewhere.

Singularly, the only national figure to berate the students has been former President Harry S. Truman who (1) announced belligerently that he would throw them out if they invaded a store he ran, (2) admonished them to "behave and be good citizens while pushing for integration", (3) accused the NAACP of "doing the wrong thing . . . losing friends instead of making them", and (4) charged that the student movement was instigated by Communists. Later he conceded that if he ran a lunch counter there would be no segregation and acknowledged that he had no evidence of Communist infiltration or instigation of the movement.

The students, the movement and the NAACP were less the victims of Mr. Truman's blunt expostulation than the Democratic Party of which the former President is the nominal head. On the basis of his record as President, Mr. Truman proved an effective campaigner in Negro districts during the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections. Present indications are that he will be a liability among coloured voters this year because of his hostility to the student movement.

Even President Eisenhower, a self-proclaimed moderate on ivil rights as on other issues, acknowledged the moral justice of ne students and gave the movement an approving nod.

In response to a reporter's question at his news conference n March 16th, the President said:

"I am deeply sympathetic with the efforts of any group to enjoy the rights of equality that they are guaranteed by the Constitution. I do not believe that violence in any form furthers that aspiration, and I deplore any violence that is exercised to prevent them—in having and enjoying those rights . . . if a person is expressing such an aspiration as this in a perfectly legal way, then I don't see any reason why he should not do it."

Such other leading political figures as Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, overnor Nelson A. Rockefeller and Senators Hubert Humphrey, ohn Kennedy and Stuart Symington are on record in support of ne students. Also supporting them are organized labour, inuding the North Carolina State Federation, various religious enominations and organizations, and many political and civic roups.

The movement shook Northern college students, mostly white, ut of the lethargy to which they had succumbed under the npact of McCarthyism. The sons and daughters of America's oper classes, students of the Ivy League colleges, as well as the iddle class students attending the state universities, municipal olleges and the less expensive denominational institutions across ne country rallied to the support of their fellow students in the eep South. They raised money to help carry on the campaign nd to provide scholarships for expelled students, circulated etitions and picketed the non-Southern outlets of the offending hains. A group of 150 students from four New England colleges cketed the White House on April 15th in protest against racial scrimination.

From the outset, the students took fierce pride in the indendence of their movement. It was something which they aimed as their own, even though many of the leaders were embers of NAACP college chapters and some of other organtions such as CORE (Congress of Racial Equality) and the Rev. r. Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conrence (SCLC). It was something spontaneous that they had arted; and they clearly intended to keep it within their conol. Nevertheless, they needed and sought the support of estabhed organizations.

The NAACP set up state and area co-ordinating committees, helping to publicize and otherwise aid the movement. The SCLC called a regional conference to assist in the co-ordination of the movement. On March 16th, Roy Wilkins, executive secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, instituted a campaign through the Association's 1,200 local units to withhold patronage from all outlets of those chains the Southern stores of which discriminated against Negroes. He also asked that picket lines be established in front of all the stores, urging consumers not to patronize them.

CORE also called for nation-wide picketing of the stores and launched a campaign to secure 2,000,000 pledges not to patronize the offending chains. Generous support was given by student groups, labour unions, the clergy, and many local organizations.

Because these stores cater primarily for low-income consumers, wholesale withholding of patronage by Negroes alone could prove an effective economic weapon. In communities where Negroes constitute 25 to 30 per cent of the total population, they may well account for 50 per cent or more of the regular patronage, as coloured citizens are disproportionately concentrated in the low-income group. A sustained campaign by Negroes, augmented by sympathetic whites, could mean the difference between profit and ruin.

The most significant success of the present campaign came in Nashville, Tennessee, where six department and variety stores quietly lifted the colour bar at their lunch counters on May 10th. Some 150 students had been harassed and arrested during "sit-in" demonstrations in April. Agreement was reached to open the counters on an integrated basis after negotiations carried on between the merchants, city officials and representatives of the students.

On April 19th, the home of Z. Alexander Looby was wrecked by a bomb. He and his wife narrowly escaped assassination. A member of the NAACP Board of Directors and one of two Negro members of the Nashville City Council, Mr. Looby was chief counsel for the students. Although the city offered a reward of $10,000 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation entered the case, no clues had been uncovered as of mid-May.

Earlier the variety stores in San Antonio, Galveston, Corpus Christi and Dallas (Texas), had lifted the racial ban. The move came in San Antonio after NAACP groups prepared to stage demonstrations. Community leaders, the clergy and business

aders settled the issue, negating the necessity for any demon-ration. Desegregation of certain lunch room facilities have also n registered in such border state cities as Baltimore, St. Louis, uisville and St. Joseph, Mo. Partial gains have been reported m Miami and from Salisbury and Winston-Salem, N.C. Else-here in the South the old pattern of lunch counter segregation s not been changed.

The "sit-in" demonstrations which have swept the South ce February 1st did not originate with the Greensboro dents. Two years ago in 1958, youth units of the NAACP in ichita, Kans., and Oklahoma City launched carefully planned monstrations at lunch counters in their respective cities. a result, a Kansas state chain abandoned its Jim Crow policy. Oklahoma City some 60 establishments which in 1958 barred groes now serve them. These demonstrations, however, did t precipitate the arrests and violence which have characterized e present movement. The following year, four members of e NAACP chapter at Washington University in St. Louis, were ested when they refused to leave an off-campus lunch room ich denied service to the three Negro students in the group. t there was no violence, nor the kind of follow-up that stemmed m the Greensboro incident.

Essentially the same conditions prevailed. Dr. King's spec-ular year-long bus protest in Montgomery had occurred in 56. The pace of school desegregation was not appreciably wer in 1960 than in 1958. Civil rights legislation was pending 1960, but a law had been enacted in 1957, the first civil rights asure passed by Congress in 82 years. The unrest which the it-ins" dramatized was as prevalent in 1958 as two years er.

Nor was there any noticeable change in the climate of opinion, ong either Southern whites or Negroes, in the 18-month riod between August 1958 and February 1960. Over the years, re had been a growing demand on the part of Negroes for the ercise of their citizenship rights; while, among younger and re enlightened white Southerners, a realization has been veloping that the old Jim Crow pattern cannot endure. Much this has been the direct result of work by the NAACP and er anti-discrimination organizations in undermining the legal ps to segregation, in expanding the Negro vote and securing enactment of civil rights, and in sharpening public awareness the basic issue of human rights.

The difference may be that in 1958 the demonstrations were initiated by high school students during the summer vacation; this year the match was struck by college students during the academic year. The Greensboro incident set practically every Negro campus in the country alight. Suddenly it became vastly more important to "sit-in" than to win the varsity letter or to be crowned "Queen" of the home-coming game. The jailed student replaced the football star as the hero of the campus. Fraternity politics and social activities dwindled into comparative insignificance.

This spontaneous maturing of the Negro college student is rooted in the grim reality of his day-to-day living—the petty, irksome indignities and humiliations. The Negro has always had to live with these. But today's students, some of them veterans of service in the desegregated armed forces, are taking a hard second look at the needless and irrational restrictions imposed upon them. They realize now, more than ever before, the impossibility of finding fulfilment in the corners left to them by segregation. They are no longer willing to crouch. They will settle for nothing less than the rights their humanity demands.

May 11th, 1960.

John O'London's

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THE GOOD PEOPLE

DAVID MILLER

HERE is very little drama in our office. It is a large, light, airy om with rows of high, wooden-framed windows along two les. It seems extraordinarily remote from all the mine dumps d headgears and haulages, the dust and noise and clamour upon hich our existence depends. We are snug and secure and thing ever happens in our tight little world. We work our w way to our pensions, and when one day we are required to e, we hope it will be quietly, in our beds.

At any rate, that's how it seems if you immerse yourself in utine and don't show much curiosity. Actually, it is strange w you can work cheek by jowl with people for months and rs, talk and argue and joke with them, and never know what es on in their backgrounds, or how old they are, or whether y are married and the number of their children.

There were three people including myself working in my ice. There was Arthur, a hefty young Afrikaner of about 20 th tremendous shoulders and a tongue that never stopped gging. He knew everything about everything, did young thur. There was not a thing in the wide world left for him to rn.

Then there was myself. I am slightly on the dismal side of 40, it thin on top, but fit as a fiddle and I aim to see the turn of the ntury. I'm a statistician, if that is of any interest to you.

And, thirdly, there was Robert, the African messenger. I uld tell you his surname, but you wouldn't be able to pro- unce it and it would make no difference to this story anyway. fact, it was of the essence of Robert's personality that even to who worked with him he was largely anonymous. He was ply Robert and to us he had no kith or kin—a being whose y context was the office.

t was—and is—most unusual to find an African occupying an ce together with Europeans. They are usually out of sight en not wanted, but we had made an exception in this case ause Robert was inclined to keep rather too well out of sight. henever we wanted him we would have to hunt for him all over building, so eventually we cleared a small corner for him hind the filing cabinet and there he sat all day where we could tch him. Our office was large. He did not intrude too much our susceptibilities.

He was a small African, not above 5 ft. 4 in. in height, with bloodshot eyes and a general air of vagueness induced by dagga smoking. His co-ordination was slack, but his duties were not arduous and he managed to perform them with adequate competence.

Arthur ragged him a bit. There were occasional spasms of horse-play between the two. I think Arthur enjoyed his physical superiority—it titillated his white vanity; it made him feel good. He regarded Robert as a rather superior domestic animal.

But on the whole Robert ignored us as much as we ignored him. He spent most of his time reading to himself and writing in a cheap exercise book. Africans are great students; of all people I have ever met, they are the most avid for learning and knowledge in any form, and even Robert in his foggy way tried to memorize long lists of words and wrote them down in a slow, copy-book hand. His time was mostly his own. I suppose there might be half-a-dozen occasions in the course of an average day when he would be called to attend the requirements of a member of our department.

Occasionally one heard stories about Robert. The caretaker always referred to him as "that no-good boy". He would pop his head into the doorway and call, "Hey, Tsotsi!" and then turn to me and ask whether he could borrow "your boy" for a few minutes. Well, a tsotsi is a very bad character who uses a knife and robs workers in bus queues on Friday nights. But though Robert was a drug addict and was, so they said, an inveterate gambler, I am certain that there was no real harm in him.

Like all petty gamblers, of course, Robert was chronically short of money. He was always borrowing shillings and half-crowns and paying them back on Friday when he got his pay packet.

So when, one afternoon about six months ago, he came and stood at my desk without saying a word, I knew what it was he was after. That was his manner, to stand silently at your elbow until you were ready to take note of his presence.

"Well, and what do you want now?" I said presently.

"Please baas," he said, sniffing, "can the baas lend for me 9/- till Friday, please?"

"Oh, 9/-," I said, looking him over. "That's more than you usually ask for, isn't it?"

He laughed automatically. "Yes please, I know, my baas."

What the hell do you want it for this time?'' I asked.

I must pay it by the shop,'' he explained, his red eyes re-ding me dolefully.

Well, can't it wait till Friday?''

No baas, the boy in the shop say if I haven't got it tonight ill me.''

Oh, he kill you, eh! Well, no doubt you deserve it.'' I felt y pocket but had no change. All the money I had on me was note, and I couldn't give him that even if I wanted to, which ln't. A fiver was beyond Robert's ability to repay. ''There are, my boy,'' I said. ''You can see for yourself, you're out of .''

rthur was not in that afternoon, and in any case our bright g man was usually at the borrowing end himself.

obert said, ''Hê, sorry baas!'' and shook his head and shuffled o his corner. I suppose if I had really put myself out, I could found some change somewhere or borrowed a few shillings is behalf from someone else. But, well, what did it matter? shopkeeper would kick up a row and refuse him credit in re and that was all there would be to it.

You lose too much money gambling with the Chinaman,'' I wagging my finger at him.

e laughed and said, ''Hai, Ikona baas, I don't do like that!'' nd that was the last I ever saw of him because that same night as murdered. We didn't know this until a few days later. we knew at the time was that he did not turn up to work the day or the next. Arthur fussed and fretted about it. He ted a meat pie for his tea and now he would have to go out buy it himself. ''These bloody coons,'' he swore petulantly, u can never trust the blighters.''

it on the third morning our caretaker, a big man with a ning bass voice, came and told us the news. He was murd-, he explained to us, in a particularly revolting way. He stabbed not with a clean, sharp instrument, but with a sort eaver. The cleaver was thrust into his ribs and pulled out with a sizeable lump of flesh.

he boss came into the office and heard the news. He had a of papers in his hand and he held them up in the air as gh he were a still from a movie.

How did you hear about it,'' we asked. We all stood together punch, wondering.

"His wife came in. She's still in my office—what shall I tell her to do?"

"Has she got a family?"

"Three kids, I think—I'm not sure."

So, because the Africans in our firm haven't got a pension scheme, the boss put his hand in his pocket and drew out a pound and we had a general whip round. I went round to a couple of other offices where Robert's services had been used and presently we had collected just over £12.

"Just a moment," the boss said, "I'll 'phone Bob Henderson and see what the Company is prepared to do." Bob was the Secretary. Old Bob wasn't a bad type; too near retirement to care much about anything, still. . . .

"Bob says the Company will probably be prepared to make it up to £20—tell you what, I'll put in the balance and get it back afterwards. Better get her down here," he said to the caretaker, and we waited till he returned with her.

"Yes," said the boss with a sigh, "that's how it is." He laid his papers down on the desk and put his hands in his pockets.

Unlike her husband, the wife was far from placid or vague. She scowled, and there was an aggressive droop to her underlip. She was an angry woman.

"How did it happen?" the boss asked her.

She shook her head. "I don't know, master, because I didn't see it."

"Did nobody else see it?"

She shook her head and almost smiled. "No, no. They did see it but they did not see it, because sometime if you see a thing like that, then next time you are also dead."

"I see. Have you any idea why?" The boss spoke kindly. He was not unsympathetic.

The wife shrugged her shoulders. From her ears hung a pair of rather sophisticated, tartish drop ear-rings, while about her body she clutched a Basuto blanket.

"I don't know, baas. Perhaps it was the money."

"Money?"

"Yes, baas. Another boy was telling him he must bring the money or there will be big trouble."

"How much money?"

"I don't know, baas, perhaps £1, £2—he never tell me."

A thought struck me—had the money Robert had tried to borrow from me anything to do with it? That odd amount—9/

h no, surely, not even a gangster committed murder for a nd or two? There could be lots of other explanations. he shrugged. "I don't know, baas," she repeated, "but that e time I am in the house and he is outside and I hear someone 'Robert, I will kill you!' "

Did you recognise the voice?"

he shook her head. "No, I don't know the voice, but I think ve a sample of him."

Sample?"

I think she means that she has her suspicions," I suggested, she nodded her head in agreement.

And then?"

Then the next night," she continued, "We are in the house. eight o'clock or half-past eight. One time Robert is getting up, g outside." She paused. "Master, two, three minutes later ther girl she is calling 'come here, come here quick!' I go out there is Robert on the ground—he is cold, so quick master!"

And you heard nothing this time?"

Nothing, baas."

Have you reported it to the police?"

Yes, master, they have tell the police."

And have the police done anything about it?"

ne looked away and sighed as though she found the questioning ous. "They look here and they look there, master."

And what do they say?"

ne did not answer. It was apparent they had not said much. he interview ended there. She accepted the envelope of ey in her cupped hands and made a small curtsy. She tened her blanket across her shoulders, looked around once s and left, the caretaker following her out.

nd when she left there remained behind in the office a strong osphere of her sorrow and resentment. And hatred. There a very strong sense of her hatred indeed, but what exactly as that she hated I couldn't really tell. The tsotsi and gang-? The white people? Just everything?.

had a strong impulse to follow after and tell her something. what? If I could only think what? Instead I went and sat n at my desk and fingered the small change in my pocket.

ne following week we got another messenger. He said he Robert's brother and that his father had sent him from his e in the country to work for us because we were good people ork for.



BOOK REVIEWS

AFRICAN HISTORY IN TRANSITION

The Journal of African History edited by R. A. Oliver and J. D. Fage. Vol. 1. Number 1, 1960. Published by Cambridge Univeristy Press, 30s. per annual volume of two parts.

Old Africa Rediscovered by Basil Davidson. Published by Gollancz, 1960, 25s. Published in the United States under the title ' Lost Cities of Africa ' by Atlantic Press, Little, Brown & Co., $6.50.

THE publication of the first number of the Journal of African History marks a new phase in the development of African studies; it is quite free from that 'parochialism' which has so often dogged them in the past. The Advisory Editorial Board is international, contributions are in French as well as English, and the subject is Africa as a whole and its history during all periods. Its contents illustrate very perfectly the transition that is now occurring in the technique and presentation of African historical research.

The first article on "The Niger and the Classics" represents one of the oldest traditions in African historical study; that of the English administrator or educationalist with a sound classical training. If it fails to bring conviction, it is only through the tendencies inherent in that tradition; too great reliance on the factual accuracy of that strange compilation "Ptolemy", perhaps too little interest in archaeology, certainly too little interest in Islamic sources (Idrisi is referred to as writing in 1254). Again "Patterned Walling in African Folk Building" by Mr. James Walton has both the strength and weakness of a pioneer effort: it opens new horizons, and the photographs are admirable even if the sketch map is quite inadequate. But his conclusion—"that pattern walling in Africa is an architectural device introduced by the Berbers"—is as sweeping and untenable as that of any nineteenth-century diffusionist. It is a pity that he ignores the problem of patterned walling in Ethiopia and the existence of the herring-bone and chevron patterns on such fourteenth- and

enth-century Tanganyikan sites as Songo Mnara. In "Christian Negro Slavery in Eighteenth-century North Africa", there is necdotal approach as old as Sir Lambert Playfair and very little the quite different economic structures of the Barbary States. n contrast, the article by Dr. Vansina on the oral history of Bakuba is a masterpiece by a Master of the New Techniques. re is a brilliant study by Margaret Priestley and Ivor Wilks eighteenth-century Ashanti Chronology, and this is only ren- ed possible by a new union of history and anthropology. "East ican Coin Finds and their Historical Significance" by Dr. eman-Grenville summarises the numismatic discoveries that revolutionising modern conceptions of the political and nomic history of the Coast; while Dr. Philip Curtin's survey the archives of Tropical Africa is indispensable for more lern historians. Perhaps most important of all for the future elopment of the Journal, there are nearly 40 pages of reviews formly of high standard.

The first review is that by the great Raymond Mauny on Basil idson's "Old Africa Rediscovered". He terms it both an portant" and an "excellent" work; this is true enough, but ve all it is a courageous one. For it is the first book in any guage to provide a survey of the history of Africa in the light ecent archaeological discoveries. Reading it and re-reading have found emphases with which I personally disagree; and I have been increasingly impressed by the mass of detailed arch it presupposes and by the compelling enthusiasm with ch this is presented. It covers the whole of Africa from the an to the Transvaal and from Nigeria to Tanganyika. Its tral theme is "the African metal age of the last 15 or 20 cen- es." Therefore, it fittingly begins with the Sudan, before ing to West Africa. Both sections are admirable, though sonally I am more ready to believe in Meroe as an African mingham than as an African Athens, and I am sceptical of the itions of race migrations into West Africa from the North .

The fourth chapter, "Between the Niger and the Congo", is most slender; clearly there should have been a fuller treat- nt of Ife and of that strange experiment in hybrid culture—the eenth- and seventeenth-century Christian Kingdom of Congo. s also is the point at which Mr. Davidson might have dis- ed the economic importance of the Katanga lead workings in pre-European period, for this may yet prove to be the clearest

link between west and east and south. Then, as the survey reaches towards the Indian Ocean it once again grows more detailed. The chapter on the Zimbabwes and on Mapungubwe "The Builders of the South", is as masterly as that on the "Kingdoms of the Old Sudan".

Part of the novelty in Basil Davidson's approach lies in his emphasis on the importance of social and economic factors as determinants of African Culture. It is a relief to escape from the old racial hypothesis of wandering and enlightened Hamiest. But this is a line of approach that will necessitate a far closer coordination than now exists between anthropologists and historians and a closer attention to the minutiae of barter systems.

Part of the novelty consists in his full use of the sporadic archaeological discoveries which are now being made throughout Africa. But again African archaeology will only make its full contributions to African history if it is linked with a study of those African oral traditions for which it provides the only check. In West Africa it must also be studied in relation to art forms, and everywhere in relation to the development of techniques. In Africa an archaeologist should also be an Africanist. The methods may be adapted from those used on Roman Britain; the problems are utterly remote.

Above all, the archaeologist in Africa is an explorer. In some sense every study of pre-European Africa is still an exploration. It is perhaps precisely because he has the zest to explore that Basil Davidson has achieved so outstanding and so exciting a book.

GERVASE MATHEW

Brief Authority by Charles Hooper. Published by Collins. 21s.

WHAT really went on in Zeerust during 1957-8? We heard that African women were burning their passes, about chiefs' huts burned down, about police raids, about assaults and murders . . . Some brave reporters for '*Golden City Post*' entered the area in an attempt to find out what was happening—and were assaulted, with police connivance (if not encouragement), for their pains. The Government iron curtain descended and then we had nothing to go on but rumours, atrocity stories and the usual hand-outs to the press, from the Department of Native Affairs, about agitators, "loyal chiefs" and turbulent

men. The proof that something was profoundly amiss me when scores of men, women and children of the Bafurutse be fled over the border into Bechuanaland. The official vernment Information Service at first denied that there were y such refugees; then later grudgingly admitted that there ould have been 250". One English paper in Johannesburg e the figure at 4,000; this may have been exaggerated, but rtainly in one week alone a thousand fled to the Protectorate, d at least another thousand left for other parts of the Union. Among the "agitators" alleged by the Government to have en stirring up the African people, especially the women, re two white people, the Anglican Rector of Zeerust, Fr. oper, and his wife. They were vilified in the report of the mmission of Enquiry into the "troubles", and were finally ved with a banning order which prevented Fr. Hooper from ering the "Native Reserve" even to take Holy Communion the sick, to celebrate Mass, or to visit the dying. Fr. Hooper d to be transferred from Zeerust; and two years later—1960 himself also became a refugee, escaping from the Union into aziland at the time of the State of Emergency in South Africa. Now, at long last, we have his account of the stirring and rible events that went on behind the Government's iron tain in the Zeerust area. A brief foretaste of it was given to ders of this journal in an article two years ago entitled iary of a Country Priest".† Now he gives us the full story, d it is as gripping as we had expected. We learn of the reign police terror; of the attempts by the authorities to prevent n accredited witnesses from appearing for the African men whose only crime, often, was to have been assaulted the police. Even the Hoopers themselves were at one moment eatened with an ambush—and there is a hint that this threat s itself not unknown to the police.

I have heard people dismiss Fr. Hooper as "another of these itical priests". This is quite untrue. He was a pupil of ne at the Theological College in England during the time I s Vice-Principal, so I know him well; and he has never had slightest leanings towards being of the "left-wing parson" e. And in South Africa, though he had long believed that rtheid was a non-Christian attitude, he was never drawn to h bodies as the Congress of Democrats. In Zeerust he ame involved, almost against his will, because as a priest he ld not simply stand by and see some of his own people—

† See Vol. II No. 4, July—September, 1958.

originally, some of his own Anglican women, though it soon extended to any African women, Christian or heathen alike—being wounded, tortured, hounded. What started by a simple carrying out of a certain command in the New Testament about "a cup of cold water", ended in a total involvement in the Africans' cause. Though even to the end Fr. Hooper never took sides in the sense that, for example, he advised the women to refuse to carry "passes"; indeed, he told them that they had a prima-facie duty to obey the law, and he sometimes had to rebuke them for behaving like "thugs and tsotsis" themselves.

He writes crisply, wittily and with a wonderfully accurate ear for conversation. Seldom have the wisecracks, the metaphor-laden language, the pungent proverbs of the African people been so faithfully and vividly recorded. We get to know his villagers, his Mothers' Union, his African children, his catechists, from their relaxed conversations long before the "troubles" start. And we find, not surprisingly, how much the black people know about the white—and how understanding they are of the white man's problems. "Judge these people (the whites) leniently", says one of his African friends. "They wear blinkers like mules. . . . They have been frightened inside ever since they could walk. Now you frighten them worse. . . . Their fear is a hole in the bucket of their joys. Be sad; but do not be angry."

And of course, the reaction of the South African Government to such a book as this is simple: ban it! This has been done. What else can you do to a truth that challenges you, and which you know you cannot refute, than to suppress it? But truth takes a lot of suppressing: 'twill out. And out it is, here among us. We must take it and spread it fast: sooner or later it will soak back into the land from which it has been expelled.

FR. MARTIN JARRETT-KERR, C.R.

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INITED STATES OF AMERICA: Mrs. M. Singer, 336 Summit Ave., Mount Vernon, New York

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PRINTED IN GT. BRITAIN BY PHILIP SANSOM, 11 OLD BOND ST., LONDON W.1

9200!

The last issue : 8000 copies

This issue : 9200 copies